CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1364
Appendix II/Volume III
26 September 1995

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

VOLUME III

Verbatim Records of the 1995 session

GE.96-60071

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.711
6 July 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

**Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 July 1995, at 3.30 p.m.**

President: Mr. Antonio de Icaza (Mexico)

GE.95-62604 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 711th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, let us offer a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who will be the first speaker today. We are very grateful to the Secretary-General, who, despite his extremely heavy schedule during his stay in Geneva, has found sufficient time to address this Conference. His presence today is proof of his personal interest in the problems of arms control and disarmament and the importance he attaches to our negotiating forum, especially at this crucial time when our efforts are focused on the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I am certain that I speak for all of us when I express my conviction that Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's presence today will give decisive impetus to our work.

I am also very pleased to extend a cordial welcome on behalf of us all to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency, Mr. Erik Derycke, who will also make a statement in this plenary meeting. His visit today is further proof of his country's continued and sustained interest in the work of our Conference. In addition to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, the list of speakers for today includes the representatives of the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sri Lanka, India, Japan, Nigeria and Armenia. The Chair will make a statement at the end.

I invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to make his statement.

Mr. BOUTROS-GHALI (Secretary-General of the United Nations) (translated from French): I am delighted to have an opportunity to be among you today, and thus to be able to tell you how much importance I attach to the work of your Conference. Our present commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Charter offers us all an opportunity to reaffirm that from the very beginning the United Nations set itself the goal of formulating "principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments". For a long time East-West antagonism stood in the way. Moreover, the advent of the nuclear age played a large part in disrupting the original plan. Similarly, the accession to independence by large numbers of new States and the growing globalization of international relations made disarmament talks increasingly complex, increasingly difficult. And yet, despite all kinds of problems, the Conference on Disarmament managed to become, during that difficult period, a "single multilateral negotiating forum" within the United Nations system.

I have appreciated the skill with which you concluded the Convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons in 1992. As depositary of the Treaty I can only offer strong encouragement for you today for you to promote its entry into force as soon as possible. I myself have sent personal letters to the heads of States that have not yet ratified the Convention, calling on them to accelerate ratification of this Convention.

(Mr. Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations)

We are now embarking on a new era in international relations! The cold war is over! East-West antagonism has disappeared, together with the strategic bipolarity that was its hallmark! You now have a chance to devote yourselves fully to your task, far from the ideological disputes that stood in the way for so long. You can therefore tackle disarmament issues in a more focused and realistic manner. You can conceive the disarmament of the future! Of course we are well aware that not all the problems of the past have been fully resolved. Such problems still make great demands on your attention. But to a larger extent than before you can be receptive to new proposals and new perspectives. I know that that is truly the spirit of your Conference.

Your agenda begins with the major, not to say key, question of the nuclear test ban. We know that the question still provokes much debate and much political divergence. It also poses technical challenges and problems of verification. But a nuclear test ban remains one of the world Organization's major projects. Since 1957 it has been on the agenda of the General Assembly, which since then has constantly invited all States to subscribe to it. Indeed, last year I myself had occasion to express in my Annual Report my satisfaction that the participants at this Conference had embarked on serious negotiations for a universal, multilateral and verifiable treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing. The conclusion of such a treaty by 1996 would unquestionably be a step forward for the international community. To my mind it is a must. For failure to reach agreement rapidly on nuclear testing would directly undermine the efforts recently undertaken by the international community with regard to nuclear disarmament. I therefore wish to emphasize the extreme importance of the negotiations scheduled for this session of your Conference. And I know that you will spare no effort to achieve a favourable outcome without delay. Moreover, as Secretary-General of the United Nations I wish once again to recommend formally a halt to all nuclear tests without exception! Such measures must be universal! In this connection we must pursue our dialogue so as to honour the commitment towards moderation assumed in that area. I think that is necessary today if there is to be prompt ratification of the Treaty. I am sure everyone realizes that a multilateral agreement on a nuclear test ban would be a decisive step towards freeing the world from the threat of irreversible destruction.

In the same context, I have noted with great interest this Conference's action to promote the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such a prohibition would be immensely gratifying to the international community. For it would represent undeniable progress towards our twofold objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is comforting to know that as we near the end of a century in which the use of fissile material for nuclear weapons became possible, we are now taking the necessary action to ban their use for purposes of destruction. The system of verification which the international community has undertaken to establish since the dawn of the nuclear age must extend to the transfer of materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. For such materials are bought and sold on the black market and used to stock arsenals whose compliance with storage norms, for example, is not

(Mr. Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations)

subject to verification. While I am aware that the storage of nuclear weapons is not included in the agenda of this session, I wish nevertheless to mention it since the stakes involved are now too high to be overlooked.

I also appreciate the efforts which the Conference is making in pursuance of Security Council resolution 984 of 11 April 1995 to include in this session's agenda the development of measures or effective agreements aimed at protecting non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. And I am aware of the careful attention which you are giving to the possible elaboration of an international convention between nuclear-weapon States and States seeking protection against the use of such weapons. For there is clearly a need for security guarantees pending the achievement of global nuclear disarmament. This issue has been under consideration since the 1960s, that is to say since the negotiation of the non-proliferation Treaty. I hope that it can be resolved here in a manner that will give us encouragement for the future and that, like the other issues being debated at this session, it will benefit from the recent success of the non-proliferation Treaty. Indeed, this Treaty has paved the way to a new concept of international relations! Its indefinite extension marks an important milestone in our collective search for a world of shared peace and security. The States parties unanimously adopted a declaration of principles and objectives concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In this way, the international legal barriers against nuclear proliferation have been strengthened. For this Treaty, which has succeeded in making non-proliferation a norm of international conduct, provides a political and legal framework for the commitment of all to nuclear disarmament. It calls for universal accession, and for the establishment of practical, effective and verifiable measures. As such, it should be a source of inspiration for the successful completion of the work that was started so long ago.

Another important issue to be considered during your session is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is natural that such an issue should be under consideration today, since activities in space and the number of countries capable of launching and conducting such activities are steadily increasing. In this connection, I am aware of the many problems posed by the multiple uses of outer space, especially its continued use for military purposes. I therefore consider that there is a need to promote confidence-building measures and guarantees with respect to the common use of outer space. Our aim should be the pursuit of security and transparency in space activities, to ensure that space is used solely for the benefit of mankind. This commitment must go hand in hand with examination during this session of the issue of transparency in armaments. For transparency, that is to say, openness combined with freedom of verification, is the key to all progress in the field of disarmament. In this regard, we must encourage a moderate, gradual approach to the problem. The search for concrete, universal and non-discriminatory procedures in military matters can open the way to building greater confidence among States in matters concerning armaments. This is one aspect that we must not overlook. For it contributes to the development of stable relations among States. Greater transparency in this field can certainly contribute to regional and world security by reducing the

(Mr. Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations)

risks of misunderstanding and distrust among States. But this transparency in military matters should not be limited to a public accounting of defence arsenals. It must also extend to international trade in and transfers of weapons. For I am particularly concerned at the ease with which weapons of all types can be acquired, and by the growth in the illicit arms trade. In this regard, I remain convinced that the maintenance and periodic review of the Register of Conventional Arms would contribute to this necessary effort to achieve transparency. For the only common expression of a humanity that has found greater freedom through greater peace is mutual trust.

The agenda of this session has thus set itself objectives that are both ambitious and necessary, because it also sets out a global programme of disarmament. Within the framework of the Conference, this global programme has two main aspects. The first concerns nuclear disarmament beyond the START II agreements. As we are aware, its aim is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The other deals with the area of conventional weapons by placing special emphasis on conventional arms and the need for a regional approach. Bearing in mind this twin objective, we should more than ever today place our conception of disarmament in a new framework. For we can now conceive of disarmament in more holistic terms in order to make it a genuine instrument of collective security! Disarmament should be understood within the framework of security. It is inseparable from peace. As such, it is a cardinal element of the purposes of the world Organization.

I shall follow your deliberations all the more closely, therefore, because the imperatives of disarmament are a constant presence in the diplomacy which I endeavour to practise in the service of peace. For my part, I look at disarmament as an essential factor in my efforts to promote a safer world. One of the most important instruments! It fits in naturally with our commitment to preventive diplomacy, in peace-keeping operations, for post-conflict peace-building and in the possible imposition of sanctions. I believe that concrete effective measures are needed to build peace! Disarmament as we conceive of it today should be one of the major tools that I wish to use in pursuit of security. This is why I included the topic of disarmament in my Agenda for Peace, which I submitted to the Security Council in 1992. I wished to draw particular attention to the distortions that still hindered our progress. We must continue to encourage more countries to support the cause of nuclear disarmament, as upheld in the non-proliferation Treaty. At the same time, however, we must be attentive to the rise of new regional ambitions that may give new impetus to trafficking in weapons of all sorts. At a time when we are striving to promote nuclear disarmament, the proliferation of conventional weapons is becoming an increasingly serious problem. The broadest possible approach is therefore desirable. For both conventional and nuclear weapons, each in their own way, pose a threat to collective security. In this regard I am especially concerned at the increase in the illicit transfer of arms and weapons technology. For this development may well have a considerable impact on international security. We must therefore be vigilant and strengthen the verification measures in this area.

(Mr. Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations)

In this context I have already had occasion to point out the essential role of regional measures in the promotion of disarmament. Not only general disarmament, but also what I call "micro-disarmament", to use a fashionable phrase. Initiatives in Africa, central Asia, the Middle East, but also in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean illustrate the major contribution of regional organizations to the global security effort. This highlights the need for the coordination of efforts. And the vital need to understand disarmament as a global enterprise involving regional organizations, States and the international community as a whole. I make this point in order to underline the importance of the actions that will stem from your deliberations, and in order that our approach should not be limited to declarations. For disarmament, as an instrument of collective security, must accompany measures taken by the world Organization to promote peace and economic and social development. Your concerns are thus my concerns. And I also wish to affirm here my support for the process of enlargement of the Conference and to strongly encourage the accession of new members. In this way today's geopolitical realities will increasingly be taken into account.

You have paved the way to further international cooperation by engaging your efforts and competence in the service of disarmament. And your decisions here in Geneva, in this city which has given so much to the diplomacy of peace, will have an impact on international security in the future. Your Conference provides us with an exceptional forum for multilateral negotiation. It must now become a guide in the conduct of multilateral negotiations, thought out from a new perspective, and free from the constraints of the past, from the constraints of the cold war.

Hence it was my wish to reaffirm here the commitment of the United Nations in the field of disarmament! For only a common determination and unshakable conviction can enable us to build together a universal civilization, a civilization which we will not be ashamed to bequeath to the future generations to whom we committed ourselves, 50 years ago, in the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his major statement. I shall now suspend the plenary meeting so that the Secretary-General of the Conference and myself can accompany the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The meeting was suspended at 4 p.m. and resumed at 4.05 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The meeting is resumed. I now have the honour to call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency Mr. Eric Derycke.

Mr. DERYCKE (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to say how pleased I am to see the work of this body conducted by an eminent representative of Mexico. I wish you every success in discharging your duties and assure you of my delegation's full cooperation.

(Mr. Derycke, Belgium)

Allow me also to place on record Belgium's respect for the work of His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is here with us. The international community owes a great deal to his action to promote peace and international security. My greetings also go to his Personal Representative, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, whose dedication and professionalism make a major contribution to the success of the Conference's work.

All of us here are aware of the historic importance of this annual session of the Conference. It coincides with a most eventful period for disarmament and international stability. Fifty years after the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, we have just been celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The renewal of this Treaty has happily been concluded in New York with its indefinite extension. This demonstrates that the international community can shoulder its responsibilities when it faces a fundamental challenge.

The Conference has always made a decisive contribution to resolving disarmament problems. Its principal achievement is to have negotiated the Treaty banning chemical weapons. I wish to pay tribute to the Conference for that major success. Today, this Conference's responsibilities include the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. As you know, we are involved in these negotiations, and Belgium has repeatedly advocated a ban on all nuclear explosions everywhere. It is true that progress to date within the framework of the Committee has been appreciable. But if we are to comply with the deadlines on a Nuclear Test Ban Conference, we shall have to speed up our work. Study of the draft treaty laid down at the time of the NPT has made it possible to identify as of now the principle of an international monitoring system that will necessarily evolve over time. This system would, it is generally felt, provide a reasonable level of deterrence with an acceptable cost-benefit ratio. The structure of an organization responsible for implementing the future treaty is beginning to take shape. Everyone seems to agree on a three-level structure made up of a conference of States parties, an executive council and a technical secretariat. Data collection will be carried out by an international centre, which would carry out technical analysis; the political act of characterizing any doubtful event would remain the prerogative of States parties; the services of the International Atomic Energy Agency could be used for ad hoc operations. But we have still some way to go before a treaty can be signed, since the text we are working on still has more than 1,000 pairs of square brackets. That is not all: in fact, while progress has indeed been made in all the technical preparations, a great many political decisions still have to be taken, concerning the scope of the treaty, the respective powers of States and the executive council, entry into force or the funding of the entire operation. If we wish to meet the 1996 deadline, it is high time that we found a solution to all these problems.

Another subject worthy of our attention is a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Here we are forced to note that the progress made is disappointing. The attempts made in 1994 to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty in pursuance of resolution 48/75 L

(Mr. Derycke, Belgium)

failed. The question of stockpiles has been an obstacle here that your work has not managed to remove. In 1995, after lengthy negotiations, the decision was finally taken to establish an ad hoc committee known as the cut-off committee. With the mandate in place, there remained only to appoint a chairman, and this seemed to be a pure formality. Unfortunately this proved not to be the case. I call upon everyone to make concessions here, otherwise no progress can be made. The very image of the Conference in the eyes of public opinion depends upon it. The misuse of procedural subtleties distorts the Conference on Disarmament, which cannot be reduced to nuclear disarmament alone; there are too many wars in the world, too many victims, for us to neglect conventional weapons.

Finally, allow me to mention the recent Belgian chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, whose work was followed by the adoption of Security Council resolution 984. We hail that achievement: the Conference on Disarmament's contribution was more than creditable. I am all the more surprised that the CD did not immediately re-establish the NSA Committee after re-working its terms of reference on the basis of the recent New York decisions. I can only deplore this inertia and hope that it is not deliberate.

In closing, I should like to take up the crucial theme of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. The very credibility of the negotiations is at stake. Belgium has never masked its commitment to such an expansion, because it considers the current membership an outdated hangover from the past. Unfortunately, here again the situation seems to be blocked, even though this is a crucial matter. At this stage there seems to be no other solution available than that of designating a special coordinator. He or she should have broad terms of reference, and should take into account the susceptibilities of all concerned, but should show that the CD is open to those with an interest in it and is not a closed club.

In closing, I appeal to all to help bring the Conference on Disarmament out of the difficulties it is experiencing. The rule of consensus is designed principally to strengthen decisions by showing beyond dispute that they have been accepted by all. To see in this rule only an opportunity to cast a veto is to distort its spirit. The CD's long history has shown its ability to carry out the tasks entrusted to it. The path ahead is not an easy one, of course, and we cannot expect complete success overnight. None the less I am certain of the absolute need for humanity to get rid of the means of destroying itself. This will be an inspiration for us in the future and will create in us and in our Governments the political will necessary to achieve the success that I wish for your Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium for his major statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Ramaker.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to first of all welcome you in our midst and, in the second place, to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Like others I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the manner in which, practically immediately after your arrival in - or should I say return to? - Geneva, you took upon yourself the difficult task of trying to break the deadlock in which the work in the CD, other than the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, finds itself.

I take this opportunity to warmly welcome the Secretary-General of the United Nations in this hall and express my delegation's appreciation for the statement he just made. A cordial welcome also to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, a country with which the Netherlands has, as you will be aware, particularly close relations. I would also like to take this opportunity to warmly welcome Ambassador Lafer of Brazil, Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia and Ambassador Akram of Pakistan, who recently joined us in the CD. I am looking forward to closely cooperating with them.

I am taking the floor briefly today to inform the Conference that last Friday, 30 June 1995, the Netherlands deposited its instruments of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York. The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention has generally been considered a milestone in the history of multilateral arms control and disarmament. It is the first treaty that comprehensively bans an entire existing category of weapons of mass destruction. It is characterized by one of the most strict and elaborate international verification regimes known to date.

Immediately after the ceremony in Paris, in January 1993, during which some 130 States signed the chemical weapons Convention, the ratification procedure was initiated in the Netherlands. The Netherlands Parliament, during the process of ratification, took an active interest in the Convention itself as well as in the many matters concerning the legislation necessary to implement the Convention. Parliament underlined the importance it attaches to the concept of challenge inspections, which it considers to be one of the essential instruments for ensuring compliance with the Convention and for confidence-building between States parties. Parliament also expressed its interest in ensuring the destruction of all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, as required under the Convention. For the success of the Convention it is, in the view of the Netherlands Parliament, essential that all States parties fulfil their obligations in this regard.

The Netherlands Government has always held the view that early entry into force of the Convention is of the utmost importance. The Netherlands, therefore, on the occasion of its own ratification of the Convention as the thirtieth State signatory to do so, wishes to echo the appeal just made by the Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and renews its call upon all States signatories which have not yet completed their

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

ratification procedures to ratify the Convention at the earliest possible date. It is our desire to see the Convention enter into force in the near future, hopefully before the end of this year.

As the host country to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its Preparatory Commission, the Netherlands feels a particular responsibility for the Convention. Permit me, therefore, in concluding my statement, to express the sincere hope of the Netherlands that, pending the entry into force of the Convention, all members of the OPCW Preparatory Commission will join in a constructive effort to solve the still outstanding issues in that Commission expeditiously.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Peru, Ambassador Urrutia.

Mr. URRUTIA (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me first of all to express to you the sincere pleasure of my delegation at seeing you preside over the Conference, and to tell you that you can be assured of our full cooperation and support in carrying out your tasks. I also wish to convey appreciation of the performance of your predecessors in the Chair of the Conference. Similarly, I wish to express the greetings and congratulations of my delegation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In the last few days we have had an opportunity, at various events connected with the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of our Organization, to hear valuable remarks and suggestions of great importance that I am sure will be welcomed by Member States. My delegation is convinced that the strengthening of democracy, both within States and in inter-State relations, is the ideal foundation for a new international order in which peace and development must be practical realities to the benefit of the nations and peoples of the world.

In recent months the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been the focus of attention in the international community. When the NPT review and extension Conference completed its work, we were pleased to see that the ultimate aim of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament had prevailed as the standard for inter-State relations. In a renewed feeling of trust and solidarity two major documents were adopted, on principles and objectives and on a strengthened review mechanism. To consolidate this state of affairs once and for all we now have the legal and moral obligation to implement the NPT fully. An urgent priority task that calls for resolute commitment on the part of all States parties to the treaty, in particular the nuclear Powers. Unfortunately the recent NPT extension Conference has not had the positive effect that was expected. Days after completing its work one nuclear Power carried out a nuclear test and another has just announced its intention of carrying out a series of tests in the South Pacific. My Government deeply regrets those decisions, which are a serious step backwards in the consistent efforts made by the international community to achieve the total elimination of nuclear tests and non-proliferation of such weaponry. We further consider that the resumption of such nuclear tests will cause irreparable damage to the environment. We urge these two countries to refrain

(Mr. Urrutia, Peru)

from carrying out these tests and to join the other nuclear Powers in a world moratorium while we endeavour to complete a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Peru resolutely supports the intensive efforts that we have been making in this Conference to conclude a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996. Through the Geophysical Institute of Peru, we have been taking part for many years in developing the world network of seismic records that will serve as the main verification mechanism for the treaty, and from January this year onwards we began our active participation in the third technical test organized by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSETT-3), in the shape of a beta seismic station, which is in the mountains near Lima. Similarly we have offered, and we again extend this offer, to have an alpha station in the future which would be located in the north of the country, and we have been holding consultations to that end with countries that are prepared to cooperate in its establishment. This station has been regarded as a potential station because of its location, logistics and low seismic noise level, which would be very important for monitoring seismic activity in the north-eastern part of South America, where major earthquakes have occurred in recent years.

We believe we have made major progress so far in the draft nuclear-test-ban treaty document. The progress made first and foremost as a result of the persistent and efficient work of Ambassador Marín Bosch and now the constant work being done by Ambassador Dembinski as Chairman of the Committee and Ambassadors Ramaker and Norberg in the working groups reflects the commitment entered into by States to pursue intensive negotiations aimed at the conclusion of such a treaty. However, we feel that it is important to clarify the question of the scope of application of the treaty. We consider that, in pursuance of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, States parties must assume a commitment not to carry out any sort of nuclear test and to refrain from taking part in any nuclear-weapon test explosion. Other important points of the treaty where solutions need to be sought are aspects relating to entry into force, the establishment of a single international monitoring system and the size or dimension and structure of the future organization.

I should also like to say how pleased my delegation is at the decision to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty to ban fissile material production. We think that this decision is of deep political significance, and we consider that the true effectiveness of the treaty will be related to the approach adopted to the question of future production of fissile material and existing stocks. We urge the committee to begin its work as soon as possible.

We view with great concern the fact that time is short. The first session has ended and the second one is almost over, and the Conference has not managed to establish or re-establish the other ad hoc committees - on transparency in armaments, negative security assurances, outer space, nor has it succeeded in appointing special coordinators to address the still pending issues on the agenda of this Conference. We offer you our full support, Sir,

(Mr. Urrutia, Peru)

in connection with the efforts you are making to find a rapid solution to these deadlocks, and hope that in the next and final session we will see work begin in the various committees.

My delegation attaches great importance to the work done by the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. In pursuance of the General Assembly resolutions, my country has submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in recent years the requisite information for the Register on international transfers of conventional weapons, and we have also supplied information on military expenditure. In submitting those voluntary reports Peru wishes to confirm in practical terms its resolve to address matters relating to military expenditure with maximum transparency so as to move forward in due time towards what might be regional agreements on limiting expenditure on armaments in order to devote the greatest possible volume of resources to development. In recent years Peru has reduced its military expenditure and its purchases of weapons have largely been designed to combat the violence perpetrated by terrorist groups, which is now fortunately under control, and also to deal with drug trafficking.

In Latin America and in the Caribbean we have managed to establish effectively the first densely populated zone of the world which is free of nuclear weapons, and which also enjoys adequate security guarantees set forth in a legally binding document signed by the five nuclear Powers. Still pending in the region, none the less, is the question of conventional weapons and the establishment of machinery to monitor and reduce military expenditure where it exceeds the legitimate needs of national defence. For these reasons, Peru considers that in Latin America and the Caribbean non-proliferation must be extended without delay to conventional weapons. Because of their destabilizing effects, it is essential to curb the illicit arms trade and to strengthen international machinery relating to transparency in international arms transfer operations. That is why Peru has resolutely supported the broadening of the international United Nations Register to include national stockpiles and local production of armaments, as well as universal participation in it, which we consider will consolidate trust among States.

Finally, we should like to inform you that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of my country has arranged for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, together with the annexes to it, to be sent to the Congress of the Republic for consideration and ratification as quickly as possible. We are aware of the difficulties and complexities involved in the implementation of the Convention on chemical weapons. We therefore encourage all countries to take the necessary measures to prepare in advance for its entry into force, drawing as appropriate on the important advisory services provided by the technical secretariat in The Hague.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and his words of support to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Dembinski.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland): Mr. President, let me first extend my warm congratulations on your presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time I want to express to you our great appreciation of your strenuous efforts to resolve the pending procedural and organizational issues of the CD. It is unfortunate and regrettable, indeed, that the Conference on Disarmament up till now proved unable to reach agreement on its agenda and thus has been denied the opportunity to play its envisaged role in regard to all aspects of disarmament.

I wish to take this opportunity to extend our cordial welcome to the new colleagues who have recently joined or rejoined us in the CD: Ambassador Lafer of Brazil, Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia, Ambassador Akram of Pakistan and yourself, Mr. President. I look forward to cooperating closely with you all in the discharge of our common responsibilities in this body. I also add my best wishes to Ambassador Shannon of Canada and Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, who have recently left us, as well as to Ambassador Chandra of India, who will be relinquishing his post soon.

As the second part of the CD session comes to an end, I should like to share with you some views on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It has been the only subsidiary body which, through an early consensus, could resume and continue its purpose-oriented work and devote undivided attention to matters of substance, consistent with its negotiating mandate. It is a matter of satisfaction for my delegation that the Committee has been able to put to the best of use both the time and conference facilities which in these circumstances it had at its disposal.

Taking stock of the state of CTBT negotiations to date, one involuntarily tends to ponder on accomplishments, however modest they may be, and on the outstanding issues and difficult tasks that obviously lie ahead. It is gratifying, indeed, that both working groups of the Committee put in really hard work throughout the second part of the CD session. For this we owe our sincere gratitude to the chairmen of the respective Groups, Ambassadors Norberg and Ramaker, as well as their highly competent team of Friends of the Chair, convenors and experts for their tenacity and dedication to our common goal.

These combined efforts, pursued in diverse operating modes, have paid off. We have brought a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT closer to our reach. We are well beyond the point of no return. In our view, important progress has been made in cleaning the rolling text further. While not exactly bedtime reading, it will be certainly more legible and coherent. The extent of the progress will perhaps be better seen when a revised version of the rolling text is circulated. It will be found considerably pruned of redundancies or alternative language marked by innumerable brackets.

On the other hand, as we face the summer recess, we may legitimately pose the question to which there can be no answer - is our glass half empty or half full? The draft CTBT text that we all helped to write will be still replete with brackets, indicating disputed areas either of a drafting nature or ones

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

which are conceptually controversial. Above all, it will be a rolling text in which issues critically important for the future CTBT, including scope, entry into force, withdrawal, verification and institutional issues, will have to be addressed and resolved. In the view of my delegation, the time to do so must be the next and final part of the current CD session. If the target date of autumn 1996 for the conclusion of the CTBT is to become a practical proposition - and I believe it is - it is imperative that we resume our endeavours at the end of this month and pursue them through September with renewed dedication, flexibility and a sense of purpose. This evidently will call for political judgement to be exercised and political decisions to be made in the capitals of each and every part to these negotiations. As was rightly noted in the G-21 statement last week, "the nuclear-test-ban issue is a global issue and all its aspects should be multilaterally negotiated in the CD". In these negotiations, therefore, no single issue could be resolved ahead of, or outside, the multilateral negotiating context.

We all are aware of the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" which have been agreed to at the NPT review and extension Conference. This important document set the target date for the completion of the CTBT "not later than 1996". It also urged the nuclear-weapon States, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, to "exercise utmost restraint". My delegation therefore fully understands the sentiments of delegations which have put on record their disappointment and regret over the polices of some nuclear-weapon States in regard to nuclear testing. We however also take note of the firm commitment of the President of the French Republic to sign the CTBT once it is completed by the above target date. In the view of my delegation, we should not allow the renewed nuclear testing to slow down the pace of the CTBT negotiations. On the contrary, our efforts need to accelerate in the months ahead if we are to discharge our responsibility in a timely fashion.

Gratified as we are by the determination of the CD members to see a comprehensive test-ban treaty in place by 1996, we are among those numerous members of the international community which cannot be reconciled to the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to address issues whose generic name is conventional disarmament. Genuine international security concerns are - in the view of my delegation - incompatible with the indifference to the fact that over the last five decades millions perished in regional conflicts that have been fought with conventional arms.

It will not be easily understood by important segments of the international community that a body legitimately proud of its status as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum should abdicate its responsibility in this regard over procedural divergences. We therefore trust that after the "cooling-off" period of the summer recess, the Conference on Disarmament will be able to take an agreed decision in regard to conventional arms. Such a decision would demonstrate that we are not totally insensitive to the grim realities of the day and that we take due heed of the urgent appeals in that regard launched by inter alia some of the world's moral authorities, including our distinguished guest speaker of today, His Excellency the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, it is indeed a pleasure for me to welcome you to Geneva and to the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that with your well-recognized diplomatic skills and experience in multilateral negotiations, you will be able to discharge the responsibilities of the presidency successfully. My delegation's cooperation will always be available to you in full measure. As we welcome you, we must say how much we miss your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, who has left an indelible impression on the CD. Let me also welcome to the Conference on Disarmament our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Brazil, Indonesia and Pakistan. My delegation also appreciates the direction of the work of the Conference so ably and amiably given by the immediate past President of the Conference, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya. My delegation is sad to notice the absence of Ambassador Shannon of Canada and Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, who have left our company recently. Very soon, Ambassador Satish Chandra of India will depart our company. They all have contributed substantially to the work of the Conference and my delegation notes with appreciation the contribution they have made to the CD.

We are encouraged by the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with us today. My delegation is confident that his presence, personal commitment to disarmament and the encouraging words he spoke will no doubt help the Conference on Disarmament discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it with added vigour.

The majority of delegations who spoke in the CD during the past few weeks expressed their joy and satisfaction at the successful conclusion of the review and extension Conference of the NPT in New York on 12 May. Despite its inability to come up with a final declaration, the Conference recognized that there was a majority of parties in favour of the indefinite extension of the NPT, thus casting aside permanently the apprehensions entertained by some States party to the Treaty that some day, somehow, its longevity will be threatened and the world community will be forced to deal with the serious problem of nuclear anarchy. It is important to recall that not only were the States party to the Treaty able to extend the Treaty indefinitely, but also, they were able to reach that historic decision without resorting to a vote. I will be stating the obvious if I were to say that such a vote would not have been without repercussions.

The decision on the indefinite extension was not the only important act of the Conference. It also succeeded in deciding on a set of "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Another decision was taken on a set of steps for "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty". Finally, a call was made to all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the NPT as soon as possible. This was the harvest we reaped in New York collectively, and collectively we shall enjoy the fruits of our labour in the years to come.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

One thing is clear. This is not the time for us to sit on our laurels and congratulate ourselves for the good work done. My delegation sees the NPT Conference as an important milestone we have passed in our long and arduous journey in pursuit of nuclear disarmament leading to eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. If we fail to tread this path carefully and tirelessly, we would run the risk of sliding down the precipice only to end up where we started, or face a worse situation. We would do well to avoid such an eventuality at all costs: we should build upon our achievements until we reach our final goal.

We should not forget the fact that the decision we reached in New York was not to replace nuclear anarchy with nuclear apartheid. Nuclear weapons cannot be the preserve or the birthright of a handful of countries who split the atom first and closed the door on others. By indefinitely extending the NPT, we neither authorize the nuclear-weapon States to be the sole possessors of nuclear weapons indefinitely, nor did we concede that they have a right to use such weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States have kept their part of the bargain. In keeping with the solemn commitment given in New York, the nuclear-weapon States should pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and chart the course for total elimination of this category of weapons of mass destruction. The Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body responsible for disarmament matters. Therefore, it is the responsibility of this Conference to commence work in that direction. The CD should establish an Ad Hoc Committee with an appropriate mandate in 1996 to commence negotiations on this important agenda item.

We should not ignore the fact that although on paper there are five nuclear-weapon States, in reality there are several others who have crossed the threshold and become undeclared nuclear-weapon States. Worse still, there are many others for whom crossing the threshold is only a matter of political decision. Given the advanced technical capabilities many countries have today, and the resources at their disposal, it is a small miracle that these countries have so far not opted to acquire nuclear weapons. The 25-year post-NPT period saw the emergence of several countries who developed a nuclear-weapon capability. Should we fail to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament and reach a decision on the elimination of nuclear weapons soon, that will be an invitation for others to follow suit.

It is for these reasons that States party to the NPT, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should commit themselves fully to and implement the set of "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". If these principles and objectives are ignored or go unimplemented, it may drive nuclear-capable countries to invoke article X (1) of the Treaty on the ground that their supreme interests have been jeopardized. None of us would dare say that such a scenario belongs in the realm of fantasy. We should avoid the temptation of being selective in putting into practice these principles and objectives.

Although it is hardly two months since the conclusion of the NPT Conference, I must confess to the fact that the post-NPT period has been less

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

than comforting for most of us. Hardly 48 hours had passed following the conclusion of the NPT Conference, when the vibrations of yet another nuclear test brought the reality home; that we have not yet seen the end of the beast which confronted humanity half a century ago. Soon thereafter, another nuclear-weapon State decided to break its three-year-old moratorium, and announced that it would conduct a series of tests. Confronted with escalating international public opinion, these nuclear-weapon States have been at great pains explaining their positions. As my delegation had occasion to express the position of my Government last week in this forum on these developments, I would refrain, at this point, from dwelling on this matter any further.

Apart from the undertaking given in article VI of the NPT "to pursue negotiations in good faith" for nuclear disarmament etc., there is nothing to prevent the nuclear-weapon States from continuing nuclear tests. To that extent, they can argue that they are operating within the Treaty. These nuclear-weapon States maintain that they must continue testing to ensure the safety and reliability of their nuclear weapons, prior to becoming parties to, or entry into force of the CTBT. Understandably, these positions hardly convince those who support the moratorium on testing. While some nuclear-weapon States seem to be losing no time to ensure the safety and reliability of their stockpiles, the non-nuclear-weapon States are traumatized by these events as such testing threatens their safety and security.

We should not permit a situation in which the number of nuclear warheads in the possession of nuclear-weapon States is significantly reduced, and at the same time allow qualitative improvement to the remaining warheads, so as to greatly enhance their range and/or destructive power. This would be inevitable, if we permit testing of any type of nuclear weapons under the future test-ban treaty regime.

In this context, it is rather disturbing to hear the views expressed during our negotiations that provision should be made in the CTBT for tests to assure the safety and reliability of existing nuclear stockpiles. While we are busy discussing the scope of the treaty, we hear murmurs behind our backs that some scientists favour continued testing of small nuclear devices. This is certainly a disturbing turn of events. At this crucial juncture of negotiations, members of the CD should weigh the consequences of promoting such ideas or insisting on such tests. We should bear in mind that the CD is negotiating for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and not yet another PTBT or a threshold test-ban Treaty. There should be no doubt in our minds that our collective endeavour here in the CD is to finalize a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty should ban all nuclear testing, in all environments and for all time. It should attract universal adherence and contain provisions to cover the vast strides being made in science and technology that could help conceal nuclear testing, both large and small. Nothing should undermine the comprehensive nature of the test-ban treaty.

While the scope of the CTBT is being discussed, we should not entertain proposals that would undermine the comprehensive nature of the treaty. It is for this reason that Sri Lanka disagrees with the arguments advanced in favour of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). Since mankind's violent exposure to

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

nuclear energy half a century ago and hundreds of tests later, no place has been accorded to PNEs. This situation led to the disbanning of the PNE unit in the IAEA secretariat. The physical process involved in the explosion of nuclear devices, whether peaceful or otherwise, is the same. Given the indistinguishability between peaceful and other nuclear tests and their adverse impact on the environment and many other reasons, Sri Lanka is not convinced that PNEs will have a role to play in the post-CTBT environment. We should, therefore, not make provisions for PNEs in the CTBT.

As you are aware, this is the final meeting of the second session of the CD for 1995. Although a major part of the time allocated to the CD for this year has already been spent, I wonder whether we can justifiably be proud of the manner in which we have utilized the time and resources allocated to us. Needless to say that we are in this predicament today due to the situation created by us at the beginning of the first session. In this regard, we are most grateful to you, Mr. President, for the commendable efforts taken by you to get the CD out of the situation by proposing a package intended to create several ad hoc committees and other working arrangements, in addition to the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, the only Committee we have been able to establish this year. We extend to you our best wishes and continued cooperation to get the CD on track once again.

It is important that we should not follow the same path next year and find ourselves in the same predicament once again. One way to avoid a repetition is to reach an understanding prior to the conclusion of our work this year on the agenda and the work programme for 1996. If we succeed, we would be better placed to undertake the responsibilities entrusted to us; that is, to engage earnestly in negotiations on crucial issues which we have to finalize here in the Conference on Disarmament. To do otherwise will be an exercise in futility. We should think over this matter carefully and encourage the next President of the CD to conduct consultations and reach agreement before the end of our final session for 1995.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and his words of support for the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chandra.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): I regard it as a unique privilege to be making my statement in the Conference on Disarmament in the same plenary meeting at which we have heard the very thought-provoking address of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. His words are a reminder to the Conference of the immense amount of work that lies ahead of us in making the world a safer place.

When I first came to the Conference in January 1993, I found it in the throes of post-partum blues after the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention (CWC). The question then on everyone's mind at the time was: will there be life in the CD after the CWC? I had felt then, as expressed in my first plenary statement, that there was indeed life after CWC. The intensive negotiations in the CD on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban

(Mr. Chandra, India)

treaty (CTBT) and the animated debate on a variety of issues have over the last two years amply borne this out. In that session of the CD, I had also strongly urged the establishment of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 2 on cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. At that time, India was alone in that attempt. I am glad to note that there is now gathering support for this idea and that the Group of 21 is taking the lead in this endeavour. The idea has found support most recently in the statement made in this form last week by the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, His Excellency Mr. Andrei V. Kozyrev. The two notions that I have mentioned here are indeed interconnected. There should be life in the CD at least as long as nuclear disarmament has not been fully achieved. The work of this august body shall remain unfulfilled until the world has been rid of this awesome menace.

There is today increasing recognition of the final goal of elimination of nuclear weapons which we need to take advantage of by translating it into reality. What is required is international recognition of the irrelevance of nuclear weapons and the attendant doctrine of deterrence. This recognition will make possible the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a multilaterally negotiated treaty. This, and not the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), affords the only sure route to the achievement of genuine non-proliferation. We believe that the NPT is a discriminatory treaty which divides the world into nuclear "haves" and "have-nots" and provides legitimacy to the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States (NWS). It is for all these reasons that we do not subscribe to the NPT.

We understand that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be achieved overnight. India had presented a phased, systematic and practical programme for this purpose within a time-bound framework in its action plan at SSOD-III in 1988. This action plan provides for a stage-by-stage achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world which lays down obligations for all States without discrimination.

The first phase of the action plan as proposed by us envisaged inter alia the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT). We hope, therefore, that his elusive treaty can be successfully finalized at an early date. As I had stated in the plenary last week in my capacity as the G-21 coordinator on the nuclear test ban (NTB), and in my earlier statements, the CTBT should entail obligations for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States, in all environments and for all time. We are in favour of a comprehensive nuclear test ban without any loopholes for low-yield tests. There should be no exceptions for carrying out nuclear tests under any circumstances. It is with this purpose that we have put forward our proposal on the article on scope in our working paper No. 244.

As for the entire CTBT, the verification system for the CTBT should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory and should guarantee equal access to all States. The verification regime should be based on the international monitoring system (IMS) as well as the consultation and clarification process and, in rare cases, on-site inspections to be carried out only by the organization. The international monitoring system should be based on the four generally accepted technologies, notably seismic,

(Mr. Chandra, India)

radionuclide, hydrc-acoustic and infrasound, and should have the capacity to assess, analyse and distribute data. The judgement in any case of non-compliance should be the responsibility of the organization. I would like to take this opportunity of expressing our deep appreciation of the efforts put in by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, Ambassador Dembinski, as well as the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassador Norberg and Ambassador Ramaker, and all the Friends of the Chair and convenors.

As a co-sponsor of United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L, we welcome the setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate the convention to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We hope that negotiations will begin as soon as possible on this convention. In keeping with the parameters of United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L and the agreed mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, the convention should focus entirely on future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We believe that the production of fissile material for civilian purposes will remain permissible and that this convention will not be applicable with retrospective effect.

On the issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons of negative security assurances (NSAs), India has consistently stated that the only credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is for the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to provide all security assurances to NNWS in a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding form which is without any qualification or discrimination. United Nations Security Council resolution 984 does not adequately meet the above criteria as I had commented even at the draft stage in the CD plenary on 6 April earlier this year. We, therefore, hope that an ad hoc committee can be established at the earliest to address this extremely important issue. India has also for some time been proposing a convention for the prohibition of the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons and has regularly been tabling a resolution in this regard in the United Nations General Assembly which has been adopted with considerable support. We believe that the time has come to build consensus on this idea with a view to the early conclusion of such a convention.

Transparency in armaments in all its aspects can be an important building block in our efforts to achieve international peace and security. Of particular importance would be transparency relating to weapons of mass destruction and to the transfer as well as use of high technology for weapons purposes. Such transparency would assist in breaking the stranglehold of the discriminatory ad hoc control regimes. However, transparency should be seen for what it is - a method for building confidence - and should not become a substitute for genuine disarmament efforts.

The question of prevention of an arms race in outer space requires urgent and detailed consideration. The frontiers of space promise immense benefits for development in diverse fields for the whole of mankind, and it is

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essential to strive towards an international order which ensures that space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. India hopes that an ad hoc committee will be set up to address the outstanding issues in this regard.

All of us are also involved in disarmament efforts outside this forum. India, as co-sponsor of United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/75 D on a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines, is ready to participate meaningfully in the review Conference of the 1980 inhumane weapons Convention to be held in September 1995, for which we have prepared through participation in the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts. India had also actively participated in the Experts Group meeting or VEREX and the Special Conference on the biological weapons Convention (BWC). We believe that the biological weapons Convention should be appropriately strengthened.

Finally, I have had the privilege of interacting with all my colleagues past and present for the almost three years of my stint here not only in the CD but also in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. As I come to the end of my stay in Geneva, I would like to salute them for their professionalism, dedication and commitment to the cause of disarmament and their personal friendship and warmth. I treasure these associations and look forward to renewing them wherever possible in the future. I would also like to avail of this opportunity to express my gratitude to the Secretary-General of the Conference, His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Deputy Secretary-General Mr. Bensmail and their efficient secretariat, as well as to the interpreters who work so untiringly for long hours. I would, finally, also like to thank, in particular, Ambassadors Dembinski and Goonetilleke for the kind words they addressed to me. I fully reciprocate their warm sentiments.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement. Today Ambassador Chandra has made his last statement to the plenary of the Conference. I am certain that all the members of the Conference would like me to extend to him our gratitude for the devotion and the talent with which he has served his country in this forum. Ambassador Chandra distinguished himself by his term of office as President of the Conference on Disarmament in the second part of the 1994 session. With his imminent departure from Geneva, the Conference loses one of its most devoted representatives. We shall miss his negotiating skills. On behalf of the Conference, I wish Ambassador Chandra all the best in his future activities.

I now call on the representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): At the outset, I wish to express my heartfelt respect to His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is here with us today at this Conference. The S.G. has been making tremendous efforts to ensure international peace and security, with his strong personal awareness of the importance of the issues of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons. Japan, which spares no

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

effort to cooperate with the Secretary-General, earnestly hopes that substantial progress will be made in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation that are assuming more complicated aspects in the post-cold-war era.

The most important task of the Conference on Disarmament today is to expedite negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In this connection, let me stress once again that Japan regards as extremely regrettable the nuclear test conducted by China and the French decision to resume nuclear testing. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to respect the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted at the NPT review and extension Conference, and to refrain from conducting any nuclear test, so as not to betray the confidence placed in them by non-nuclear States.

During this second session of the Conference, strenuous efforts have been made among delegations to grapple with many important issues in CTBT negotiations. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that many of the major issues have remained unsolved. My delegation regrets to say that the progress of the negotiations in this session is not quite satisfactory. The completion of the negotiations on a CTBT in 1996 is one of the most important undertakings of the international community specified in the "Principles and objectives". Nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States bear the responsibility to achieve this goal. In fact, there is not much time left for us to conclude the negotiations and draw up the final text of the treaty, if States are to sign the treaty in 1996, hopefully, in autumn of that year at the latest.

After the cold war came to an end, significant steps were taken in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation such as the signing of START II and the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. It is extremely regrettable if we are unable to produce sufficient results on a CTBT in this year, which marks the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. I feel it might help expedite the pace of negotiations if the negotiating States come to share the same understanding on a certain interim timetable for reaching agreement on a number of major issues so as to conclude negotiations in good time.

It is essential in the next session of the CD that each State makes its utmost efforts to overcome the difference of positions on fundamental issues such as verification, organization and scope. My delegation intends to make its stands more specific, in the hope of making contributions to facilitate negotiations. Today being the last plenary meeting of the second session, I wish to touch upon some focal points briefly.

First, the issue of verification is an essential element of a CTBT. The reliability of a CTBT largely depends on the credibility of its verification system. Establishing a technically reliable and efficient verification mechanism is not an easy task. We should accelerate the treaty negotiations in order to meet the target date in view of the many points still remaining undefined. Considerable efforts have already been made by delegations on this

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

issue. But I would like to re-emphasize the importance of the participating governments and decision makers in the negotiations to take leadership and indicate a definite direction, so that detailed work may be accelerated on the clear understanding of the common ground.

Concerning an international monitoring system, a number of issues should be further examined to establish it and make it operational. In particular, it is necessary to decide immediately the required capability as well as its funding.

As to on-site inspection, a decision has to be made whether OSI should be conducted in one phase or two phases. Such issues as the decision-making system for OSI implementation and its funding also need to be resolved.

Secondly, the CTBT organization should be established under the principle that it is small in size, efficient and cost-effective as much as possible, keeping the financial burden of each State party to a minimum and avoiding too much bureaucratization. Bearing in mind that it is a practical and appropriate option to pursue an arrangement by which we can avoid duplication with the activities of existing international organizations and make the best use of the expertise already possessed by those institutions, particularly IAEA, Japan is now considering Vienna favourably as a possible seat for the organization.

Moreover, the scope of this treaty is a central issue in the negotiation. For a conclusion of negotiations in 1996, utmost efforts to reach an agreement should be made during the third session of the CD. Japan, too, is determined to make its best possible contribution to this end.

A CTBT should embody a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban, not a threshold test ban. Any nuclear weapon test explosion or other nuclear explosion should be banned. It is not acceptable to allow any nuclear explosion, even if it is limited to peaceful purposes only, as is alleged by one State. In this connection, it is worthy to note that the United Kingdom and France showed their flexibility in the last session of the Conference in relation to so-called exceptional nuclear tests.

I should like to stress that the time has already come for each State to show a strong political will to solve all remaining major issues, so that we may fulfil the task entrusted to the CD by the international community, namely the conclusion of a CTBT in 1996. Japan earnestly hopes that the day will come soon when a CTBT is agreed universally and when we live in a world where mankind shall never experience another nuclear explosion. To this end, Japan will continue its endeavours together with all States concerned.

Mr. FASEHUN (Nigeria): Mr. President, we welcome you warmly and all our distinguished colleagues who joined the CD during the second session of 1995. We are also pleased at the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and for his encouraging words on disarmament. On behalf of the Nigerian delegation, I bid farewell to Ambassador Satish Chandra of India, an

(Mr. Fasehun, Nigeria)

amiable, effective and pleasant diplomat whose smile and wisdom will be missed in the course of the CD. A global nomad diplomat and I hope our paths will cross again. I wish Ambassador Chandra well in his new assignment.

Mr. President, I join other delegations that have congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency. Since you took on the burdens of this Conference, you have demonstrated great stamina and creativity to ensure that the wide difference existing amongst delegations on the agenda is narrowed. It would have been our wish that your great and much admired efforts are handsomely rewarded. That this is not so is regrettable. We salute your predecessors also, especially Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya, from whom you took the baton.

Approximately seven weeks ago, States parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty decided, without a vote, to extend into perpetuity the Treaty. The decision was significant in that fear about the future of the Treaty was put to rest. Those of us who advocated rolling periods of extension of the Treaty shared the same vision with the majority of States parties that a world without nuclear weapons is achievable and indeed desirable. But we were of the view that nuclear-weapon States should be held accountable through a 25-year rolling extension decision. That view remains valid, especially in light of unsalutory developments since that historic decision. Amongst other things, nuclear-weapons testing is continuing, there are plans to revoke the moratorium for testing and proposals are being advanced that would convert the comprehensive test-ban Treaty into a threshold test-ban treaty. These developments are discouraging and hamper the cause of non-proliferation. Indeed, they call to question the morally binding agreement stated in the "Objectives and principles" decision in the NPT. Nigeria calls on the States concerned to cease nuclear testing and requests States that have suspended testing to continue to adhere to the moratorium until the CTBT enters into force.

Against these recent unpleasant developments is the laudable decision of the summit of the Organization of African Unity which endorsed the Treaty for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. This singular achievement in the African continent is a significant boost to non-proliferation and vindicates the position of African countries which for over three decades called for the denuclearization of their continent. A goal that appeared distant and seemingly unachievable is now at hand. African countries should be congratulated on this achievement. Nigeria calls upon all nuclear-weapons States to sign the Protocol to the Treaty so as to give the Treaty maximum effect.

An African nuclear-weapon-free zone is a significant step in non-proliferation but other steps are urgently needed. As a follow-up to the NPT review and extension Conference, this Conference should without further delay commence discussion on the mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Such a committee should be established in the beginning of 1996. Such a decision will enhance the seriousness of purpose of the CD and be a

(Mr. Fasehun, Nigeria)

befitting 50th birthday present to the United Nations. I would like to end by quoting a very famous American politician. He said: "I see things that are and say, Why?, and see things that are not and say, Why not?" Why not an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Armenia, Ambassador Melik-Chahnazarian.

Mr. MELIK-CHAHNAZARIAN (Armenia) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would like first of all to congratulate you on your election to the presidency of this Conference and wish you every success in guiding the work of this important forum. I have begun my statement in Spanish especially to express my respect for your beautiful country, Mexico, and for you personally.

This is the first time that the Ambassador of Armenia has had an opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. It is for me a signal honour to take the floor in the same plenary which was addressed by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, whom I wish to greet cordially on behalf of my country. I would also like to convey greetings to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, with whom I had the pleasure and honour of studying and working in Moscow in times past.

The independent and sovereign Republic of Armenia, on acquiring observer status in the Conference on Disarmament, intends to participate actively in the negotiations which are being held here. Later on, when I learn the disarmament terminology in Spanish, I will be able to make my statements completely in the immortal language of Cervantes, but for the moment please allow me to continue in Russian with which I am more conversant.

(continued in Russian)

The Conference on Disarmament has repeatedly reasserted its exceptionally important role in the international disarmament process. Such important international agreements as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons and the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons were negotiated within these walls. Currently the attention of world public opinion is riveted on the negotiations under way here on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. We are profoundly convinced that the conclusion of a treaty on this subject will eliminate the dangers to international peace connected with the possible modernization of existing nuclear arsenals, and contribute to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The recently adopted historic decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will doubtless further the successful conduct of these negotiations.

From the very outset Armenia adopted a position of principle regarding the need for the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty on the

(Mr. Melik-Chahnazarian, Armenia)

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, believing that only such a decision is capable of guaranteeing that the Treaty will achieve its purpose. For us this was a separate goal and we did not link it with any other. We are convinced that this Treaty is an effective means of maintaining international security and stability, is in keeping with the interests of the entire international community and lays a sound basis for further efforts by States in the field of nuclear disarmament. The logical next step along this path should be further reductions in these appalling weapons of mass destruction, and subsequently their full elimination. At the same time I should like to stress that my country, which has consistently advocated the indefinite extension of the NPT, has counted and continues to count on the progress made in New York by the five nuclear Powers being perceived by them as a signal for active efforts towards disarmament. Hence the beginning of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in our forum would in our view be a turning-point in mankind's progress towards the desired goal, the full and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This would be the best confirmation of the fact that the voice of Armenia and that of other countries, dreaming of a world without nuclear weapons, has been heard and that real steps have been taken along this most important path. Of particular importance for us is the early conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests, which could be signed next year and would remove from the agenda forever the question of possible attempts to breach the existing national moratoriums on nuclear testing.

I would like to say a few brief words regarding our perception of the nuclear-test-ban treaty being drawn up by the Conference on Disarmament. To our mind the treaty should be comprehensive in nature. Its parties should be all the nuclear Powers as well as all the threshold States possessing the relevant nuclear potential. The treaty should provide for the creation of an effective verification system capable of monitoring all environments in which nuclear testing could possibly be conducted, that is, in the atmosphere, underground, underwater and in outer space. At the same time, the system should not place an unnecessary burden on the parties to the treaty. For such countries as Armenia, considerations connected with financial outlays on the future monitoring system will be crucially important. We share the view prevailing in the negotiations that the international monitoring system should include four basic monitoring methods - seismic, radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound - as well as on-site inspections. It is important that the organizational structure of the international monitoring system should not be discriminatory in nature and should offer large and small States equal opportunities. In this connection we support the creation of an international organization under the CTBT, and within it an international data centre; to our mind this would place all parties to the treaty on an equal footing.

Another important element in the package of nuclear issues before the Conference on Disarmament should be the development of a convention on prevention of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and other explosive devices.

Armenia attaches great importance to the problem of security assurances to non-nuclear States. We welcome the resolution recently adopted by the

(Mr. Melik-Chahnazarian, Armenia)

United Nations Security Council on this issue, as well as the harmonized statements by the nuclear Powers regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the NPT. However, we believe that we should not sit on our laurels and that we should formalize these guarantees in a legally binding international convention. In this context we are in favour of the early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative assurances in the Conference on Disarmament. We also believe that very useful work could be done within the context of two other ad hoc committees which it has not yet been possible to agree to set up. I have in mind the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments and the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. As for the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space, it is time to give up the confrontational approaches of the "cold war" era and to move towards a search for truly achievable practical agreements, with a view to the creation of a regime which would forever guarantee the exclusively peaceful use of outer space.

The disarmament problem area constitutes a process which is huge in terms of dimensions and significance. We believe that considerable resources exist for completing this process. In this connection we support the proposals submitted at this session regarding the need for all disarmament efforts to be concentrated to the maximum possible extent within our Conference on Disarmament, which is truly unique and undoubtedly the most competent forum in this field. Bearing in mind the significance of the issues discussed here for the fate of mankind, my country believes the time has come to expand the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, pursuing the goal of making it more balanced and representative.

Geneva has distinguished itself as a venue for international disarmament negotiations, and not just those directly connected with the Conference on Disarmament. We welcome in particular the recently reached agreement on the start of work in Geneva by the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. We believe that these negotiations occupy an important place on the disarmament agenda, since they deal with an extremely lethal weapon of mass destruction in the possession of many countries. It is important that intensive efforts should be made within the framework of the Ad Hoc Group to carry out the task entrusted to it by the Special Conference of the States Parties to the biological weapons Convention, whose second session opens next week, on 10 July.

(continued in Spanish)

Allow me in conclusion to express my conviction that this Conference, as the multilateral forum on disarmament problems, will succeed in accomplishing successfully the tasks which have been entrusted to it. The delegation of Armenia, for its part, is firmly resolved to make its own modest contribution to the common effort, as the other participating countries do.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Armenia for his major statement, his words of support for the Chair and his amazing mastery of the language of Cervantes. The representative of Canada, Mr. Bishop, now has the floor.

Mr. BISHOP (Canada): Mr. President, since this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor of the plenary during your presidency, let me take the opportunity to express how pleased we have been to see you, our NAFTA partner, presiding over the meetings of the Conference. This has been a particular challenge for you, having just arrived in Geneva. My delegation would also like to thank you for your efforts over the period of your presidency to attempt to move the Conference forward on the full spectrum of the work of the CD. A number of weeks ago, you took the initiative to convene open-ended Presidential consultations in that context. You resumed that worthwhile initiative yesterday.

With respect to fissile material cut-off, it is worth recalling the achievements of this Conference. Last September, the Conference agreed in principle to establish an ad hoc committee on a ban on fissile material production, subject to agreement being reached on the appropriate mandate for a negotiation on that subject. After 14 months of consultations, all delegations here adopted the report of the Special Coordinator and established the Committee under the presidency of your predecessor, Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan. The report contained the mandate and attendant understandings. These were agreed by consensus, by all delegations. The adoption of the report and creation of the committee were not subject to any pre-conditions, or, in the language of the CD, to any linkage with any other work of the CD. The subsequent insistence by some delegations on successful resolution of issues relating to other work of the CD, when known differences of opinion exist on elements of that work, casts doubt on the commitment to the negotiation already agreed upon.

It is most unfortunate that we see a further delay in the commencement of the work on fissile material cut-off. We have a committee, a mandate and a chair candidate: it is incomprehensible to my delegation why we cannot carry through on commitments we have all made unconditionally and hold the first meeting of the committee. We are hopeful that the inter-sessional period will allow delegations time to reflect and so organize themselves that negotiations can begin in the next part, consistent with the commitments made in March.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and his words addressed to the Chair and I share some of his concerns. I now call on the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, I asked for the floor to make a short statement. Before that, however, may I use this opportunity to welcome you in our midst and congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? I assure you of the full support and cooperation of the Romanian delegation.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

I followed with great attention the important address of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The analysis and the suggestions put forward by the United Nations Secretary-General constitute a source of inspiration and concrete support in our endeavours to find solutions to topical questions we have before us in our quest for promoting disarmament.

I had the pleasure to remark that at our meeting of 8 June, the Romanian Government has been examining the possibility to declare a moratorium on exports of anti-personnel land-mines with a view to fully contributing to the current international efforts aimed at ridding the world of the scourge of these horrible weapons. I can now inform you that a moratorium has already been approved and entered into force on 1 July 1995. The Romanian unilateral moratorium applies to all categories of land-mines and it will last for an initial period of one year. This decision crowns the Romanian stance on land-mines and, in particular, our co-sponsorship in last year's General Assembly resolution on the establishment of moratoria in this field. Its significance redoubles since it came into force just days before the international conference on mine clearance started its proceedings. May I kindly ask, Mr. President, that this statement be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Romania for his important statement. I have no further speakers on my list, and if no one wishes to take the floor I shall make a brief statement.

Mexico's term in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament is drawing to a close. Allow me therefore to make a few remarks about the organization of our work, stemming from what has been for me a unique experience in leading this equally unique negotiating forum on a subject which is literally of vital importance. Some of these remarks are self-evident truths, and I apologize in advance for repeating them. This applies to the statement that the annual organization of work of the Conference has to be decided at the beginning of the year. After that, the passing of time undermines the sense of urgency and of the need to harmonize national agendas in pragmatic solutions. It is also pointless to recall that decisions on arms taken outside the Conference have an influence on the willingness of delegations to reach consensus. When such decisions are of particular importance, a period of reflection and internal digestion is called for. Finally, it is an understatement to say that it is not an easy matter to negotiate on disarmament against a background of explosions, or the announcement of explosions, of nuclear tests.

The foregoing may serve as a partial explanation, and not an excuse, for why we did not reach the necessary consensus to resolve the pending issues in the organization of work, despite the goodwill of all delegations, the skill and even the occasional flexibility of the group coordinators, and the efforts made by the Chair with the most efficient help of the secretariat. In order

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to discuss the matter, in the past four weeks we have held two meetings open to all delegations and four formal consultations with the group coordinators. In turn, the groups devoted practically all the time in their weekly meetings to this set of problems. As President I had 10 meetings where this subject was taken up, informally but very thoroughly, by a great many representatives, and I wish to express my gratitude to the heads of delegation that were kind enough to organize them. In all there were more than 20 meetings at which 15 different proposals were examined. But we began the exercise of organizing our work almost two thirds of the way through the annual session, immediately after the non-proliferation Treaty review and extension Conference, and while in plenary the main topic was actual or announced nuclear tests. Although the time was not the most propitious, there was no lack of will. If we did not reach consensus it was because of the difficulty of overcoming a chain of linkages which forced us into an overall approach that proved to be excessively ambitious. Here I would like to offer a rather less obvious statement: a linkage between related topics may be a useful instrument, but if it is maintained for too long, then it inevitably leads to a paralysing spiral of linkages in which new elements are introduced whenever an understanding is in sight. Although we did not achieve the result we all wished for, the effort was useful to air different opinions, evaluations, priorities and to specify areas of disagreement.

I shall now venture to read out the last of the informal proposals which were examined. The "non-paper" of 4 July, entitled "Draft Presidential statement", reads as follows:

> "The Conference recalls its decisions contained in the 'Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of work for the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament' (CD/1294) and its decision to establish an ad hoc committee on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and decides:
>
> "1. To initiate, under item 2 of the agenda, entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Ban on the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, under the chairmanship of Ambassador ...
>
> "2. To establish the Ad Hoc Committee on 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space' with the 1994 mandate (CD/1125), under the chairmanship of Ambassador ...
>
> "3. To establish the Committee on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons' with the 1994 mandate (CD/1121), under the chairmanship of Ambassador ...

(The President)

"4. To establish an ad hoc committee under item 8 of the agenda to consider practical means of enhancing transparency in armaments, under the chairmanship of Ambassador ... The Ad Hoc Committee will take into account past and future proposals on the subject.

"5. To appoint Ambassador ... as special coordinator to resume consultations on the review of the agenda, and, in that framework, inter alia, to seek the views of member States on the issue of conventional arms and on the most appropriate institutional arrangement for its more thorough consideration in the Conference on Disarmament.

"6. To appoint Ambassador ... as special coordinator to make every effort to reach an urgent solution to the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference.

"7. To appoint Ambassador ... as special coordinator to initiate consultations, in the framework of agenda item 2, on the early establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.

"8. To request the special coordinators to report to the Conference on the progress achieved on the issues under their responsibility before the end of its 1995 session.

"The Conference reaffirms the importance it attaches to the conclusion of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and reiterates the priority it has assigned to this work."

I should like to place on record that as no agreement was reached on some of the paragraphs, none was adopted, and neither was the proposal as a whole. The main differences arose on paragraphs 4, 5 and 7, and concerned the priority and institutional arrangements that should be assigned to nuclear disarmament and conventional weapons. Unfortunately these differences prevent us from beginning work immediately not only on nuclear disarmament and conventional weapons but also on other topics considered to be of importance, such as fissile material, the arms race in outer space, negative assurances, the agenda and the expansion of the membership of the Conference. I consider that during the inter-sessional period beginning tomorrow, and of course in the third part of this year's session, delegations should give serious thought to the relevance of the system of linkages that is preventing us from taking up subjects that all delegations regard as important, and the need to pursue consultations to enable us to reach agreement in 1996 on the organization of work in the first week of the first part of our session. Meanwhile, let us continue our intensive priority negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. As far as I am concerned, I wish to assure all of you, in particular the group coordinators and the Conference secretariat, of my deep gratitude for your support, guidance, cooperation and unfailing courtesy.

I should now like to refer to the informal paper distributed by the secretariat that sets forth the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodes during the first week of the third part of the annual session, in other words, from 31 July to 4 August 1995. This

(The President)

timetable has been prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual it is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no more matters to deal with, and accordingly I intend to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 3 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.712
3 August 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shirchinjavyn Yumjav (Mongolia)

GE.95-63394 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 712th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is a great honour for me and for my country to take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at the start of the third part of the 1995 CD session.

At the outset, allow me, on behalf of all of us, to extend a very warm welcome to the newly appointed Ambassador of India, Her Excellency Ms. Arundhati Ghose, who is with us for the first time today. Ambassador Ghose brings to our Conference a wealth of experience in bilateral as well as multilateral diplomacy, having served her country in Vienna, New York, Paris, Brussels and Cairo, among others. I am sure the Conference will benefit greatly from the diplomatic skills traditionally associated with her country's representatives. Whilst assuring Ambassador Ghose of our cooperation and support, I should also like to wish her every success in her new post. I also take this opportunity of welcoming the new representative of South Africa, His Excellency Ambassador Selebi, who is also among us for the first time today.

I would like to thank His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, for their valuable support and services to the Conference.

Allow me also to express my deep appreciation and respect to my predecessor Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico for his commendable efforts to reach a compromise solution to all outstanding issues.

I have on my list of speakers inscribed for today the representatives of South Africa, Germany, Romania and Peru. Before giving the floor to the speakers, I would like, with your indulgence, to make a few opening remarks on my assumption of the presidency of the Conference.

As a member of the CD Mongolia attaches great importance to the work of the Conference and makes its efforts to contribute to the cause of disarmament. Clear evidence of our commitment to disarmament and arms limitation is the fact that Mongolia became the twenty-first State which deposited the instrument of ratification of the chemical weapons Convention.

The Conference on Disarmament is passing through a very important epoch in its history. After successful conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention the CD is now conducting multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a priority task of the Conference.

The last two parts of the 1995 CD session are taking place in the aftermath of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. In this connection I would like to note the significance of the decision to extend indefinitely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. My Government considers the NPT as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. The Treaty has

(The President)

played and continues to play an important role in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is also important that States parties to the NPT, especially nuclear-weapon States, reiterated the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and committed themselves to strengthening the Treaty review process.

The results of the NPT Review and Extension Conference have a direct bearing on the work of the CD as well as on its agenda. The document "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" which was unanimously adopted by the Conference sets the target date for completion of the CTBT not later than 1996.

Since the start of this year's session we have made some important progress in the CTBT negotiations. However, a number of substantive issues have remained unsolved. Issues critically important for the future of the CTBT, including scope, entry into force, withdrawal, verification and institutional issues should be resolved and political decisions should be taken for achieving quick progress in the negotiations. Therefore, during the second part of the CD session some delegations have expressed their concern over the slow pace of our negotiations and have appealed for the intensification of efforts with a view to concluding the CTBT by the above target date.

Another important outcome of the Review and Extension Conference is the objective on the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes.

The "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" also urge the nuclear-weapon States, pending the entry into force of a CTBT, to exercise utmost restraint on nuclear testing. In this connection, we fully share the concerns and disappointment expressed by many delegations in the CD at the recent decision and action by some nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear testing. We urge that all nuclear-weapon States should continue to refrain from testing in order to maintain the present political climate favourable to the CTBT negotiations.

The NPT's underlying purpose will be served if the non-nuclear-weapon States are adequately assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this respect Security Council resolution 984 of 11 April 1995 on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the unilateral statements of nuclear-weapon States are welcome developments auguring well for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. Such arrangements, in our opinion, should cover not only non-nuclear-weapon States but also nuclear-weapon-free zones. It is of crucial importance for Mongolia, which has declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Mongolia, like many others, is of the view that the only effective way to provide assurances is to conclude a multilateral agreement of a legally binding character.

(The President)

Another important issue of political significance which needs to be solved without delay is the expansion of the CD. My delegation considers that the legitimate request of many countries for membership in the CD should be seriously considered in the CD in light of the present political realities.

In conclusion, let me say a few words on the organizational matters of the CD work. As you are aware, I have already undertaken a number of consultations both at the bilateral level and with group coordinators in order to seek ways of overcoming the difficulties which still beset us concerning the outstanding issues relating to the agenda and organization of work for this session. It is my intention to intensify my efforts in order to try to bring about a compromise solution which would enable the Conference to deal with all items on its agenda. I would appeal to delegations to display the necessary degree of flexibility to make this possible.

This concludes my opening remarks. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of South Africa, Ambassador Selebi.

Mr. SELEBI (South Africa): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of the important office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am particularly pleased that you are presiding over the Conference during my first address before it. I would also like to express my appreciation and that of my delegation to your predecessors for the very creditable way in which they guided the work of the Conference during the 1995 session. It was particularly pleasing for us when Ambassador Nanjira, a fellow African, filled the presidency earlier this year. As President of this Conference it will be your task to attempt to resolve several sensitive issues which have remained outstanding for many months, and I wish you the best of luck.

South Africa has been participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament since 1992. We formally applied for membership later that same year. South Africa's interest in disarmament arises out of the Government of National Unity's commitment to a policy on non-proliferation and arms control which covers all weapons of mass destruction and which extends to our concerns about the proliferation of conventional weapons. We see our non-proliferation and arms control policy as being integral to our commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection. It was in this context that South African turned away from the edge of the nuclear weapons abyss.

The non-proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime and it forms the foundation upon which much of our work is based, including the negotiations presently being conducted in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. When the NPT was adopted 25 years ago it represented a major advance towards nuclear disarmament, committing its members to making the world a safer place. The dramatic changes brought about by the end of the cold war have created the global environment in which it is possible to realize the NPT's basic objectives. The achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty will be the attainment of one of the most important of these objectives.

(Mr. Selebi, South Africa)

At the recent Review and Extension Conference, which was held in New York during April and May, the NPT regime was reinforced by the adoption, without a vote, of the decisions on the strengthened review process and on the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". The "Principles and objectives", and especially the section dealing with nuclear disarmament, have a particular significance for the Conference on Disarmament because of the Conference's role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The "Principles and objectives" note that nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The States parties further undertake to fulfil "with determination" the NPT's nuclear disarmament undertakings, whilst the nuclear-weapon States also reaffirm their commitment to negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The "Principles and objectives" then go on to outline certain measures in a programme of action which are important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The programme of action which was adopted entails the completion of the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a "cut-off" convention and the determined pursuit of nuclear and general and complete disarmament.

It is the intention that these "Principles and objectives" will be renewed at every review so as to ensure that they are dynamic and that they adapt to changing international circumstances. They should be the yardstick by which all the States parties can measure nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament achievements.

The NPT Conference was also an important landmark in our goal of achieving the universality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this context I would like to reiterate my Foreign Minister's words when he addressed the NPT Conference during its general debate. He stated:

> "Apartheid South Africa as a part of its national security policy embarked on a nuclear weapons programme. Democratic South Africa sees its international and regional security being achieved by complete nuclear disarmament. The NPT provides us in Africa and the international community with greater security than did the nuclear weapons which we have destroyed. Southern Africa until very recently was in a state of conflict, war and destabilization and nuclear weapons were thought to be providing security. I believe that the South African experience - namely, that security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation - is a telling one: not only for the 'threshold' States, but also for the 'acknowledged' weapon States."

I am particularly pleased to be able to relate to the Conference certain developments concerning the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The OAU/United Nations Group of Experts, who were very ably assisted by a member of the United Nations disarmament secretariat in Geneva, Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo, completed their task of preparing a text for the Treaty during a meeting in Johannesburg at the end of May. The sixty-second meeting of the Council of

(Mr. Selebi, South Africa)

Ministers of OAU adopted the "Pelindaba Text" of the Treaty on 23 June 1995 (Pelindaba is the headquarters of South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation and the word when roughly translated means "the discussion has been completed"). The Treaty will now be forwarded to the General Assembly. Africa attaches great importance to this Treaty and we hope that its protocols on security assurances and on the prohibition of testing of nuclear devices within the zone will obtain the support of all the nuclear-weapon States. Once the Treaty has entered into force, we look forward to establishing cooperative arrangements with other nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere. Work should then also begin on a treaty establishing Africa as a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

My country has been observing the progress towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty with interest. We pay tribute to all those delegations which have worked so hard to produce the current rolling text, which is already a significant achievement. South Africa stands ready to implement its commitments in the international monitoring system when it is set up.

On the vexing question of the scope of the treaty, my delegation favours a simple article based on article I of the partial test-ban treaty. We do not think that a CTBT should include the concepts of peaceful nuclear explosions, safety tests or low-yield tests, all of which could be open to abuse, which could frustrate the purposes of a comprehensive test ban. South Africa sees a future CTBT as an instrument both for non-proliferation and disarmament. Both these elements must be reflected in the scope of a future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The importance of the work being done in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the early conclusion of the CTBT negotiations was reiterated during the NPT Review and Extension Conference. In the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" the States parties to the NPT decided without a vote that the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996 is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the NPT. We must therefore constantly reinvigorate the negotiations to ensure maximum utility of the time available. It is vitally important that the "Principles and objectives" deadline should be strictly adhered to if we are to maintain the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and of the decisions taken in New York.

My delegation looks forward to the commencement of negotiations for a convention prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Shannon of Canada, whose tireless efforts led to agreement on a mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on "cut-off".

I would like to take this opportunity of outlining some of our interest in the proposed convention and some preliminary thoughts on what it might entail.

(Mr. Selebi, South Africa)

South Africa was probably one of the first States at the end of the cold war to cease production of fissile materials for weapons purposes when operations at its pilot enrichment plant were terminated early in 1990. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) had been produced at the plant for use as fuel in the production of isotopes as well as for the nuclear deterrent devices. The very same facility therefore produced highly enriched uranium for both peaceful and military purposes, clearly illustrating the difficulties we can expect in verifying a "cut-off" convention. The plant has been regularly inspected by IAEA since November 1991 after South Africa acceded to the NPT and implemented a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.

In our opinion, the purpose of a cut-off convention would be to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to provide a prohibition on the production of nuclear material for weapons purposes through a binding legal commitment. The main undertakings in a "cut-off" convention would be: to terminate operations and to refrain from any further production of fissile materials intended for explosive devices; to refrain from providing assistance to any other State to produce fissile materials for proscribed purposes; and to accept non-discriminatory international safeguards to verify these undertakings.

During the General Assembly last year a significant new resolution was adopted by consensus on the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament (resolution 49/77 B). That resolution recalled the report of the Special Coordinator for membership designated by the Conference, Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, and the subsequent statement made by the Special Coordinator on 26 August 1993, recommending a dynamic solution to the question of membership. The Conference was also urged by the General Assembly to make every effort to reach a solution resulting, by the beginning of this year, in a significant expansion of its composition, which would then include at least 60 countries.

South Africa is concerned that very little attention has this year been focused on the problem of expansion of the Conference, notwithstanding resolution 49/77 B. With the passage of time the reasons for a change in composition of the Conference become ever more striking and the Conference's lack of progress in this regard more conspicuous. The Conference will no doubt be aware that the adoption of resolution 49/77 B without a vote at the General Assembly was a source of great hope not only to my delegation but also to many others represented here. The lack of progress on this issue will undoubtedly cast a shadow over how we view the overall work which has been done in the CD this year. It is also my hope that the excellent coordination and cooperation which was prevalent between the non-members of the CD will continue during the General Assembly as it did last year.

In conclusion, I would like to address the matter of the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, which has not progressed since the "Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of work for the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament", despite the notable accomplishments in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the agreement of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on "cut-off". As an observer South Africa is not

(Mr. Selebi, South Africa)

participating in the Presidential consultations on this matter. We would, however, encourage the members to be flexible in their deliberations so as to move the work of the CD forward. Such flexibility would allow us, even at this late stage, to address the important issues which appear on the Conference's agenda. Of particular importance to South Africa are the matters of nuclear disarmament, the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons and transparency in armaments.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of South Africa for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I pledge the fullest cooperation of my delegation to your endeavours to advance the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I also avail myself of this opportunity to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, for his untiring and genuine efforts to sort out, albeit in vain, the existing stalemate hamstringing the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I hope that under your able guidance we can break this stalemate in the forthcoming weeks. Let me also welcome wholeheartedly Ambassador Ghose of India and Ambassador Selebi of South Africa, who will add to our workforce here, and they are very welcome to Geneva.

Indeed, we have to recognize the CD's failure to re-establish last year's ad hoc committees except the Ad Hoc Committee on CTBT negotiations. Various issues of nuclear disarmament have been on the agenda of the CD since its very beginning. As recognized by 178 States in their decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by consensus in New York this year, a multilaterally negotiated CTBT and a cut-off convention are measures to realize nuclear disarmament. We hold that these principles and objectives, which Ambassador Selebi also mentioned, are a political document of great importance and we are fully committed to its contents. Therefore, the CD should immediately start the work of the ad hoc committee on cut-off already established.

It is simply beyond my understanding why we should not work on nuclear disarmament by negotiating a cut-off convention under agenda item 2 of the CD agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". A cut-off convention would reinforce the role of the CD as the sole negotiating body for global disarmament in the coming years. We should bear in mind that we are asked by the United Nations General Assembly and the NPT Review and Extension Conference to negotiate a cut-off convention. We have already agreed to the mandate of an ad hoc committee and its establishment. If some delegations want to block cut-off negotiations by blocking the appointment of an ad hoc committee chairman because they prefer speaking about nuclear disarmament in general terms rather than implementing it in concrete terms, this will be a message not easily understood by the international community.

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

I would like to make some observations regarding conventional disarmament. We failed to re-establish an ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments, the only ad hoc committee dealing inter alia with conventional armament. The outer world will not be interested in the internal quarrels of the CD. What will matter remains the message that conventional disarmament or control of conventional armament are not deemed worthwhile being dealt with by the CD as a forum negotiating multilateral disarmament conventions. Without neglecting the importance of nuclear disarmament the CD does not live up to the expectations of the international community when disregarding the vast majority of weapons provided by so-called conventional weapons which have been causing numerous regional conflicts and misery to the civilian population.

Let me finally touch upon the ongoing CTBT negotiations and their relation to nuclear test moratoria. In doing so I refer to a speech given by Chancellor Kohl to the German Parliament on 13 July of this year. The sovereign decision of our close partner France to conduct nuclear-weapon tests in the Pacific has caused concern in Germany and in other countries. The Federal Government has been advocating the conclusion of a verifiable and comprehensive test-ban treaty for a long time. The Federal Government has always held the view that nuclear test moratoria are most important for successful negotiations in Geneva. The commitment of the Federal Government in favour of a general test ban is part of its efforts towards worldwide nuclear disarmament, a goal the Federal Government has always been advocating. The decision of the States parties to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons indefinitely was an important step in this regard. In addition to the indefinite extension of this treaty it was agreed in New York to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. We hope this goal can be attained. As we all know, an explicit statement to abandon nuclear-weapon tests right now could not be achieved in New York. Nevertheless, the decision taken in New York regarding the date of conclusion of the CTBT negotiations remains an important breakthrough. For the first time all nuclear-weapons States including France have committed themselves to the deadline 1996 to conclude a CTBT. The German delegation will continue to work as constructively as possible to bring about the conclusion of the Geneva nuclear-test-ban negotiations at the latest in 1996.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to Ambassador Neagu of Romania.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you, the distinguished representative of Mongolia, on your assumption to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to pledge my delegation's full support in your discharging the important duties ahead of you, and, in fact, ahead of all of us in the Conference. I also avail myself of this opportunity to pay tribute to your immediate predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, for his arduous, sincere and indeed skilful efforts to find solutions to the pending problems of organizing our work in the Conference. The appreciation of my delegation goes also to the Ambassadors of Italy, Japan and Kenya, who assured with competence and devotion the presidency of the CD this year. At the same time, let me extend a cordial welcome to all our distinguished

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

colleagues, the Ambassadors of Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mexico, India and South Africa, who recently joined us in the CD and I am sure will bring a new, fresh impetus in our deliberations.

I have asked for the floor in order to present some comments and argue in favour of re-launching a more concrete, business-like debate on transparency in armaments (TIA), part and parcel of disarmament and international security, which now challenges the international environment most acutely and dramatically.

It is a widely recognized reality that all the conflicts erupted on the Earth during the last five decades were exclusively fuelled by the proliferation and build-up of conventional weapons. Since World War II millions of lives have been taken away due to conventional, not mass-destruction weapons. The large-scale use of conventional armaments both in internal and international conflicts has also generated economic, social and ethnic disruptions of profoundly negative impact for normal life. The tragedy which continues unabated today in former Yugoslavia, as well as in other parts of the world is a permanent reminder of such horrendous consequences.

Let me recall in this context the growing problem generated by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land-mines, a category of conventional weapons which inter alia cause enormous casualties, slow down or prevent the return of refugees and affect the United Nations humanitarian and peace-keeping operations. Another facet of the issue is the illicit traffic in small arms, which involves in fact massive quantities of such arms. The growth in the illicit arms trade, as indicated by the United Nations Secretary-General before the CD itself on 6 July 1995, constitutes a source of particular concern, a most disturbing and dangerous phenomenon especially for the internal situation, for the respect of human rights in the affected States.

Moreover, the balance of forces established in time or by international agreements in various sensitive regions can be undermined through preferential conventional arms transfer policies.

Recent events as well as new risks emanating from the post-cold-war political environment demand responsible and timely action from us all.

The adoption more than three years ago by the United Nations of resolution 46/36 L constituted a unique first step in the process for greater transparency in armaments. It represented a significant departure from past practices since for the first time the United Nations embarked upon an action-oriented endeavour by establishing a United Nations Register of Conventional Arms with a built-in mechanism for review and expansion of transparency in armaments. As recognized in United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/75 C, the establishment of the Register constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters and a viable instrument capable of attracting the widest possible participation.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The issue of transparency in armaments is indeed rather complex and sensitive because it relates directly to the security of States in a troubled, uncertain period, in which various regions of the world are affected by suspicion, instability and mistrust. However, the common awareness of risks and challenges should not inhibit but stimulate our determination for cooperation. Therefore, we firmly believe that there is no valid reason for evading the topic. On the contrary, it is our conviction that the problem of transparency in armaments needs urgent and close consideration.

Having in view its complexity, probably the approach should be gradual, starting with conceptual aspects and advancing step by step towards more action-oriented measures.

Taking into account these basic requirements Romania has submitted to the CD a proposal for a "Code of conduct for the international transfers of conventional arms", now document CD/1257 of 17 May 1994. We have also welcomed similar ideas put forward by Australia, Ireland and New Zealand. Essentially, the idea of a code of conduct is intended to bring about restraint and responsibility in conventional arms transfers. It also envisages the endurance of equal and undiminished security of States at the lowest levels of armaments. Basic principles of conduct, criteria to be followed in considering arms transfers or for avoiding transfers, respectively, as well as an appropriate mechanism of data-sharing and consultations should be equally taken into account when discussing such an international instrument. Obviously, the code of conduct should be open to all States in order to meet fully its commendable goals.

Now at the demise of the cold war there is a great opportunity to address concretely the problem of conventional arms build-ups. We share the view that however legitimate the preoccupations over nuclear disarmament may be, as has also been noted by the distinguished Ambassador of Germany today, nothing can justify the continued failure to address conventional weapons. Transparency in armaments is a relatively new item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, which Romania regards as the most appropriate forum able to play an essential role in the overall process. I am fully confident that the Conference will find resources to overcome procedural inconveniences and to embrace soon the path of concrete negotiations on this most acute issue of international security and disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I would not like to give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Urrutia.

Mr. URRUTIA (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me first of all to convey to you my delegation's congratulations on seeing you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of this third and last session for 1995. I should also like to extend to you our full cooperation and support in the discharge of your duties. Likewise we should like to express our congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador de Icaza

(Mr. Urrutia, Peru)

of Mexico, on the magnificent way in which he guided our work. My delegation would also like to welcome the new Ambassadors of India and South Africa who have joined the work of the Conference today.

My delegation has asked for the floor to inform the Conference on Disarmament that on 20 July Peru deposited with the United Nations Secretariat in New York the instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, thus becoming the thirty-second State party. The full accession of our country to this international convention is further proof of Peru's peaceable and responsible approach and its ongoing commitment to the efforts of the international community to make progress in the field of disarmament, and, in this specific case, in eradicating weapons of mass destruction.

The successful conclusion of negotiations on the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in September 1992 and, months later, the signing ceremony in Paris in January 1993, marked the beginning of a new stage in the implementation of a multilateral disarmament agreement which encompasses the elimination of a whole category of weapons under international control universally applied. Two years later, we continue to face the urgent and priority task of ensuring that the Convention enters into force. We believe that we States should shoulder the commitment to strive and do everything within our power to realize this task which the international community demands.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of India.

Ms. GHOSE (India): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I am taking the floor under your presidency, I would like at the outset to congratulate you on your assumption of this important office at a crucial stage of our work in the CD. My delegation is particularly glad to see you in the Chair because of the close links between our countries. I would also like to avail of this opportunity to thank all the colleagues, including you, Mr. President, who have welcomed me here today. I look forward to working closely with all members and observers of the CD in our common endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for her statement and for the kind words addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

As you are aware, I have already undertaken a number of consultations both at the bilateral level and with group coordinators in order to seek ways of overcoming the difficulties which still beset us concerning the outstanding issues relating to the agenda and organization of work for this session. It is my intention to intensify my efforts in order to try to bring about a

(The President)

compromise solution which would enable the Conference to deal adequately with all items on its agenda. I would appeal to delegations to display the necessary degree of flexibility to make this possible.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 10 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.713
10 August 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on
Thursday, 10 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shirchinjavyn Yumjav (Mongolia)

GE.95-63435 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 713th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers the representative of Pakistan, who will speak in his capacity as coordinator of the Group of 21, as well as the representatives of France and Australia. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, before I turn to the statement that I have been entrusted to make as the Coordinator of the Group of 21, let me take this opportunity to express to you my warmest felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. We are confident that you will be able to make a signal contribution to our work at this very critical juncture in the affairs of the Conference on Disarmament. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, for the valiant efforts that he made in trying to resolve the problems being faced by the Conference on Disarmament with regard to the organization of its work. He tried heroically and he almost succeeded, and we hope that his work will continue to contribute to the eventual success of our Conference. Finally, it is also my pleasure to express a warm welcome to the new Ambassador of India, Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, who, we are confident, will make an outstanding contribution to the work of this Conference.

I have been entrusted by the Group of 21 to make the following statement on the draft resolution circulated by Argentina in the United Nations Security Council, document S/1995/567.

The G-21 takes note of the draft resolution circulated to members of the Security Council regarding the proposed role for the Security Council on the question of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The G-21 notes with concern that the draft resolution is silent on the vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on nuclear disarmament and on the continued existence and retention of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States. In the Group's view, the huge nuclear-weapons stockpiles in the possession of the nuclear-weapons States, continuing qualitative improvements to nuclear-weapons systems and the development and production of new nuclear weapons must constitute a priority in the field of multilateral disarmament since these represent a grave danger to international peace and security. It is this issue which should be of special concern to the Security Council, in view of the overwhelming demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, recognized and voiced in various United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

The Group believes that non-proliferation in all its aspects can be best promoted through the adoption and implementation of a legally binding, multilaterally negotiated treaty for elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. It is high time that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) commenced negotiations on such a treaty. This would be consistent with the biological and chemical weapons conventions which aim to eliminate respective categories of weapons of mass destruction entirely.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

Any deviation from the role envisaged for the Security Council under the United Nations Charter or in certain circumstances under multilateral treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament would undermine the provisions of these treaties and conventions, including the inherent mechanisms for securing redress for the violations of their provisions. It would also call into question the value of painstaking multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control treaties in the Conference on Disarmament.

In this context, the Group reiterates its position that the Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues. Circumventing the Conference on Disarmament or undermining the provisions of the existing treaties will seriously prejudice the ongoing negotiations in the CD on the CTBT and other issues.

I would request that this statement may be circulated as an official document of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I should like to welcome your accession to the office of President of our Conference at a particularly critical time in our work. It goes without saying that you may rely on the full support of my delegation. I would also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, the Ambassador of Mexico, for the talent, persistence and courage with which he led our deliberations. Finally, I would like to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassador of South Africa, the Ambassador of India and the Ambassador of Peru.

On 13 June 1995, when the President of the Republic announced the resumption of a final series of nuclear tests, he made a solemn commitment that France would sign the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the autumn of 1996. This is the main goal. Let us not lose sight of it. It means, firstly, that we are firmly looking to a halt to nuclear testing in the very near future - before the end of May 1996 as far as we are concerned, before the end of 1996 for all countries. We must honour the commitment which, like all the States parties to the NPT, we assumed in New York on 11 May 1995 in adopting the "Declaration on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". This applies above all to the five nuclear-weapon States, which must shoulder their responsibilities.

It also means that the cessation of nuclear testing that we contemplate will be final. This is why France expressed clear support for a treaty of unlimited duration on 29 June 1995.

Lastly, it means that the future treaty will provide for a comprehensive ban on testing. The President of the Republic made this very clear on 14 July.

(Mr. Errera, France)

This is the framework within which we will now be compelled, like the other nuclear-Powers, to ensure the safety and the reliability of our weapons. This means that the French nuclear forces will continue to rely on the same doctrine of deterrence, the same concept of strict sufficiency and thus the same weapon systems. To put it clearly, France has no intention of designing new types of weapons, or increasing the number or power of existing weapons, or developing miniaturized weapons, or modifying the role of nuclear weapons in our defence doctrine. It also means that it cannot be claimed, as we sometimes hear, that the resumption of French nuclear testing would harm our negotiations. The opposite is true. France is determined to spare no effort to ensure that the objective of the signature of a comprehensive test-ban treaty next autumn can be reached. The President of the Republic is committed to it. It will be done.

In order to achieve this goal, the negotiations must take a new course. There is an urgent need for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to fulfil the mandate that was assigned to it: the conclusion of a universal and internationally verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In concrete terms this means that in the coming weeks agreement should be reached on a number of crucial points. Firstly, with regard to the verification regime, it is time to formalize the broad agreement on the components of the international monitoring system and turn to the best possible account the remarkable work accomplished under the guidance of Dr. Peter Marshall over the past 18 months. France will in particular seek to ensure that, without claiming to be perfect, the regime to be established is effective and makes the best possible use of the means available, and that its constraints are applied in an equitable manner. As regards the architecture of the future organization entrusted with the implementation of the treaty, now that the outlines of the verification regime appear more clearly, here too the time has come to decide among the various options. Finally, as for the very heart of the future treaty - the scope of the ban - the President of the Republic has expressed France's resolve to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The proposal to prohibit "any nuclear-weapon test or any other nuclear explosion" corresponds to this aim. France has decided to adopt this formulation.

Since the beginning of these negotiations France has always stated in a straightforward manner the constraints to which it was subject; its responsibilities and its objectives. We have always unambiguously held that the treaty we are negotiating would be a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests and not a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. We have never concealed that our active involvement in these negotiations was compatible with a possible resumption of our testing. From the outset, when we took this decision, we set forth with the utmost transparency the reasons for which we were resuming those tests. Likewise, everyone knows that in entering these negotiations we accepted the prospect of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Today no one should doubt our determination to honour our commitment. Everyone should be convinced of France's resolve to move the negotiations forward. This is ultimately what the international community expects from us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, allow me also to congratulate you on your assumption of this position and assure you of the cooperation of my delegation in the difficult task ahead of us. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues.

I asked for the floor today to make a statement on the acceleration of the negotiations and the importance of this Conference adhering to the strong expectations of our concluding the CTBT negotiations in 1996.

In a statement today in Australia, the Prime Minister of Australia said that an international agreement to a binding and genuinely comprehensive CTBT no later than 1996 is a central policy aim of the Australian Government. Such an agreement would be a major boost to international security and to our goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context, I can welcome the positive elements in the statement by the Ambassador of France. I must reiterate, however, Australia's firm opposition to nuclear testing. We have expressed firm opposition in this body to continued testing by China. We have opposed the French decision to resume testing. We press for a reversal of those policies and for an immediate end to testing and the maintenance of moratoriums while a CTBT is negotiated and brought into force.

The Ambassador of France said that we are definitely facing a halt to nuclear testing. My delegation believes that the only way to ensure that that is the case is by the earliest possible conclusion of a test-ban treaty, and in that regard I would like to turn to the statement that I had prepared for today.

As we are all well aware, the firm expectation of the international community, expressed earlier this year, is that the CTBT should be concluded as soon as possible, but no later than 1996. This was, in itself, a welcome and considerable advance in precision on late 1994 consensus language which could only muster sufficient enthusiasm for a conclusion "without delay", and I quote the 1994 resolution.

As has been recognized since then, however, the 1996 target is of itself not sufficiently precise as a guide to achievement. Fortunately, we already have significant statements pointing in the direction of greater precision, in recognition of the realities of next year's international calendar. In this context, Australia believes the commitment of President Chirac of France to sign a CTBT by the northern autumn has been particularly important. To add further precision, it is Australia's firm view that our goal should be signature of the CTBT before the fifty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Without doubt, international endorsement of a CTBT text as one of the final acts of the historic fiftieth session of the General Assembly would be a powerful symbol of our collective determination to roll back the nuclear

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

shadow under which the United Nations itself was created, and of our determination to achieve the safer world envisaged when we decided on the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

But stated commitment to a target date, even combined with steady work in the Conference, will not ensure the achievement of our objective, and in making this comment let me say I have no intention of detracting from the highly commendable work of our chairmen who are putting forward every effort to achieve results. Clearly, however, a structured process and a thorough awareness of steps necessary to conclude our negotiations are required if we are to meet the target. We cannot rely on ritual acknowledgement of a date and some miracle of osmosis to bring the negotiations to fruition, though I fear we often seem to work under that delusion.

Working back then from the target date of signature of the CTBT by UNGA51, it quickly becomes evident that our negotiations in Geneva will have to be concluded by mid-1996 to allow sufficient time for resumed consideration by UNGA50, as well as preparations for the signing ceremony as soon as possible thereafter. On the basis of experience with the chemical weapons Convention, 10-12 weeks will be needed for these steps.

Conclusion of the negotiations by mid-1996 presumes, in turn, that from the start of our 1996 session the CTBT negotiations must move decisively into an end-game phase. This has immediate implications for delegations around this table, since the remaining six weeks of the 1995 session will be crucial in preparing for this last phase of the negotiations. In Australia's view, and obviously in the view of the delegation of France, there is a series of issues which form prerequisites for an end-game and thus should comprise the focus of our efforts for the remainder of this session.

Obviously convergence on scope is a fundamental requirement if we are to reach a conclusion to the negotiations in line with our commitments. The range of views on this issue is now in many cases a matter of public record. Australia sees the focus of the CTBT as to ban nuclear explosions. We see the CTBT as an essential and urgent component in a series of arms control measures designed to move towards the ultimate goal of universal nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Accordingly, I have to say that we still believe some delegations are advocating an over-extension of the scope of the treaty through an attempt, that is not feasible in our view, to cover wide-ranging nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation goals; other reported approaches, by contrast, would have the effect of undermining the concept of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It is not credible for us to talk in terms of a serious effort to discharge the international negotiating responsibilities of this forum by 1996 if we are unable to show significant progress towards consensus on clear and simple scope language. Australia's working paper 222, which we note attracts increasing support, was designed to meet, in the most streamlined and unambiguous manner possible, the precise mandate of the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

We urge all delegations, which have not yet been able to join in endorsing such a formulation, to redouble efforts in this regard before the end of this session, and we urge the nuclear-weapon States in particular to contribute to the elaboration of an agreement on scope which is consistent with, and moreover reinforces the objective of a comprehensive ban. In this context, the statement by the Ambassador of France has obvious and immediate relevance.

If I might turn next to verification, which we too believe is a prerequisite area, convergence on key verification issues is essential in this final part of the 1995 session. We must find orderly and efficient ways of defining that technical detail which we decide must be reflected in the treaty and its protocol, while identifying lower-level detail which should fall to a preparatory commission to resolve.

There is much still to be done in verification in order to bring this section of the treaty text up to the same level of development as we now have for legal and institutional issues. We are well on the way to achieving this however, and the improvements to the verification text resulting from the second part of the session have been appreciable. We welcome the decision of the Ad Hoc Committee to allocate additional negotiating time in the third part of the session to verification.

Of course all final technical details do not need to be agreed this year, but my delegation considers it will be necessary by January 1996 to have a clear convergence, reflected in treaty text, on: firstly, the international monitoring system as a concept, and its component elements (including agreement on the major aspects of IMS architecture, and on the nature of data-processing by the international data centre); then funding of the organization (in particular, funding of the monitoring system and verification activities); and, finally, a single concept for the development of on-site inspection.

There are obvious interrelationships here, particularly in the work on the monitoring system. Agreement on funding arrangements and on the IMS data-processing concept will clearly make final agreement on IMS architecture much easier to achieve. In this context, I wish to acknowledge the highly significant flexibility shown yesterday by the United States on funding issues which we believe will significantly aid delegations in coming to concrete agreement on IMS architecture in the next fortnight.

Without significant progress here - both conceptually and in text - it would be exceedingly difficult to convince the international community that we are making a serious effort to bring home the treaty in line with commitments and expectations. On a practical level, it would also be difficult to launch a productive and credible end-game in January 1996 if so many loose threads remain affecting verification issues. Welcome movement on funding will be a big step forward.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

A third prerequisite in our view for the end-game phase is further streamlining of the, as yet, heavily bracketed rolling text. By necessity, this will involve deletion of aspects which are found to be duplicative, or otherwise extraneous. In this context, Australia continues to see no place in the treaty for provisions on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, or on security assurances for States parties. In the case of the first issue - PNEs - our concerns were set out in detail in my plenary statement in June. In the case of security assurances, while supportive of continuing international attention to that issue we do not believe that a Committee mandated specifically to draft a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the appropriate place in which to address it.

Our fourth candidate issue for urgent attention is that of organization. Some delegations have argued up until now that discussion of the relationship between the organization and other international institutions was premature and largely dependent on progress in Working Group 1. While this argument may have held some weight in the past, it is in our view no longer valid. We now have agreement on the basic elements of the verification system, which should enable a decision at least on the **principle** of the relationship. We should now move promptly to examine its technical and financial aspects.

For Australia's part, we continue to believe that the CTBT organization should be co-located with, but independent from the International Atomic Energy Agency. This would enable savings to be derived in the start-up and running costs of the organization, in the area of accommodation, and in the general administration of the technical secretariat, which could be provided by IAEA on a "user pays" basis. Common servicing should not, in our view, be extended to the technical aspects of verification, although where relevant IAEA technical expertise were identified, it could be utilized by the CTBT organization on a contractual basis as the need arose.

The logical consequence of our position is that Australia supports, in principle, Austria's offer to host the seat of the CTBT organization in Vienna. I suggest we now need detail from Austria about its offer, in particular, confirmation that a CTBT organization based in Vienna will have access to international telecommunications tariffs equal to the best available in the world, in order that transmission of large amounts of verification data be cost-effective. We look forward to early discussions with Austrian representatives.

A considerable degree of convergence on the above issues represents, in my delegation's view, the minimum necessary to facilitate the end-game phase of the negotiations. It is simply not feasible to leave agreement on all issues to the final phase of the negotiation, and as necessary we must be prepared to undertake substantial inter-sessional work.

Lack of progress in these key issues this year would, I fear, indicate to us a lack of serious intent to engage in concluding these negotiations next year, and failure in this, I suggest, is something none of us can afford to view with equanimity.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

I might conclude by saying that the developments of yesterday and today as far as the negotiations on which this Conference is engaged should give us hope that this part of our session is gathering pace and will yield significant achievements to provide a firm platform for an end-game process that will bring to conclusion these negotiations by the middle of 1996. That is the objective to which we work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to Ambassador Norberg of Sweden.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to join previous speakers in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference, and I wish to assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation.

I would like to make a short announcement which is not directly related to the CD proper, but I believe is of interest to many delegations of members of the CD and observers. This announcement concerns the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. This conference will be held in Vienna from 25 September to 13 October 1995. The Provisional Secretary of the Conference has circulated in New York a note regarding the preparation of the Conference, and I draw the attention of delegations that this note is now being distributed here in Geneva to States parties. The note contains information regarding the organization of the Conference, and the availability of the President-designate of the Conference, Ambassador Molander, for consultations. I jut wanted to inform delegations that those who are interested in an appointment with Ambassador Molander (appointments on 21 and 22 August) are welcome to contact the Swedish delegation in order to make an appointment with him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his announcement and for the kind words he addressed to me. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

As members of the Conference are aware, consultations are still under way in an attempt to overcome the difficulties facing us with regard to the agenda and organization of work of the Conference during this session. Unfortunately, I am not in a position at this stage to report any progress and, therefore, it is my intention to explore all possible avenues, and to continue both bilateral and group consultations, in order to bring positions closer together. I would, once again, urge delegations to extend to me the necessary support and cooperation in my endeavours.

(The President)

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 17 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.714
17 August 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 17 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shirchinjavyn Yumjav (Mongolia)

GE.95-63468 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 714th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to extend a warm welcome to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Mr. Roland Smith, who will be addressing the Conference today. His presence among us today is further evidence of the importance attached to our forum by his Government, especially at a crucial time when the Conference is intensifying its negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I should also like to warmly welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, the newly appointed representative of Canada, Ambassador Moher. I am sure that the experience of Ambassador Moher in multilateral diplomacy and his deep knowledge of arms control and disarmament issues, especially in the nuclear field, will be an asset to this Conference. I should like to assure Ambassador Moher of our full cooperation and support and wish him every success in his tour of duty in Geneva.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United Kingdom, Argentina, Chile, the United States of America, Germany, Japan and Canada. I now give the floor to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Mr. Roland Smith.

Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, thank you for your words of introduction. May I begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and assuring you of the United Kingdom's full support.

I am delighted to be able to take part this morning in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This body and its predecessors have a distinguished history. It is due to them that the international community has succeeded in agreeing important multilateral instruments for controlling nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. And it is on continued efforts here that hopes for further progress in these and other areas are so largely centred. It is, therefore, not surprising that many States are keen to play a full part in the important negotiations which take place here. In our view, their participation would enhance the work of the Conference and add weight to the agreements which it concludes. So, at the outset, I put on record once again my Government's firm view that we should work for the early admission of all who have applied to date.

During their visits to the Conference over the past two years, both of my predecessors in my present job explained the reasons why we in the United Kingdom believed that an indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty would be in the best interests of all States. That extension has since been achieved. We firmly believe the decision of the parties to extend the Treaty indefinitely, without resort to a vote, is a tribute to the statesmanship of all concerned. The Treaty is now a permanent feature of the international scene, and this can only strengthen the prospects for both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Smith, United Kingdom)

In our view, with a bit more time, the Conference could also have agreed a final declaration covering the review element of its work. But we certainly do not regret the time spent on agreeing and adopting without a vote three other documents - the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", the decision on "Strengthening the review process", and the resolution calling for universal adherence to the Treaty and making special mention of the need for all States in the Middle East to accede to the NPT as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards. These are important documents and we intend to ensure that they are followed up.

Since the Conference, Chile has acceded to the Treaty, bringing the total number of parties to 179. But further accessions are necessary to secure universal adherence and we must all search for ways to secure these. We shall also need to give thought to precisely how the strengthened review process will operate once it begins in 1997. And, of course, we must make every effort to build on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. This document contains sections on many important subjects, including security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones. We shall continue to address these topics seriously. But, since time presses, I propose to focus today on the section which deals specifically with nuclear disarmament.

The Principles and Objectives rightly state that it is important to complete the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. Our record in the negotiations demonstrates our commitment to this objective. We have dropped our reservation on scope and accepted language which would ban all nuclear explosions. We welcome the fact that, in his statement here last week, the distinguished Ambassador of France also accepted this language. Our experts are ready to continue to provide technical support, as required, to the Verification Working Group. In other areas we shall also play whatever part we can to ensure that we achieve our shared objective of a treaty no later than 1996.

We continue to believe that this is a realistic ambition. Through the forest of square brackets, the makings of a workable treaty are now visible. These negotiations were never going to be easy, but the progress which has been made since January 1994 is impressive. We understand that many States would have preferred the negotiations to take place in the absence of any nuclear-weapons testing. For our part, we have no plans to conduct such tests. But it is essential that we should not allow concerns about testing today to eclipse our efforts to ensure an indefinite test ban for tomorrow and the future.

The Principles and Objectives document also states that it is important to achieve the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Despite the

(Mr. Smith, United Kingdom)

decision of the Conference in March to establish an ad hoc committee for this purpose, work on the negotiation of a cut-off convention still has not started. We regret this delay in moving forward on a topic which we all agree is important.

We are, however, continuing to give a good deal of thought to the detailed issues which will have to be discussed once the Ad Hoc Committee is up and running. We remain of the view that the scope of the convention should be confined to banning the future production of fissile material for explosive purposes. But it will also be necessary to consider what the detailed arrangements for verifying this obligation should be, how the costs of these arrangements might best be met, and how we can ensure the universal application of the treaty. We hope others are also giving thought to these issues, so that swift progress will be possible once the Ad Hoc Committee does begin its work.

The third point which the nuclear disarmament section of the Principles and Objectives mentions is the need for the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The last part of this wording draws attention to the need to make progress on non-nuclear as well as nuclear issues, to which I shall refer in a moment.

As far as reducing nuclear weapons globally is concerned, it is clear that substantial reductions have been made, and are being made, as a result of bilaterally negotiated agreements and unilateral actions. In our view, these continue to be the right routes forward for the time being. But certainly there is no doubt that a world in which United States and Russian nuclear forces were counted in hundreds, rather than thousands, would be one in which Britain would respond to the challenge of multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear arms. That time has not yet come, however, and accordingly we believe it would be premature for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. In the nuclear sphere the Conference already has plenty to do in concluding the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban and in pursuing negociations for a cut-off.

I have dwelt on nuclear issues in these remarks because the United Kingdom is well aware that the decision to extend the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty indefinitely does not mean there should be any relaxation of efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. For our part, we are not conducting any nuclear explosions, and we remain committed to the success of the negotiations in this Conference for a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996; we have ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes, and we look forward to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations by this Conference for a cut-off convention; we are reducing the total number of our nuclear warheads and their total explosive power, and we will join multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear arms once that seems likely to be the best way forward.

(Mr. Smith, United Kingdom)

The Principles and Objectives document rightly states that nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The United Kingdom is striving hard to realize the potential which these favourable developments have brought about.

I hope I have left you in no doubt about the United Kingdom's continued commitment to nuclear disarmament. But that is by no means the whole of the picture. And I turn now to non-nuclear issues.

We continue to attach great importance to the early entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention. So far, 32 States have ratified the Convention, and I am pleased to say that the necessary domestic legislation to make United Kingdom ratification possible has now been published in draft with a view to its being introduced as early as possible in the 1995/96 session of Parliament. The pace of ratifications must speed up if entry into force is to take place, as hoped, in 1996. It is also important that we make faster progress in The Hague with preparations for the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We hope all the signatory States represented here will help to move this work forward in a constructive way during the coming months.

We also continue to attach great importance to strengthening the biological and toxin weapons Convention, in particular by adding legally binding verification arrangements. We welcome the fact that a start has been made on this following the Special Conference of the States Parties last year. We believe the recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Group made good progress in identifying the main issues to be addressed. And we hope all the parties represented here will use the time between now and the Group's next meeting in November to facilitate progress. We need to move quickly if we are to complete this work by the time of the biological and toxin weapons review Conference in 1996.

Nor must we forget about conventional weapons. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are potential weapons of mass destruction, but now, today, it is conventional weapons which are the actual weapons of mass destruction. One has only to think of the large numbers of people killed and maimed by the sadly all too commonplace land-mine. Like a number of other States, we have introduced an extensive national moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. We urge others to do so too. We also believe that we must take full advantage of the United Nations weaponry Convention Review Conference next month. Our main objectives will be to broaden adherence to the Convention and to see its provisions on the use of land-mines considerably strengthened and extended. We also remain committed to making progress on the Land-Mine Control Programme - the initiative launched in June at Budapest with a view to restricting the production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel land-mines - in a way which will complement the revised United Nations weaponry Convention.

But land-mines are only one of the many forms of conventional weapon. It is very important not to forget all the others, and I wish to emphasize

(Mr. Smith, United Kingdom)

our hope that all States will submit returns for 1994 to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Completion of these annual returns is not a demanding step for States to take, but in the past too many have not taken it. It is also our strong view that this Conference should continue to give thoughtful attention to the problems posed by conventional weapons, including by re-establishing its Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. The issues posed by conventional weapons require attention. It is no more right for this Conference to ignore these issues than it would be for it to ignore nuclear issues.

Let me in conclusion reiterate our view that concerns about nuclear weapons must be balanced by concerns about other weapons - about chemical and biological weapons, and about conventional weapons. Movement on these issues is also vital if we are to make well-rounded progress towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. We continue, therefore, to attach importance to ensuring a balanced programme of work for this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Sir, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your distinguished presidency, I would like to congratulate you on the way you are conducting the business of this body and to offer you all our support and cooperation.

This statement will be distributed in English at the end of this meeting.

Allow me to begin this statement with a brief reference to the draft resolution on non-proliferation submitted by my country on 2 June last in the United Nations Security Council. It is not our intention to put that draft before this Conference on Disarmament for consideration, since we consider that the appropriate forum is the one in which it was tabled. We are only prompted to make this comment by the statement made by the Ambassador of Pakistan at the last meeting of this plenary on behalf of the G21. We have taken note of that statement and forwarded it to our Foreign Ministry and our delegation in New York. Nevertheless we would like to make the following points.

Argentina fully subscribes to what was said in that statement, to the effect that this Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body on arms control and disarmament. We also agree with what it says about the impact on the ongoing negotiations if this Conference were to evade or affect the provisions of existing treaties. It would be hard for any member of the Conference to disagree with that view. Similarly it would be hard for any Member of the United Nations to deny that the Security Council has a role to play in maintaining international peace and security or that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security. This is the subject of the aforementioned Argentine draft resolution, which, the very day before the statement made by the

(Mr. Sánchez Arnau, Argentina)

representative of Pakistan in this chamber, was enhanced at a meeting held in New York by proposals from the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement that are members of the Security Council. Therefore let us leave the Security Council to do its job within the framework of its responsibilities and let us continue our efforts to advance the work of this Conference.

If there is one thing that drives the foreign policy of the Argentine Republic, that is its firm commitment to peace, security and disarmament. And we are determined to pursue this policy in a context of dialogue and understanding of the interests and problems of all those that sincerely share these aims. This Argentine commitment is borne out by the fact that on 9 August last our Congress adopted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and also the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

If the Conference on Disarmament is to be able to perform its functions properly, we consider that three requirements must be met. In the first place, we must restore the will to negotiate and work together without preconditions. For decades, through the nuclear build-up, a tremendous destructive capability was formed, which was intended to be, and managed to be, a deterrent. Today, the end of the cold war is enabling us to dismantle this capability piece by piece. To attempt to force the pace is, to say the least, unrealistic. To make every step in the negotiations within this Conference, however small it may be, whether we are talking about negotiating a treaty on "cut-off" or extending transparency in conventional weapons, dependent on some predetermined disarmament scheme, does not contribute, but rather hampers this negotiating process.

In the Argentine Republic our view is that we should try to avail ourselves to the full of each and every opportunity that we are offered so as to dismantle the atomic arsenal. It is healthy and positive for the international community to maintain its pressure on the nuclear Powers and those that still aspire to that status, so that the progress towards disarmament becomes irreversible. If we wish to trace a predetermined road, perhaps we shall not get very far. If we had set prior conditions, we should not have had a Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, nor a Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons.

The second requirement for our success is that we should work responsibly on the expansion of the Conference, to make it duly representative, so that its decisions can be readily accepted by the international community as a whole. Without a doubt expansion is a subject of common interest for member and non-member countries of this Conference on Disarmament. Consensus on the principle of expansion is as general as it is pressing. The General Assembly gave us a very precise mandate. It urged us to take this step. All that remains is for us to find a way of ensuring representativeness that is more appropriate to the times we are living in. The Conference must incorporate a significant number of new members in order to regain the degree of representativeness that it enjoyed vis-à-vis the world in 1978, when the last

(Mr. Sánchez Arnau, Argentina)

expansion of this Conference was carried out. I am not going to recapitulate the oft-told history of the present membership of the CD, but I can say that the decision to establish it included a decision to carry out regular reviews of its membership. There has been no lack of serious efforts made to fulfil that commitment to hold regular reviews. Today we need to include in those exercises the new elements that will allow us to break the deadlock as quickly as possible. One of these is certainly the expectations that the international community has placed in this body since the end of the cold war.

This suggests to us that the Conference membership must bring together the strategically more important countries as well as those which, geographically or for political reasons, provide the necessary balance. We must maintain the consensus achieved by the international community in adopting resolution 49/77 B at the last General Assembly of the United Nations. We, as members of this Conference, have the responsibility to produce an imaginative solution on the basis of that consensus which will enable us to discharge the mandate of the General Assembly to the full.

The third requirement for our success is that we should consolidate the credibility of the Conference by rapidly concluding the nuclear-test-ban treaty. In our reading of the international context there is no lack of elements to suggest that this can be done. Among these elements we believe it is important to highlight the statement made by President Clinton on 11 August on the scope of the treaty. We hail his political courage in making that decision and encourage the remaining nuclear Powers that have still not done so to accept the principle of a complete ban without thresholds. We have also noted with satisfaction the commitment made by President Chirac to sign the treaty, and his definition of scope, which we consider to be another encouraging element for the future of our negotiations. We also appreciate the proposals made by the United States about the funding and structure of the international monitoring system.

Our country considers that the nuclear-test-ban agreement must cover absolutely every type of nuclear test, including small-scale nuclear explosions. This is fully set out in the proposal "to prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" contained in working paper 222 submitted by the Australian delegation on the scope of the treaty. These and other contributions made daily in the context of our negotiations can, we feel, make a sound contribution to the achievement of our objective of rapidly completing the negotiation of the CTBT.

We know that this stage is undoubtedly of the highest importance for bringing positions together on verification. This is why we wish to appeal to all member and non-member countries of the Conference to make an active scientific and technical contribution to this work. Only in this way will it be possible to provide such a system with a properly defined list of facilities in good time. The Argentine Republic considers that such a list of facilities should be included in an appendix to the treaty, so that States are clearly aware, sufficiently in advance, of the commitment that they are entering into. In this regard I would also like to announce that my

(Mr. Sánchez Arnau, Argentina)

Government is offering to hold a workshop next November in Argentina that will bring together seismic experts from the South American continent with a view to bringing about a stronger and better-organized commitment on the part of countries in the region to participate in defining, establishing and operating the international monitoring system under the CTBT.

In the light of developments at this session of the Conference, we believe the time has come to analyse the situation very carefully and adopt a practical approach that will enable us to return to the path of consensus. We have to admit that our negotiations are not progressing as quickly as they should. In this respect, I wish to add my voice to those who, a week ago, warned of the danger we run if we fail to meet our commitments and disappoint the international community's expectations of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile, Ambassador Berguño.

Mr. BERGUÑO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on the way you are discharging your duties and offer you my delegation's cooperation.

Today we have a feeling of great opportunities, broad horizons, historic changes. If we are truly capable of living in keeping with the times, we can leave behind the heavy legacy of the nuclear threat and offer future generations a safer and cleaner world. Nuclear weapons are no longer pointed at the adversary's cities; programmes of assistance are being devised for a gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals; and the logic of mass destruction has been replaced by that of reasonable control. This process of containment and stabilization is still a long way from constituting a commitment to halt the nuclear arms race completely and achieve full nuclear disarmament.

While we are moving away from the risks of nuclear confrontation, temporarily and not irrevocably, the proliferation of technology and the manufacture of nuclear weapons constitute a serious threat. Many nations today have scientific personnel, a critical mass of information and data-processing capacity that is superior without a doubt to those available to the designers of the first atomic bomb. The production of fissile material is expensive and technically demanding, but it can be achieved with arduous effort; the equipment is hard to obtain, but there are a range of ways to violate export controls and the international safeguards regime is still imperfect.

With several nations possessing a nuclear capacity and others on the threshold of access, with illegal trafficking and growing problems of nuclear security, we must ask ourselves what is the sense of distinctions between horizontal and vertical proliferation, and the controversy about the comparative risks of one scourge or the other, or the responsibilities of the Security Council and the Conference on Disarmament in these matters. In the face of the nuclear threat, half-hearted action is not appropriate, nor can the privileges of an aristocracy composed of the possessors of a capacity

(Mr. Berguño, Chile)

for maximum destruction, who endanger the right of life, health and the environment, be maintained indefinitely. The entire international community and all bodies in the United Nations system are called upon to take action to attain the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

In this context, the continuation of nuclear testing, of which we have had discouraging examples in recent days, is a message from one nuclear State to other non-nuclear States, with an implicit panegyric concerning the importance and legitimacy of nuclear weapons. A nuclear test is an indication of intent or at least resigned acceptance of possible use of such nuclear weapons. To hold that the conduct of nuclear tests is a precondition for agreement on their future elimination, without taking into account the effect that such a position has vis-à-vis the rights of others, is understandable solely from a standpoint that institutionalizes nuclear deterrence sine die (which runs counter to article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty and other solemn commitments). This is without mentioning the environmental risks, the enormous cost of this lavish expenditure and the twisted approach involved in applying the creativity of scientists, technological experts and professionals to the refinement of death-dealing weapons and the management of the toxic waste they generate.

On the anniversary of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Chile said that the best tribute that can be paid to the memory of the victims is to work hard for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. Progress towards that objective requires first of all the planned and sustained application of the set of principles adopted by the Conference on the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Once that stage has been completed (which presupposes agreement on the treaties for the total prohibition of nuclear testing and fissile material for the warlike purposes, the universalization of security assurances, the consolidation of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, the further development of safeguards and checks that would make proliferation impossible), the conditions will have been laid down to obtain through consensus from the General Assembly the historic mandate that the Conference on Disarmament would be called upon to convert into a formal contractual commitment. In this set of actions, the convention for the total prohibition of nuclear testing is the first and most pressing priority.

The statement by the Ambassador of France to the plenary of this Conference on Disarmament and the announcement by the President of the United States who spoke in favour of the "zero option" which would ban all nuclear explosions and tests, together with the reiteration of this position by the Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office today, offer a major contribution to the negotiation of an agreement that must be comprehensive, without reservations or scope for turning back, so that it can have its full impact. With such an agreement, as presented in Australian working paper No. 222, with which Chile expresses its full agreement, we support the structural outline of the future organization, its location in Vienna, in accordance with the formula suggested in the Australian paper, and we are ready to make Chile's sound seismological research capabilities available to the international monitoring system with the firm conviction that the

(Mr. Berguño, Chile)

verification of the nuclear tests to be banned in all environments constitutes the basic premise for the total ban that we seek to institutionalize permanently.

There are certainly other significant priorities within the global multilateral negotiations, notable among them the proposed convention to prohibit fissile material for warlike purposes. However, this and other important issues on the international disarmament agenda remain deadlocked. Today's statements by the United Kingdom and Argentina are important, but I must single out the valuable comments made by Ambassador Sánchez Arnau on the three conditions the Conference on Disarmament must meet in order to fully justify its mission, including the specific reference to resolution 49/77 B, of which this Conference has not formally taken note. The truth is that the Conference on Disarmament is totally deadlocked in the face of the challenge represented by its inappropriate structure and methods of work, as well as the lack of representativeness to negotiate legal instruments that call for universal accession, as has been pointed out in the already mentioned General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus. The Conference should give thought to the prospect, once this first technical and political stage of review of the draft convention is over, since this is the only subject for which it has been possible to begin or trace the path, of transferring this issue to the democratic forum of a specialized diplomatic conference. This procedure could continue to be applied until the Conference is in a position to and able to re-establish its traditional machinery for expansion. There is also a need for an organized link between these global negotiations and the progressive establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, like the Treaty of Tlatelolco zone, in the various regions of the world.

We welcome the announcement by Ambassador Selebi of South Africa concerning the finalization of the African treaty and we note that a new spirit is propitious to the establishment of such zones in the ASEAN and Middle East regions. Beginning with the Treaty of Rarotonga, it is essential for all the nuclear States to sign the protocols that guarantee the obligations entered into, ensuring that no non-peaceful nuclear devices, components or elements will be introduced, transferred or transported through the denuclearized zones. If all nuclear States stop testing; if all countries in the world stop producing, stockpiling or transferring fissile material for military use; if the rights of the parties to agreements banning nuclear weapons are firmly upheld; if the agreed safeguards, verification machinery and confidence-building measures are improved and put into effect; if the rule banning nuclear intimidation is universally applied, what sense would there be in persisting with a doctrine of nuclear deterrence relegated to parts of the Euro-Atlantic, central Asian and north Pacific regions? In this geopolitical framework, Mongolia's decision in 1992 to declare its territory free of nuclear weapons can be seen as a singular harbinger of the new era.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, as this is the first time that I have taken the floor under your presidency, allow me to offer my congratulations on your assumption of the Chair. I extend to you the full support of my delegation. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome warmly our new colleagues around this table as well as our distinguished visitor, Under-Secretary Roland Smith of the United Kingdom.

At the conclusion of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference three months ago, all NPT parties agreed to work to complete a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. I would like to inform the Conference today of the most recent steps taken by my Government toward this very important goal.

Last Friday, 11 August, the President of the United States reaffirmed our commitment to do everything within our power to conclude the CTBT negotiations as rapidly as possible so that a treaty can be signed next year. As part of a major initiative to bring the negotiations to closure as rapidly as possible, the President detailed United States support for concluding a "true zero yield" CTBT that would ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion no matter how small, immediately upon entry into force of a CTBT. In his statement, President Clinton also highlighted specific, concrete safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a CTBT, including the centrality of the United States programme for stockpile stewardship in the absence of nuclear testing, and our right to withdraw from the treaty under the "supreme national interests" clause. While clearly important internal considerations for the United States, these safeguards require no action by this Conference. Hence, my delegation will not be proposing any additions or changes to the rolling text in regard to these initiatives.

We hope and expect that President Clinton's announcement, together with the welcome French initiative announced by Ambassador Errera in this body one week ago, will bring the Conference closer to agreement on the text on treaty scope proposed by Australia, namely a treaty which would ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. In this regard, I would like to acknowledge the positive remarks we just heard from the Ambassadors of Argentina and Chile about the CTBT scope initiatives of last week.

President Clinton has instructed me and my delegation "to redouble efforts to complete and sign a CTBT next year". We therefore call on all members of the Conference to strive to conclude a good treaty as soon as possible. This will require key political decisions that will enable the negotiations to progress expeditiously. I sincerely hope that next week's discussions of the international monitoring system architecture, for example, will result in significant agreement on the CTBT monitoring network. In this same regard, my Government hopes that intensive work on this treaty will continue in the inter-sessional period before the 1996 CD session formally begins its work.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

In closing, may I ask that the text of President Clinton's 11 August statement and an accompanying fact-sheet on safeguards, both of which have been submitted to the CD secretariat today, be circulated as official documents of the CD?

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Mr. Keller.

Mr. KELLER (Germany): Mr. President, please allow me to make the following statement regarding the scope of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The Federal Government is committed to concluding a truly comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996. It therefore welcomes the decision of France and the United States to seek a ban on any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other explosion including explosions of low yield in the ongoing CTBT negotiations. We take it from recent Russian declarations that there might be a convergence of views emerging in this respect. The Federal Government is convinced that these decisions will give a decisive impetus to the CTBT negotiations with a view to enabling an early and successful conclusion of the treaty. A common position of the five nuclear-weapon States regarding the banning of any nuclear explosion including low-yield explosions would be of particular importance for the discussion on the scope article scheduled for 24 August 1995 in Working Group 2 of the CTBT Ad Hoc Committee.

While I have the floor, Mr. President, allow me to make a comment on the most recent Chinese nuclear test. We think that this most recent Chinese nuclear test underscores once more the necessity to bring about a ban on nuclear testing as rapidly as possible. To our mind, nuclear tests are no longer appropriate today. They are not in line with the spirit of the results brought about in the NPT extension Conference and the goals of the ongoing CTBT negotiations. The Federal Government will do its best to drive forward the CTBT negotiations and conclude them no later than in the autumn of 1996. As already mentioned, the American and French decision to extend a treaty ban to all nuclear explosions has given an important impetus to the CTBT negotiations.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): Mr. President, at the outset, since this is the first time that I take the floor under your presidency, I would like to extend to you my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I pledge the fullest cooperation and support of my delegation to you in the discharge of your important duties to guide the work of the Conference. At the same time, allow me to extend a heartfelt welcome to all our distinguished colleagues, the Ambassador of South Africa, His Excellency Mr. J.S. Selebi, the Ambassador of India, Her Excellency Ms. Arundhati Ghose, and the Ambassador of Canada, His Excellency Mr. Mark Moher, who recently joined us in our common endeavour. It is also a great pleasure to have among us the distinguished Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Roland Smith of the United Kingdom.

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

It is with profound regret that I am obliged to make a statement concerning the nuclear test conducted by the People's Republic of China today. While Japan and indeed the international community as a whole renew our hope for peace and our desire for nuclear disarmament in this year of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the atomic bombing, China again conducted a nuclear-weapon test, in addition to that in May this year, despite the agreement that the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint on nuclear testing reached at the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

Japan attaches great importance to the ban on nuclear testing as one of the most important tasks in the field of nuclear disarmament, and, therefore, takes it seriously that China conducted yet another nuclear test today despite our repeated calls to halt testing. Japan strongly urges China not to repeat nuclear testing any more. At the same time, it is important that all nuclear-weapon States refrain from conducting any nuclear test.

On 11 August, President Clinton of the United States made an announcement that he supports a true zero-yield comprehensive test-ban treaty which prohibits any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Japan wholeheartedly welcomes and highly values this decision as it is in accord with Japan's stance to seek a total ban on nuclear explosions by a CTBT.

The fact that the United States, a nuclear-weapon State, made this decision will give a significant impetus to the negotiations on a CTBT for its completion no later than 1996, the undertaking that was agreed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May this year. On 10 August, the Ambassador of France, His Excellency Mr. Gérard Errera, announced in this room that France had decided to adopt the formulation of a CTBT which shall prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Japan expects that these recent developments will contribute to the acceleration of the CTBT negotiations.

It is Japan's strong hope that other nuclear-weapon States will immediately take positions of supporting a total ban on nuclear-test explosions under a CTBT, taking into account the recent decisions of the United States and France. Japan, too, will make its utmost efforts together with other participating countries toward the completion of the CTBT negotiations early next year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for her statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Moher.

Mr. MOHER (Canada): Mr. President, I wish first of all to express my sincere appreciation for your very generous welcoming comments at the opening of this session, and also for the welcoming comments of other delegations around this table. On this my first occasion to address the Conference, I also wish to emphasize my desire to work with all delegations, both members and observers, to achieve more effective arms control and disarmament

(Mr. Moher, Canada)

measures. You can be assured of the full support of the Canadian delegation as you continue your presidency. I would also like to pay tribute to the hard work and commitment of your predecessors, Ambassadors de Icaza, Nanjira, Kurokochi and Vattani, as well as those of the secretariat of the Conference.

Canada's priority at this time, as for many around this table, is the early conclusion of a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Much has been accomplished in the last 18 months. My Government welcomes the recent developments respecting the scope of the treaty, particularly the express commitment by the President of the United States of America to a true "zero"-yield CTBT and the adoption by the Government of France of the proposal to "prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion". These extremely important decisions, and the timing of their announcement, will help the progress of our negotiations significantly.

We all appreciate as well the important work being conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts, who have been meeting this week and last under the chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman, particularly the GSETT-III experiment in which many Governments, including that of Canada, are involved.

The necessity for early progress is particularly significant. We share the goal expressed by others of obtaining the signature of the CTBT before the fifty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, that is, during the resumed session of UNGA 50 next September. We believe that such a goal is achievable. The CD can achieve this aim through a structured process, with careful planning and strong political commitment.

As all are aware, much work remains to be done. Canada attaches particular importance to the following issues at this stage.

First, scope. Canada supports the Australian formulation calling for a prohibition of all nuclear-weapons test explosions and any other nuclear explosion, that is, a total and complete ban. We urge the earliest possible consensus on this point.

Second, verification. It is a matter of great priority for us all to obtain agreements on the component elements of the international monitoring system (including the nature of data processing by the international data centre), synergetic meshing of the four agreed technologies and convergence on a concept for on-site inspections. We for our part will continue to do our best to promote such agreements.

Third, organization. Canada believes that the treaty should be implemented through the most cost-effective arrangement possible. Independent management and co-location of the CTBT organization with the International Atomic Energy Agency with carefully negotiated linkages can help achieve these objectives.

As I have already observed the recent highly positive decisions of the United States and French Governments are greatly encouraging. We welcome the

(Mr. Moher, Canada)

further statement by Mr. Roland Smith of the United Kingdom Government here this morning. We call on all remaining nuclear-weapon States to adopt such positions. These vital political decisions coupled with the valuable work being carried out in this Conference portend well for our efforts. It is our hope that this momentum can be maintained. We are prepared to do our best to assist in that regard.

A complete end to all nuclear testing is vital to international security. The Canadian delegation expressed in June of this year its regret that two nuclear-weapon States intend to continue testing. It is, therefore, with particular regret we have learned of the latest Chinese test this morning. We strongly urge the cessation of all nuclear testing.

On a separate matter, the Conference is well aware that the Government of Canada has long been committed to the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I pay respectful tribute to the work of my predecessor and good friend Ambassador Gerald Shannon for his achievement in March of this year of a mandate for such a negotiation following 14 months of consultations. We consider this as one of the principal achievements of the Conference this year and salute the commitment of all delegations to common objectives that led to the adoption of the mandate. It is therefore my Government's firm desire that work of the Ad Hoc Committee established by this Conference in the first part of the current session be initiated as soon as possible under agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

As a final point I should note that expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament continues to be a pressing issue. It becomes increasingly difficult for members of the Conference to claim the title of a truly credible multilateral negotiating body when so many worthy applicants are excluded from full membership. I look forward to resolution of this pressing issue as well.

In concluding, I would like to reconfirm my commitment and that of my delegation to advancing the work of this Conference. We look forward to working with all delegations and the secretariat in the future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Armstrong.

Mr. ARMSTRONG (New Zealand): Firstly, Mr. President, I congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency, and assure you of my delegation's full cooperation.

On 1 June I conveyed to this Conference New Zealand's shock and disappointment at the conduct by China of a nuclear-weapon test on 15 May. Today the New Zealand Prime Minister has expressed New Zealand's serious concern and regret at China's action in proceeding with yet another nuclear

(Mr. Armstrong, New Zealand)

test. This is the more reprehensible in light of the current widespread protest at France's decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

The New Zealand Prime Minister has also drawn attention to the recent decision by 18 nations for the Asia-Pacific region to call for an immediate end to all nuclear testing in the region.

New Zealand opposes nuclear testing wherever it occurs and by whomever it is conducted. The Prime Minister has recalled that, after its last nuclear test, the Chinese Government confirmed that it was committed to the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and would stop testing once the treaty had been concluded. In this context, the New Zealand Government urges the Chinese Government to show its serious commitment to the completion next year of the CTBT negotiations in this Conference. In particular, New Zealand calls upon China to announce its agreement to a zero threshold for testing and to withdraw its proposal to allow for so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions".

New Zealand's serious concerns regarding this further nuclear test are also being conveyed direct to the Chinese authorities.

While I have the floor, can I also express New Zealand's support for the constructive statement on the issue of expansion made earlier by the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina? It is also New Zealand's view that the United Nations General Assembly has provided this Conference with a basis for itself achieving consensus on this question.

Mr. STARR (Australia): I have asked for the floor to inform the Conference that the Australian Prime Minister has condemned the nuclear test conducted by China and detected by Australian monitoring stations at 3 a.m. this morning Geneva time.

I would like to read to the Conference the statement by the Prime Minister of Australia. The Prime Minister has said that:

"Australia condemns the latest test of a nuclear weapon by China.

"This test is the second in only three months since the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May this year. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference all nuclear-weapons States agreed to exercise 'utmost restraint' with respect to nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1996, and to work sincerely towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons. China's action flies in the face of these undertakings, which it supported in the NPT conference.

"One of the unfortunate consequences of China's decision to continue testing is that nations which aspire to possess nuclear weapons will question the sincerity of nuclear-weapons States to eventual nuclear disarmament and their interest in developing nuclear weapons may be reinforced. Such a development would be a serious threat to world peace.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

"Australia welcomes the recent statement of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which called on nuclear-weapon States to bring an immediate end to nuclear testing, as a clear expression of regional and international concerns about the continued and unwarranted testing of nuclear weapons.

"Australians are angry that despite the end of the cold war and the successful extension of the NPT both China and France have decided to continue testing nuclear weapons. Our disappointment is the greater because of the restraint exhibited by the other nuclear-weapons States and the fact that these weapons-testing programmes are occurring at a critical time in international negotiations on a number of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives.

"Australia urges China to cease its nuclear-weapons testing programme now as both an important boost to global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and global security."

That concludes the statement by the Prime Minister. I would like to continue that, from the point of view of my delegation, this explosion unfortunately follows most positive developments arising from significant steps by France and the United States in the context of this Conference's work which gave rise to expectations that we were advancing strongly towards our goal of concluding negotiations on a genuinely comprehensive ban within our 1996 target.

Thus in the context of these negotiations and of our shared expectations my delegation, like that of New Zealand, urges China to reaffirm its 1994 call for a zero threshold, to withdraw its proposal for an exception for "peaceful nuclear explosions" and to endorse explicitly the goal of concluding negotiations by mid-1996 to enable signature of this treaty by September of that year.

Mr. RUSSELL (Ireland): Mr. President, I should like first to offer you congratulations on your taking up the office of President of the Conference and to wish you well during your weeks of office.

I have asked for the floor this morning to register the concern and disappointment of Ireland at the news that China has conducted yet another nuclear test. This news is all the more disconcerting coming as it does at a time when the negotiations of the Conference on a comprehensive test-ban treaty are clearly entering their final phase. Now is surely a time for the practice of utmost restraint, in a way which most States understand that phrase to mean.

As we have made clear in previous statements to the Conference, and on the occasion of the previous Chinese test on 15 May, Ireland is opposed to all nuclear testing. We would ask those nuclear-weapon Powers who are not observing a moratorium on testing to do so, and we would also ask all members of the Conference to redouble their already productive work and bring the CTBT to a conclusion at the earliest possible stage.

(Mr. Russell, Ireland)

As I have the floor, I would like to record Ireland's appreciation of the remarks made this morning by the United Kingdom, Argentina, Chile and Canada on the expansion of the Conference, and we hope that this work will proceed productively.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ireland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Sha.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): At the outset, Mr. President, I would like to warmly congratulate you on taking up the office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. The Chinese delegation will closely cooperate with you. At the same time I would like to extend a warm welcome to our colleagues who have just joined us, the Ambassadors from India, Canada and South Africa. I wish them success in their fulfilment of their responsibilities.

China understands the concerns of the non-nuclear States on the question of nuclear tests. On the matter of nuclear testing, China has always adopted an attitude of extreme restraint and has so far conducted a very limited number of tests. It is the hope of China that the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB of the Conference on Disarmament will, in accordance with its mandate, conclude as early as possible and no later than in 1996 an "excellent" comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Chinese delegation will, as always, participate in the negotiations with a positive, serious and responsible attitude so as to make its contribution to the early conclusion of such a treaty. Once the comprehensive test-ban treaty enters into force, China will abide by the treaty and stop nuclear testing for ever.

China possess a small number of nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of self-defence. The nuclear weaponry of China poses no threat to any State. On the contrary, China itself has always lived under the shadow of the nuclear threat.

From the first day China came into possession of its nuclear weapons, it committed itself unconditionally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States or nuclear-free zones. On many occasions China has suggested that the nuclear-weapon States should negotiate and conclude a legally binding international treaty against the first use and on the non-use of nuclear weapons. China suggested long ago that, as in the case of the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and biological weapons, we should try to conclude a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons and their total destruction. It is our hope that the above-mentioned suggestion of China will secure an early positive response from the parties concerned.

China has its own views with regard to some members of military alliances which, while enjoying the protection of a nuclear umbrella and supporting the policy of nuclear deterrence, resort to the practice of making remarks about a small number of limited nuclear tests conducted by another State.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? This is not the case.

As you are aware, consultations are still under way on all of the outstanding issues facing the Conference. However, we have not yet identified enough common ground to enable us to move forward. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon me to persist in my efforts to try and bring positions closer together before the end of my term of office. Therefore, I shall continue to hold consultations, both bilaterally and with groups of delegations, and shall report to you next week on the outcome of my endeavours.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 24 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.715
24 August 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shirchinjavyn Yumjav (Mongolia)

GE.95-63529 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 715th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to extend a warm welcome to this year's participants in the Disarmament Fellowship Programme, who are with us for the first time today. As you know, as part of their training, the Fellows will follow the work of our Conference in order to become acquainted with the negotiating aspects of disarmament. I am sure their exposure to the proceedings of this forum will be valuable, especially given the crucial stage reached in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I should like to wish all the Fellows a very interesting and enjoyable stay in Geneva.

As you are aware, the representative of France, Ambassador Gérard Errera, will be leaving us very soon after four and a half years as head of his delegation. I am sure you will all agree with me that the imprint made on this Conference by Ambassador Errera will be felt long after his departure. He joined this forum at a crucial time when the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention was being finalized, and his personal contribution to its conclusion is still fresh in our memories, as is his role, and that of his entire delegation, in ensuring the success of the ceremony held in Paris for the signature of the Convention. We also remember the polished and highly effective way in which Ambassador Errera steered the Conference during his presidency in January 1994, and the smooth adoption of our agenda and organization of work at the first plenary of that session. Ambassador Errera will also be remembered for the tenacity and talent with which he has upheld his Government's position and for the clarity of his presentations. His diplomatic skill, as well as his human qualities, will be missed by this Conference. I am sure I speak on behalf of all of us in wishing Ambassador Errera and his family every happiness and success for the future.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Egypt, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mexico, Belgium, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden and France. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to congratulate you most warmly on assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during the final part of its 1995 session. I would like to express our appreciation for all your efforts in guiding our work through this critical phase of our deliberations. Equally I express our best wishes for success to Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco, who will preside over our remaining meetings of the session starting next week. I also take this opportunity to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, who made commendable and much appreciated efforts in attempting to resolve the various outstanding issues relating to the organization of our work before the conclusion of the second part of the CD session. I take this opportunity also to welcome amongst us here at the CD our new colleagues from Canada, Ambassador Mark Moher, India,

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Mrs. Arundhati Ghose, Ireland, Mrs. Anderson, and South Africa, Mr. Jacobs Selebi. I am looking forward to cooperating with them in this forum and in other forums in Geneva.

I have heard, as you said, Mr. President, that Ambassador Gérard Errera of France is going to leave Geneva soon. We regret his departure but at the same time I would like to congratulate him on his new post and wish him every success because he has left many splendid tokens of his constructive contributions to this Conference.

Towards the end of this session, I would like to present our understanding of the situation in the Conference and express our opinion about various subjects we have dealt with officially or informally, and I would like to start with the CTBT. So far we are working in the framework of only one Ad Hoc Committee, which began its work in January, and the Conference has been unable until now, the third part of its session, to resolve issues relating to the organization of its work. However, in our view, the work done so far this year in the Ad Hoc Committee and the two working groups has been quite slow, particularly as regards major issues of substance, the solution of which requires political decisions. It is certainly disturbing that, with an entire annual session of the CD devoted exclusively to CTBT negotiations, the results achieved have been fewer than we expected. We hope that this will not impede progress towards the conclusion of those negotiations and the signing of the treaty in 1996.

On this occasion we wish to welcome the recent positive announcements made by France and the United States regarding the scope of the treaty, and we hope that the comprehensive and total ban on all nuclear tests and other nuclear explosions will be endorsed by all nuclear-weapon States and all other countries, thereby allowing a consensus on this important issue. In this connection, I wish to point out that, as long as we are committed to the final aim of nuclear disarmament, in our view there is no need to conduct nuclear tests to ensure the serviceability and safety of nuclear-weapon stockpiles. This has also been confirmed by scientists. Indeed, a test-ban treaty with a scope which falls short of banning all nuclear tests and any other nuclear explosions would not be comprehensive and, therefore, would be ineffective. It therefore goes without saying that our negotiations here must result in a complete and total ban on all nuclear explosions without any exceptions for whatever purpose or of whatever yield.

With regard to verification, in our view the verification mechanism of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must be structured in such a way as to provide an effective detection capability without being excessively complicated or unduly costly. We feel that agreement can be reached on such a mechanism and its component parts, and we urge all delegations to cooperate to ensure that this is done. As far as the organization is concerned, we feel that this task should ideally be assigned to an existing forum, namely IAEA, after its enlargement and adaptation. This approach would allow us to benefit from the experience so far acquired by the Agency in implementing the relevant provisions of the NPT, and would reduce the costs of verification under the CTBT.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

After the NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted the "Principles and objectives" on 11 May 1995, we expected that agreement could be reached in the CD on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. We were sorry to hear the view expressed at our last meeting on 17 August 1995 that the "time has not yet come ... for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament". This view stands in stark contradiction with what was decided at the NPT Conference, and raises questions about the true value that States seem to place on the decisions taken during that Conference, which explicitly called for "the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons" (decision 1, para. 4 (c)). In this connection, we wish to repeat our firm position that what is needed today is agreement on a specific time-frame for complete nuclear disarmament in accordance with the provisions of article VI of the NPT and of the above-mentioned resolution on "Principles and objectives". Such a timetable should be subject to negotiations in the framework of the proposed ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. I also take this opportunity to welcome the statement of the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kozyrev, before this Conference on 29 June 1995, in which he supported the establishment of such a committee. The same position was also expressed by the Group of 21 and other non-aligned countries. We hope that those who believe that the time has come to establish such a committee will make every effort to ensure that this committee can start its work at the beginning of our 1996 session.

The issue of banning the production of fissile material could also have been discussed this year in the committee that the Conference agreed to establish under item 2 of the CD agenda. We feel that the time available this year could have been used to narrow the significant gap that exists between the positions of delegations with regard to the scope of this ban. For our part, we see little point in a fissile material ban which would only cover future production and thereby freeze the status quo, especially as the General Assembly resolution on that subject did not specify future production of that material. For work in the field of a ban on the production of fissile material to have any real significance, the aim for which we are striving, namely the prevention of both vertical and horizontal proliferation, must imperatively be placed in a disarmament context. This dual aim cannot be achieved unless existing stockpiles of fissile material, both military and civilian, form an integral part of our negotiations, as indicated in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, which the Conference agreed to establish, and as reflected in the report of the Special Coordinator on this issue, Ambassador Gerald Shannon

With regard to the issue of security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States, we deplore the fact that this issue is progressively being sidelined at the CD. States which have renounced the nuclear option have an undeniable right to receive legally binding assurances - through a multilaterally negotiated instrument - against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as explicitly stated in decision 1 on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted on 11 May 1995 at the NPT Conference. That decision stated that "further steps

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument" (para. 8 of the decision). There is also a gap in the NPT which we tried to cover later by negotiating either a multilateral international convention or a protocol to the NPT. Such assurances have not been forthcoming despite the declarations made by the five nuclear-weapon States and despite the adoption of Security Council resolutions 255 and 984. The nuclear-weapon States which are enthusiastically pursuing the aim of non-proliferation and at the same time defending their "right" to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent against non-nuclear-weapon States are attempting to reconcile objectives which are irreconcilable.

Although several useful proposals have been made to enable us to resume our deliberations on transparency in armaments, no progress has been made on this issue during the present session. This stalemate is unfortunately due to the fact that, since the end of the 1994 CD session, some States have created a linkage between the re-establishment of certain ad hoc committees and the re-establishment of the Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Contrary to a view we hear all too often in and around this Council chamber, we are firmly committed to the objective of genuine and complete transparency in all types of armaments. Accordingly, we cannot accept a selective approach to this matter. If we are seriously seeking full transparency on military matters, this should apply to all types of weapons. If, however, our objective is to expose the military capabilities of some while those of others remain hidden from scrutiny, we will continue to face the same problems we have faced here at the CD in the 1993 and 1994 sessions, and therefore no progress will be achieved on this issue. I would like to reaffirm that we are seeking full transparency in conventional weapons, as well as all weapons of mass destruction, bearing in mind the evident fact that over 80 per cent of conventional weapons exports originate from the five permanent members of the Security Council.

While most issues which are important to all of us in this chamber have not received the attention they deserve this year, one aspect of the package of issues received no attention at all during the present session. This was the issue of prevention of an arms race in outer space. While we assume that, after the end of the cold war, there is no longer any need for an arms race in outer space, we believe that every effort should be exerted in order to ensure that, in keeping with the proclaimed desire of the international community, outer space is demilitarized and is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. If such efforts are not made at an early date in a serious manner, the long-term consequences could be most regrettable. In such a case, we could be faced with a situation in which other States might attempt to acquire capabilities for military uses of outer space as long as no universal and legally binding commitment exists to prevent such a development. Therefore, before it is too late, negotiations should commence in order to ensure once and for all the full demilitarization of outer space and its preservation as an environment reserved exclusively for the benefit of all mankind as a common heritage.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

With regard to the issue of expansion of CD membership, no progress has been achieved despite the many efforts made to reach a consensus, in which I personally participated in my capacity as President of the CD from August 1993 to January 1994. This has resulted in frustration of the aspirations of those States wishing to participate in the work of the CD as full members. We call on all members of the CD to show maximum flexibility in order to allow a speedy resolution of this problem so that work can begin in 1996 with an enlarged and hopefully invigorated CD. Since special coordinators on expansion of the membership, review of the agenda and improved functioning of the CD could not be appointed, the CD was therefore unable to do any useful work in those fields. In this context, Mr. President, I propose that you yourself consider conducting wider consultations on the issue of expansion as well as the issues of review of the agenda and improved functioning of the Conference in order to determine whether or not progress can be achieved in those fields before the end of this session, so that the results can be reflected in the CD's report to the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. This would also be useful in our work at the beginning of 1996.

The CD is a forum which is supposed to serve the interests of all and not only the interests of some. Therefore, we see no justification for depriving it of the assistance that it could receive from non-governmental organizations which are playing an active role in other forums. It is paradoxical that some States which encouraged participation by NGOs in fields such as human rights do not wish to see them play a positive role in other forums such as the Conference on Disarmament or the World Trade Organization. The CD should also reconsider the manner in which its annual report to the General Assembly is drafted, since in its current form it does not fully reflect the deliberations of this forum. It is indeed illogical that the important proposals contained in statements made by heads of State, foreign ministers, eminent personalities and heads of delegation who address this body should be disregarded in our report. Consequently, we should give serious thought to the best way in which the statements of delegations and the ideas, proposals and initiatives contained therein could be faithfully reflected in our annual report. Summary records are inadequate for this purpose.

Before concluding, allow me to say a few words on two issues of particular importance to Egypt, to Africa and to the Middle East. Firstly, Egypt is most gratified at the conclusion of the draft African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, the text of which was approved by the African summit held in Addis Ababa in June 1995. This represents a singularly important achievement in the field of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament at the regional and international levels, within the framework of article VII of the NPT, and should serve as an example for other regions of the world where nuclear weapons continue to pose a threat to international peace and security. As I have already stated during the CD's 1994 session, Egypt has offered to host the signing ceremony for the treaty, as the initiative for the establishment of this zone came from Cairo in 1964, i.e. over 30 years ago. In this connection, I would like to acknowledge the commendable efforts undertaken by Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo, the United Nations Chief

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Expert Adviser on the African nuclear-weapon-free zone, and his positive contribution to the rapid completion of the drafting process in the expert group.

Secondly, we cannot talk about nuclear-weapon-free zones without mentioning the Middle East, which regrettably remains far behind Africa in this particular field. For over 20 years Egypt has worked for the establishment of such a zone in that region, but so far to no avail. In 1990, President Hosni Mubarak also proposed a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Both initiatives were welcomed and commended by the international community, which called for their realization. We hope that the impetus of the African zone will have a positive impact on the Middle East, and we also hope that the Middle East resolution adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference will be followed up appropriately, particularly where it "calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the [NPT] as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards". To quote from the decision on Principles and objectives, "the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, should be encouraged as a matter of priority". There is only one State in the Middle East with an advanced and dubious nuclear programme as well as nuclear facilities that are not subject to the IAEA safeguards system. We therefore call on Israel once again to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. We also call on Israel to participate positively in the work of the Multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group which has formed part of the Middle East peace process since the Madrid Conference in 1991.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Ramaker.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, allow me first to congratulate you not only on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference, but also - as this is the last plenary you will be presiding over - on the able way in which you guided us in our work during the past four weeks. I already had the opportunity to express my appreciation for the way in which your predecessor discharged his duties and I pledge my full support for your successor, Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco. I also would like to take this opportunity to warmly welcome Ambassador Arundhati Ghose of India and Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada, who recently joined us in the CD. I am looking forward to close cooperation with them in the years to come. I wish Ambassador Errera, who will be leaving us soon, all possible success in his next important assignment and I thank him for his friendship. His wit, sense of humour and iron logic will be missed.

In my intervention today I will mainly address the ongoing negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. These negotiations are reaching a crucial phase. In order to allow the treaty to be concluded "not later than 1996", an undertaking of all participants to the NPT Review and Extension Conference, there should be - before the start of the 1996 CD session - a

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

large measure of convergence on basic elements of the future treaty. This would allow us to focus next year on the "end-game" issues and the preparation for signature after the treaty has been presented hopefully to a resumed session of the 50th United Nations General Assembly.

Today, I would like to share with the Conference the Netherlands' views on the basic elements on which convergence this year is needed, as well as my delegation's suggestions as to what such a convergence might look like. First then, what are these basic elements on which we can build the final agreement? In answering this question, it goes without saying that I present our national views to the Conference. However, as Chairman of Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, delegations will bear with me if I start with issues within the purview of that body, and which seem to have come a little bit closer to my heart.

Early convergence on scope - that is, a large measure of agreement on what the treaty should prohibit - will be pivotal for achieving progress elsewhere in the negotiations. Throughout these negotiations, the Netherlands' position has been that a CTBT should indeed be comprehensive and prohibit all nuclear-weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions. Thus far it is, however, not easy to detect such a straightforward prohibition in the draft scope article in the present rolling text. In the light of recent developments and declarations the prospects for progress on this fundamental provision nevertheless seem to be promising. My delegation particularly welcomes declarations by the United Kingdom, France and the United States, endorsing the Australian draft article on scope contained in document CD/NTB/WP.222.

This draft indeed has the advantage of being both straightforward and comprehensive, and I am glad to note the wide support it enjoys. At the same time it is important to bear in mind that the scope provision should be comprehensive and not be overburdened by exhaustive language. We should bear in mind the negotiating mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which specifies that we negotiate an "internationally and effectively verifiable test-ban treaty". A scope article spelling out the unverifiable should not be envisaged. The future verification regime, on the other hand, should be designed in such a manner that it effectively deters possible violations.

Most progress in Working Group 2 this year has been made with respect to the draft articles on the treaty organization. I am most grateful to my Friend of the Chair, Mr. Kumar of India, and his friends. This part of the rolling text has been streamlined and is now free of redundancies. This makes it a readable text, allowing delegations now to focus on the remaining substantial issues. Apart from funding, which I will address separately later, these issues concern: the seat of the organization, the possibility of a relation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the powers and functions of the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council and the powers and functions of the Technical Secretariat. In my delegation's view, further progress can be made on all these items during the remaining part of the 1995 CD session.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

The CTBT organization should be "lean and mean". This would rule out an entirely independent organization, which would be costlier than necessary. Some form of co-location with another international organization would enhance the cost-effectiveness of the CTBT organization. In addition, given the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in the nuclear field, some expertise of that Agency might be of use to the future organization. In order to assist delegations in deciding on a relation with the Agency in Vienna, more detailed information should be obtained about the administrative and logistical services IAEA could provide for the requirements of the CTBTO, in order to demonstrate the general advantages of co-location, and any substantial contribution IAEA could make to the CTBTO's verification needs, the basic elements of which after all are now known and agreed, so as to assess the added value of co-locating the organization with IAEA compared with any other international organization.

These questions should be formulated and forwarded to IAEA by the Ad Hoc Committee before the end of the CD summer session, with a view to having them answered by mid-November of this year. This would then provide a basis for further inter-sessional work on that issue. If consensus is achieved that certain links with IAEA are desirable, the exact nature of the relationship should be included in an agreement with the Agency, to be negotiated during the PrepCom phase.

While more details about the nature of relations of the CTBT organization with IAEA are being gathered, we look forward to an elaboration by the Austrian authorities of their offer to host the organization in Vienna. A better understanding of both the links of the future organization with IAEA and the Austrian offer would enable balanced and simultaneous decision-making on the two issues.

As far as powers and functions of the organs of the organization - the Conference of States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat - are concerned, any agreement on their role relating to the international monitoring system and on-site inspection should now be worked out quickly and subsequently be faithfully reflected in the rolling text on the organization. Working Groups 1 and 2 should work closely together in order to ensure that duplication of work and redundancies in the rolling text are avoided.

The issue of funding of the future treaty, and especially of the IMS, is one of the major questions facing us in our negotiations. The Netherlands welcomes the agreement reached in Working Group 1 this week that the basic principle of financing the IMS is funding through the budget of the organization, to which States parties will contribute according to the United Nations scale of assessment, adjusted to take into account differences in membership of the States parties to the treaty. We believe this agreement will provide an excellent basis for further discussions on the more detailed financial arrangements for the IMS.

In practice, we think that States parties, if they so wish, should be reimbursed for establishing new or upgrading existing monitoring facilities.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

As far as facilities outside the territory or jurisdiction or control of States parties are concerned, we think that the organization would be primarily responsible for their establishment or upgrading if required. It should be possible, however, that States parties could take this responsibility upon themselves, with the option of reimbursement of the costs involved. In relation to the division of costs between States parties and the organization, we believe there is a need for a differentiation of ownership. The principle should be reflected that the party that pays for the establishment of facilities will have the ownership of that facility.

Since most of the capital investment for the establishment of the IMS will occur between signature and entry into force, the Netherlands sees a special need for appropriate arrangements at the PrepCom stage. We think a fund should be created to which States signatories could pay voluntary contributions, in cash or in kind through a system of contribution credit, which subsequently can be reimbursed after entry into force, in such a way that the organization will not be short of funds during its first years.

Leaving Working Group 2 and turning to verification issues, delegations are aware of the further technical work being conducted this week with the aim of defining the architecture of the international monitoring system (IMS). During the 1994 inter-sessionals basic agreement was reached on four monitoring technologies and the corresponding approximate networks. It is high time that that basic agreement is reflected in consensus on the IMS architecture and on the corresponding provisions in the rolling text. According to the Netherlands, the IMS should, in order to be able to monitor nuclear-test explosions anywhere, incorporate the following technologies and their respective facilities and stations.

As regards seismic monitoring, I would like to welcome warmly the agreement reached this week in Working Group 1, with the invaluable participation of the seismic experts, on the final number of 50 primary stations, as well as the agreement on the principle of incorporating auxiliary stations in the IMS. On the latter point, it is important that the next meeting of the GSE, on the basis of the experience gained from GSETT-3, prepare the ground for decision-making by the Ad Hoc Committee as to the exact number of auxiliary stations and their location.

Radionuclide monitoring: 75 to 100 stations, which in essence will have to monitor particulate radionuclides. Monitoring of noble gases could be included if expertise and experience is available at a sufficient number of stations.

Infrasound monitoring: 60 to 70 stations, the exact number to be decided during experimental work and subsequent evaluation of this network.

Hydroacoustic monitoring: apart from the 2 MILS stations offered by the United States, a number of 8 to 9 stations, which could be fixed cable stations near land masses and moored buoys in more remote and deeper waters.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

Earlier this week we introduced a more detailed outline of our thinking on these matters in our answer to the questionnaire of the Friend of the Chair for verification, Dr. Peter Marshall.

The short answer to the question of when the IMS should be operational is: at entry into force of the CTBT. This should, however not be interpreted in such a way that the entry into force of the treaty can be taken hostage. Operational at entry into force, in the view of the Netherlands, therefore, implies that at entry into force the stations, facilities and sensors of the above-mentioned technologies function in such a way that they are able to sufficiently guarantee that the provisions of the treaty are being complied with. This approach would mean that not each and every one of the stations agreed upon has to be in place and functioning. Rather it would mean that their coverage will provide minimum deterrence against would-be violators in the initial stages of the treaty. The completion of the networks, their calibration and synergy would subsequently only enhance that deterrence, making the networks more and more reliable and evasion of detection by the IMS increasingly difficult.

More generally it should not be the intention to establish an IMS which can detect any nuclear explosion in any possible medium and scenario. This would infinitely increase the network density and thus lead to unacceptable costs.

One final point on the IMS. From the beginning, all the above-mentioned networks should have fast and reliable communications. The international data centre, foreseen as an integral part of the Technical Secretariat, therefore does have to be 100 per cent operational at entry into force.

My delegation would welcome early agreement on the principle that only States parties have the right to request an on-site inspection. Further convergence on the main building blocks of a viable on-site inspection regime seems possible within the coming weeks, notably on the following elements.

To prevent unnecessary on-site inspections, States parties should be encouraged - but not obliged - to resort to consultation and clarification in the case of ambiguous events, whereby the organization can offer its expertise and good offices or mediate.

The general rule that verification should provide adequate deterrence against violations applies also to the CTBT. This should be the guiding principle not only for the architecture and capabilities of the IMS I just mentioned, but also for on-site inspection, being an integral part of the entire verification system of the future CTBT. One of the main outstanding issues regarding OSI concerns the decision-making procedure for the launching of an on-site inspection. Since the option of an OSI should contribute to deterring possible violations of the treaty, the Netherlands believes that an on-site inspection should go ahead automatically upon request, unless there are overriding reasons not to mount an OSI. On the other hand, my delegation recognizes the need for accuracy and for limiting the costs, both financial and political,

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incurred with a full-fledged OSI. In order to balance these needs, the Netherlands is attracted by the idea of a phased on-site inspection.

As far as the first phase of an on-site inspection is concerned, it should be carried out at the request of a State party on the basis of data received from the IMS, possibly in combination with other information, unless the Executive Council decides otherwise with a two-thirds majority (a "red light" procedure).

Data obtained from so-called national technical means can be of considerable importance for detecting ambiguous events. We see merit, however, in the position of some delegations that such data should be authenticated or in some way officially recognized. Therefore, if a request for the first phase of an OSI is solely based on information other than that obtained from the IMS, there should be a positive decision from the Executive Council with a two-thirds majority that such an inspection can be carried out (a "green light" procedure). This approach, also advocated by France in the Ad Hoc Committee last week, seems to be a good compromise recognizing the different positions on data obtained from national technical means.

If during the first phase of an OSI it becomes clear that more information is needed to obtain clarity about an ambiguous event, any following phase should be decided upon by the "green light" procedure.

My delegation attaches absolute priority to reaching agreement on the above-mentioned issues before the start of the 1996 CD session. We support any inter-sessional work which could help in achieving that aim. Once again, this seems to be a bare necessity to allow conclusion of the treaty next year. In my opinion work on a Preparatory Commission, which should prepare the smooth implementation of the CTBT immediately after signature, should be initiated before the end of the summer session, possibly by appointment of a Friend of the Chair by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. There certainly remain other important issues to be resolved. I could mention the entry into force of the treaty and the composition of the Executive Council. On both, further work should be done already in 1995 to prepare for final decision-making next year.

The Conference is working full-time on the CTBT, thereby giving the negotiations the priority they deserve. That it is working on CTBT only is by default, however. The circumstances which allow us to devote all our time to the text-ban negotiations are in themselves regrettable. Right to this moment, the Conference has not been able to agree on starting any activity other than the CTBT negotiations. In this respect I would like to raise for brevity's sake only two matters which are of particular concern to my delegation. In the first place it is unfortunate that, although the Conference did agree to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, work on such a treaty could not commence because of what I would call retroactively applied linkage.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

Secondly, because of the ongoing deadlock it is for the first time since a few years that the Conference is not devoting any attention to conventional arms control and disarmament. During the two years in which we discussed "transparency in armaments" in the corresponding Ad Hoc Committee, many interesting proposals were presented for confidence-building measures in the conventional sphere. Although these did not meet with consensus yet, I have already expressed on other occasions the opinion that the discussion of such proposals should be allowed more time to enable useful ideas to come to fruition.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is certainly the most notable example of a useful and practical global measure in this respect. It has demonstrated its potential for contributing to more confidence and trust, leading to greater stability, by providing transparency in global trade in important categories of conventional arms. I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to encourage all States which have not yet done so to provide their returns on arms transfers for 1994 to the Register.

Finally, I would like to draw attention to the issue of enlargement of the CD. This issue is directly related to the status of the CD as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. My delegation can only echo the call made by so many other delegations that this issue deserves special and urgent attention, and repeat its position that all States that applied for membership should be admitted as full-fledged members. A new, enlarged - and therefore more representative of the world community - Conference on Disarmament would no doubt inspire new and fresh ideas about the role and work of the Conference in the near future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Hwang.

Mr. HWANG (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, since this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor under your presidency, I would like to express my warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, and extend to you my delegation's full support and cooperation.

With regard to China's resumption of nuclear testing last week, I would like to bring to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament the text of the statement of 17 August by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.

> "The Government of the Republic of Korea deeply regrets China's nuclear test - the second test this year alone. China's nuclear test violates the spirit of mutual trust and confidence between non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States that enabled the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty last May. It also goes counter to the Chairman's statement of the ASEAN Regional Forum, adopted 1 August 1995, which called for an immediate end to all nuclear testing.

(Mr. Hwang, Republic of Korea)

"We strongly hope that China's continued nuclear testing, and the recent decision by France to resume nuclear testing, will not obstruct international efforts for an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We urge the Chinese Government to immediately halt all nuclear testing and demonstrate leadership in global non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament efforts."

In addition to this statement, my delegation wishes to make clear our views on some relevant issues. We attach great importance to the recent announcements made by France and the United States through which they support, in the CTBT context, the full prohibition of any nuclear-weapons test, or any other nuclear explosions. My delegation firmly believes that this political decision will greatly contribute to the early conclusion of the CTBT and will further promote a general atmosphere of restraint, under which all nuclear-weapon States will refrain from testing before a declared deadline or the entry into force of the CTBT.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to stress once again the supreme necessity of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. In view of the reality that nuclear tests are still being conducted, the international community is looking to the CD, as never before, to expedite its negotiation process and achieve a worldwide consensus on its results. In order to meet the aspirations of the international community, it is urgent to expand the CD membership so that the decision of the CD will command indisputable support from an appropriate number of full member States participating in its negotiations. My delegation sincerely hopes that the present members of the CD will exert their utmost efforts to settle this problem at the earliest possible date.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi.

Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I take the floor under your presidency, please allow me to express the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you, a representative of Mongolia - a country with which Indonesia enjoys excellent relations - presiding over the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed it would be a challenging task for you to chair our deliberations at this particular juncture, in which some pressing issues pertaining to the organizational work of the Conference need to be urgently resolved. I am however confident that under your leadership progress will be made towards the settlement of these pending issues. Let me pledge the fullest cooperation of my delegation in helping you to discharge these demanding duties. At the same time, I should also like to thank sincerely your predecessor, Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico, for the excellent manner with which he conducted our previous work. It would be less than candid if I do not also seize this occasion to extend a warm welcome to our distinguished colleagues Ambassador Arundhati Ghose of India, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada and Ambassador J.S. Selebi of South Africa, who have recently joined us in the Conference. I firmly believe that their

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participation in this august body would significantly contribute to the attainment of the Conference's objectives to which we all aspire.

Upon instruction of my Government, I would like to address the decision of the United States Administration regarding the scope of the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), as contained in the statement of President Bill Clinton delivered on 11 August 1995. In this regard, my delegation would like to warmly welcome the reaffirmation of President Clinton to bring the negotiations on the treaty to an end as soon as possible and for that purpose to accept a true zero-yield CTBT that will ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, no matter how small it is, immediately upon entry into force of the treaty.

By the same token, my delegation also wishes to commend the statement made by the representative of France, Ambassador Errera - who will unfortunately be leaving us soon, and certainly I personally will miss him - during the previous session in which he outlined the position of the French Government on the scope of the CTBT that my delegation understood as similar to that of the United States stance. At this critical juncture of our negotiations on the CTBT there is a need more than ever before for a reaffirmation of our commitment and coherent attitude in order to accomplish the tasks bestowed upon us by the international community in an expeditious manner. Hence, my delegation would like to urge strongly all remaining nuclear-weapons States to follow these positive attitudes which will hopefully pave the way for the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. Of similar importance is the willingness of all nuclear-weapons States to exercise utmost restraint on nuclear-weapons testing. Therefore, I should like to use this opportunity to express also the Indonesian Government's profound regret at the nuclear-weapons testing conducted in our region quite recently, which in our view would have some undesirable impact on the course of the negotiations on the CTBT. My delegation therefore wishes to urge once again all nuclear-weapons States to live up to their international commitments to help ensure the materialization of the objectives agreed by all States parties to the NPT during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

Together with the other ASEAN countries, comprising Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam, the Indonesian national position towards nuclear-weapons testing has been consistently maintained and will remain the same in the future. It was therefore natural that the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 29 and 30 July, released a consensus joint communiqué in which the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN made a clear reference to this important subject. "The Foreign Ministers emphasized the importance of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in promoting international peace and security. Bearing in mind the objectives of general and complete disarmament, the Foreign Ministers noted the outcome of the recent 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the parties to the NPT and attached particular importance to the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones by the year 2000. In this regard, the Foreign Ministers deplored the resumption or planned resumption of nuclear tests in the Asia-Pacific in view of the commitment of all States parties to the NPT to

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exert utmost restraint on nuclear-weapons testing and to conclude the CTBT in 1996. They also called on all nuclear-weapons States to desist from testing nuclear devices."

Lastly, speaking on behalf of the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, I would like to indicate that my delegation would, in due course, submit the relevant part of the joint communiqué of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, which I consider to be of paramount importance and highly significant to the work of the Conference, touching inter alia on the issues related to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the South China Sea, and the South-East Asia Nuclear-weapons-free Zone (SEANWFZ). I would ask the secretariat to subsequently circulate it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, may I begin by complimenting you on the competent manner in which you have been conducting the work of the Conference on Disarmament during the current month. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada. We look forward to working with him closely. It is also my sad duty at this moment to express words of farewell to Ambassador Gérard Errera of France, who will soon be leaving us to assume even more important responsibilities which are, I hope, not unrelated to the goals which we are striving for in the Conference on Disarmament. Ambassador Errera has defended the policies of his great country with great dignity and integrity. I am confident that in his new environment he will be equally adroit and amiable in discharging his responsibilities.

Speaking in this Conference on 14 February 1995, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated that "for over 30 years, Pakistan has advocated the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as a means of halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. We welcomed last year's landmark decision by this Conference to mandate its Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate such a test-ban treaty."

The Conference on Disarmament has been negotiating on the comprehensive test-ban treaty for almost two years. It is only in the last few days that prospects have emerged for the conclusion of a genuine and truly comprehensive test-ban treaty.

For Pakistan, and indeed for most of the world, it was always self-evident that a nuclear test ban should be total and complete. No exceptions could be allowed - not even for explosions to check the safety and reliability of nuclear arsenals. This position was fully reflected in the statement of the Group of 21 of 30 June 1995 (CD/1329). Yet, this self-evident proposition - that a treaty must be truly comprehensive - was obviously not accepted, in letter or spirit, by most of the nuclear-weapon States. In our negotiations, there was consistent insistence on an exception

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being made for so-called "safety and reliability tests". And, it is well known that consultations were being held among the nuclear-weapon States to evolve agreement on the threshold of such "safety and reliability" tests.

Pakistan therefore welcomes the statement which was made in this Conference by Ambassador Errera on 10 August 1995 that France will accept a truly comprehensive treaty and support a prohibition of "any nuclear-weapons test or any other nuclear explosion". Pakistan also welcomes the announcement by President Clinton of the United States on 11 August 1995 that the United States "will seek a 'zero'-yield CTBT" which "would ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion immediately upon entry into force".

These developments have created a positive climate for the CTBT negotiations. They would provide the required impetus for the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Pakistan shares the sentiment which has been widely expressed in this Conference that we should seek the earliest possible conclusion of the CTBT in 1996.

It needs to be reiterated that, as noted in the Group of 21 statement, "the nuclear test ban ... is a global issue and all its aspects should be multilaterally negotiated in the CD". It will be a disservice to the effectiveness of a CTBT if significant aspects of a test ban continue to be discussed and negotiated outside the framework of this body. Likewise, any unilateral measures sought to be taken outside the CD which impinge on our negotiations cannot but produce a negative effect.

We hope that agreement will be reached soon on the text for the article on "scope" of a CTBT. Such an agreement could be evolved on the basis of the formulation proposed by Australia. We shall wish to ensure however that the scope of the treaty is so defined that no exceptions or loopholes are available for the continuation of nuclear testing on any pretext.

Despite the improved prospects for agreement on the scope of the CTBT, there are a large number of issues which will require arduous and no doubt difficult negotiations, in particular the international verification regime for a CTBT. Pakistan will continue to work towards an effective, non-discriminatory and non-selective international verification system which would create equal access, rights and obligations for all parties. The international monitoring system, the procedures for on-site inspections and the use of national technical means must be evolved within the framework of these principles which are widely endorsed within the CD.

On more than one occasion, Pakistan has emphasized that to be effective, a CTBT should be "universal". The article on entry into force will need to be formulated to require the participation in the treaty of all those States which have the established capability to conduct nuclear tests or other nuclear explosions.

Similarly, the CTBT's survivability and permanence should be built on solid foundations. We are glad that the so-called 10-year opt-out clause

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(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

has been given up. But, the treaty should not provide parties with the opportunity for an easy exit especially if this is to be determined by necessarily subjective judgements regarding such things as the presumed safety or reliability of specific types of nuclear weapons. For its part, Pakistan has suggested an entirely objective criterion for withdrawal from the treaty, i.e. the conduct of a nuclear explosion by another State.

Discussions in the working groups relating to scope and verification have reinforced my delegation's view that the CTBT should require the permanent closure of test sites. Otherwise, the temptations to resume testing in future may become irresistible.

I would like to add a final word about what we hope a CTBT will achieve in making our world a safer place. For 30 years, Pakistan and other non-aligned and non-nuclear States have perceived a CTBT, to quote the G-21 statement again, as "an instrument against both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation [which] should effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament". The assertions of the nuclear-weapon States that a CTBT cannot prejudice the operational credibility and reliability of their nuclear-weapons arsenals are, I would submit, incompatible with the original objectives of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The statement made by Ambassador Errera spoke of maintaining unchanged France's nuclear doctrine. In his statement of 11 August, the President of the United States stated that "the United States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile".

It would appear from these and similar statements made by other nuclear States that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is alive and well, even in the post-cold-war era. The presumption that the end of the cold war has created the conditions for the conclusion of the CTBT, and other treaties which have been proposed, does not seem to be borne out by the cold realities. On the contrary, the assessment offered here last year by Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico seems to have been confirmed. He said:

> "What is occurring now with regard to nuclear testing is no different from what has been happening in the disarmament field for years: the technologically more advanced nations reach a point where they can discard a certain weapon or weapon-related activity and then they move to ban that weapon or activity for the rest of the world through a multilateral treaty".

The real challenge before the Conference on Disarmament, the real challenge of the nuclear era, is to break away from this cold and unpalatable "reality". The Pakistan delegation continues to believe that the CTBT should contribute to both non-proliferation and to nuclear disarmament. In this context, we deeply regret that the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to commence negotiations for all these years on the issue of nuclear

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disarmament, an issue which has been accorded the highest priority by the international community. It is these weapons, almost 50,000 of them, which pose the greatest threat to world peace and security. We urge the nuclear-weapon States to reconsider their opposition to taking tangible steps to promote nuclear disarmament. We ask them again to declare their commitment to the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound programme of nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador de Icaza.

Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would first like to express our satisfaction at the way in which you have been guiding our work, to thank you for your efforts and to assure you of the wholehearted cooperation of my delegation.

Secondly, I wish to extend the warmest welcome to the heads of the delegations of India, Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, South Africa, Ambassador Jacobs Selebi, and Canada, Ambassador Mark Moher. Likewise I wish to convey to Ambassador Errera of France our best wishes for success in his new and important mission.

Thirdly, I wish to inform the Conference that on 17 August, on being informed that a further nuclear test had been carried out, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Dr. José Angel Gurría, stated at a press conference that my Government found that development very regrettable and repeated our position on the matter, which, as representatives of the member countries in the Conference are aware, is as follows.

The conduct of nuclear tests runs counter to the spirit and indeed the letter of the decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" which was adopted at the Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the three months since the adoption of those principles and objectives and the undertaking entered into by the nuclear Powers to exercise the utmost restraint with respect to tests, two tests have already been carried out and another seven or eight have been announced. Even with a generous interpretation of the notion of moderation it cannot be maintained that the carrying out of series of tests is compatible with an undertaking to exercise the utmost restraint.

The conduct of nuclear tests not only contradicts the spirit and the letter of what was agreed to in New York, but also jeopardizes the regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons itself.

The conduct of nuclear tests is not conducive to the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which all countries, including the nuclear countries, undertook to conclude in the course of 1996.

(Mr. de Icaza, Mexico)

Carrying out nuclear tests at this point in time is all the more unfortunate because the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty had received encouragement from the statements made by the Governments of France and the United States in favour of a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests and all other nuclear explosions.

The Government of Mexico has already had occasion to express satisfaction at the decision announced by President Bill Clinton of the United States of America to suspend the United States programme of nuclear tests, including small-scale tests, and to support the speedy conclusion, by next year at the latest, of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In turn the Group of 21 has re-emphasized its position that the CTBT must provide for a complete ban on all nuclear tests by all States, in all environments and for all time, with no test permitted on any grounds or with any justification, including those linked to the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.

The Mexican Government calls on the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting tests of such weapons and to declare an immediate and complete moratorium. It also calls on all countries to support the proposal for a complete and total ban on nuclear testing, in order to encourage intensified negotiations leading to a treaty which can be opened for signature before the commencement of the fifty-first United Nations General Assembly in 1996.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Guillaume.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on the way in which you are carrying out the tasks of President of the Conference on Disarmament and express our satisfaction at seeing the work of our body in the hands of a distinguished representative of Mongolia. There can be no doubt that the important negotiations in which we are involved require the competence and skill which we know you possess. I wish you every success in the performance of your duties and can assure you of the full and total support of the Belgian delegation.

I would also like to welcome the arrival of our new colleagues in this body, Ambassadors Ghose of India, Moher of Canada and Selebi of South Africa, and say that I look forward to our cooperation, which has already begun in a very productive manner. I would also like to take this opportunity to say to our colleague and friend Gérard Errera how much I have appreciated his cooperation and his friendship during his years in Geneva. Within the CD he has displayed great negotiating abilities in sometimes very testing situations. He has always coped with skill, panache, not forgetting a note of humour. He is now leaving for a country with which I am a little familiar, to take up new responsibilities where all his qualities will be just as much required as in Geneva. I wish him every success and offer my best wishes to himself and his family.

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

Belgium welcomes the important statements made here by this same representative of France, Ambassador Errera, on 10 August, as well as by the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, on 17 August, in which they informed us of the henceforth unreserved support of their respective Governments for the principle of a "zero option" for the future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT), which all of us here wish for. We can only welcome the statement made here last week by His Excellency Mr. Roland Smith, the Deputy Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in which he announced that the United Kingdom was lifting its reservations on the scope of the future treaty and accepted a wording which would ban all nuclear explosions. We can now glimpse with optimism the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests, of whatever nature, in whatever environment and of whatever magnitude. We hope that these important statements will shortly be followed by similar statements by the two other nuclear Powers. This would reinforce the undertaking we have made to conclude the negotiations on a CTBT before the end of the next annual session of the Conference on Disarmament. However, the Belgian Government unfortunately cannot but deplore the attitude displayed by China, which is continuing its policy, without any commitment for the future or formal support for a truly complete ban in the treaty. On the contrary, if we compare the recent Chinese statements with those which have been repeated more than once before, we can only be struck by the shift in Peking's attitude: until a few weeks ago, we were told that the last tests would be taking place in 1996 at the latest, whereas now the deadline has been pushed back until the entry into force of the treaty. This is truly contrary to the spirit of our negotiations and makes the conclusion of a CTBT all the more urgent.

Since the start of the negotiations in which we are engaged, Belgium has constantly demonstrated the importance it attaches to the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) accompanied by an effective and genuinely dissuasive international verification regime. In our view the inevitable effects of the implementation of this treaty will go beyond the strictly military aspect of the use of nuclear energy. As you know, my country boasts one of the most advanced nuclear industries and one of the highest levels of research in this area in the world. We are expecting to assume a special responsibility in this respect, which leads us to envisage in the future highly productive cooperation with the future organization responsible for implementing the CTBT. We will be prepared to make our expertise available to it. If the future organization is to perform its role fully for the benefit of international peace and cooperation, we will need to have a treaty which is truly comprehensive in scope. This is why I should like to make it clear that Belgium fully supports the draft article on the scope of the future CTBT which was presented by Australia in document CD/NTB/WP.222 of 9 March 1995, a proposal which has already been supported by several other delegations.

Among the other matters which must also receive our attention, I would like to mention here the proposals presented to the Working Group on Legal and Institutional Issues in connection with possible links between the future organization and IAEA. Certainly, we can well understand the advantage of co-locating the future CTBT organization in Vienna with the headquarters of

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IAEA. The future organization could indeed benefit in some respects in terms of the sharing of certain logistical facilities such as buildings, secretariat services and communications links. From the budgetary point of view alone such a prospect seems to merit consideration. However, it seems to us infinitely more hazardous to go so far as to consider a merger of the Executive Council of the organization with the Board of Governors of IAEA. Such a development, we believe, would inevitably result in the absorption of the future organization by another, well-established body, whose modes of operation, procedures, purposes are all different. It seems increasingly clear to us that the expertise available in IAEA is tailored to other objectives and a priori is ill-suited to the goals that would be pursued by an organization entrusted with implementing a CTBT. The two bodies would not apply themselves to monitoring the same events; the instruments, the modes of operation, the procedures are dissimilar. We can therefore only feel great perplexity as to the justification of the proposals for their near-merger. On the other hand, what we are prepared to consider, besides the pooling of some administrative services, is selective, case-by-case cooperation, if and to the extent that this proved advantageous for the purposes pursued by a future CTBT.

This brings me to one of the central issues in our negotiations. I have in mind the essential element in the CTBT, its verification regime. I wish to inform you of Belgium's replies to the main questions posed in the paper prepared by the Chairman of the International Monitoring System Expert Group (CD/NTB/WP.225). As you know, my country attaches great importance to the definition of an effective IMS, ensuring reliable and equitable coverage of the entire planet at a cost acceptable to the States parties. The IMS must be operational when the CTBT comes into force. For this to be so, the two networks whose role is vital to ensure the detection, identification and location of the monitored events must themselves be operational - I am referring to the seismological network, necessarily comprising primary stations and auxiliary stations, and, as a complement, the hydroacoustic network, in the southern hemisphere. As for the radioactivity monitoring network, it should play only a complementary role, all the more so as it will only be able to be established progressively, after the entry into force of the treaty, to the extent that its benefits will be effectively demonstrated by experience.

After listening with the utmost care to the arguments exchanged in this room, within the working groups, noting and carefully studying the many working papers and expert reports submitted to our Conference, we continue to harbour the greatest doubts about the usefulness of including an infrasound component in the IMS. We are not yet convinced that such a development would be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the IMS, that is, ensuring a sufficient level of deterrence, offering the best possible guarantee for an acceptable financial cost. Any excess in this area would inevitably have a seriously counter-productive effect by threatening to make the entire system inoperative because of excessive cost. Our doubts are buttressed by the actual conclusions reached by the Expert Group on the IMS, which are to be found in document CD/NTB/WP.225 of 13 March 1995, featuring on page 10 (the last page) a very explicit comparative table covering the various technologies

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proposed for the IMS and their respective advantages. The experts clearly consider that infrasound would add almost no benefit, except in the case of atmospheric nuclear explosions.

With respect to radioactivity monitoring, we regard this as complementary to the allied techniques of seismology and hydroacoustics. We see it being integrated in the IMS after the entry into force of the treaty, for at least two reasons. First, the effective establishment of a radioactivity monitoring network could take years, and we cannot allow ourselves to make the whole IMS hostage to this, when the system has to be operational at the time of entry into force. We find confirmation of the fears we nurture in this respect in the very terms of the summary presented to Working Group 1 last Tuesday by the spokesman of the group of experts on radioactivity. In their assessment of the answers to Ambassador Norberg's questionnaire for a world inventory of existing resources in this area, the experts clearly indicated that only very few of these installations comply with the specifications of a future CTBT. Furthermore, they feel that adapting them to operational standards for a CTBT would be very difficult.

Secondly, the contribution of this technology to the detection and identification capabilities, while undoubtedly significant, would be truly so only in the case of atmospheric nuclear explosions, which is regarded as being the least likely scenario; and in any event its contribution in terms of location capacity is negligible. Another argument which we feel supports the idea of conditional integration in the light of lessons drawn from the actual operation of the IMS is based on financial considerations: this network would certainly be the most expensive of those developed to ensure CTBT verification. Available estimates (CD/NTB/WP.225, p. 4) fluctuate between "optimistic" and "pessimistic" assumptions, which suggest a sum of $75 million for the establishment of a network which may be considered to be "complete". However, experience teaches us that in budgetary matters one should always adopt "pessimistic" assumptions. If nevertheless, bearing in mind the considerations and reservations which I have just outlined to you, it were to prove that in practice such an investment might be truly helpful for the IMS and with a satisfactory cost-benefit ratio, we would support option 2 in system B1 as described in the report from the group of experts on radioactivity (CD/NTB/WP.171 of 23 August 1994), to wit a system for monitoring particulates aerosols alone comprising 75 stations.

We have taken note with attention of the working paper presented last Tuesday to Working Group 1 by the American delegation on monitoring of noble gases and we are obliged to them for this effort towards developing our thinking on the matter. However, I must tell you that we are not yet convinced of the vital need for this technique in the IMS. It requires other detection instruments and techniques for analysis. The options proposed in CD/NTB/WP.171 seem to us to be far too burdensome. We consider that a hydroacoustic network might be helpful in making up for shortcomings in the seismological network in the southern hemisphere. We would advocate the use of six to seven hydrophones, fixed to the sea-bed and linked to the shore by fixed cables. This would have the drawback of being far more expensive at the outset but over the long term would be a good investment because of its

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satisfactory service life and maintenance requirements. A system of moored buoys would run up against considerable problems in terms of additional costs (major maintenance difficulties, short life expectancy linked to very harsh meteorological conditions prevailing in the southern oceans). Last but not least, the seismological network should be able to include 50 operational primary stations from the moment the treaty enters into force.

We welcome the very valuable contribution which the experts have been able to make to help advance our work as a result of their recent meeting. We fully support the list which is to be attached as an annex to the protocol to the future treaty. It would be desirable to attach to the primary network an auxiliary network comprising between 100 and 150 stations in order to provide the desired identification and location capability. As you know, we attach great importance to the principle of the most effective possible synergy between the various components of the future IMS. This is why we feel we should wait for the results of the GSE session at the end of November, which in principle should enable us to have a fuller assessment of the ongoing GSETT-3 experiment. In that way we should be able to form a clearer idea of the overall architecture of the future seismological network. Any decision on this matter should be able to be taken only after the forthcoming GSE session. Similarly, since a proper principle of synergy should not allow us to take any decision on any one component of the IMS without close interrelation with the others, we feel that no decision on the possible use of radioactivity monitoring should be taken before that time.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): First of all, Sir, allow me to welcome you, as the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia, to the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. We greatly appreciate the efforts you are making to seek ways to resolve the organizational problems facing the Conference in its work. You can always count on cooperation from the Russian delegation. It also gives me satisfaction to note the close historical ties which exist between our two countries and to express my certainty that these friendly relations will continue to develop. I would also like to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Canada, India, Ireland and South Africa, and wish them success in their new functions. I would like to wish every success to the distinguished Ambassador of France, Mr. Gérard Errera, who will soon be leaving his post in the Conference in order to take up new, senior and responsible duties. Ambassador Errera has made a significant contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and we shall miss his diplomatic skills and friendly cooperation.

In my brief statement today I would like to touch on a procedural aspect of the question of expanding the membership of the Conference. As we know, this problem has been under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament and in the United Nations for a long time now - more than 10 years. In resolution 49/77 B, adopted without a vote at the forty-ninth session of the

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United Nations General Assembly, the General Assembly urged our Conference "to make every effort to reach a solution resulting, by the beginning of 1995, in a significant expansion of its composition, which would then include at least 60 countries". The Conference cannot turn a deaf ear to this call. The lack of any movement on this issue gives rise to legitimate disappointment, not to say resentment, on the part of the international community, and is detrimental to the prestige of this forum. The Russian delegation considers that we need to be active in seeking a way out of this protracted deadlock. The States which have applied for membership in the CD have legitimate demands for equal participation in multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues; their requests should finally be officially considered and they should receive an answer. It is quite simply improper to delay consideration of these applications endlessly and not to give a clear yes or no.

The Russian delegation has frequently spoken in favour of a rapid decision on expanding the membership of the Conference. In his statement in our forum on 29 June 1995, Russian Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev, as you will recall, stressed: "The current membership of the Conference does not fully reflect the new realities. Following the end of the 'cold war' it is worth reflecting also on issues related to 'balance' in the membership of the CD, especially since all the members have what amounts to a veto."

In recent years, various attempts have been made to resolve the issue of expanding the membership of the CD. At one time consensus was taking shape on the "1 + 1 + 2" formula; later we were very close to agreement on the list proposed by the distinguished Special Coordinator, Ambassador O'Sullivan; last year there were proposals for admitting States from the list in two stages, making changes in the rules of procedure of the Conference, and so on. However, none of these options led to a practical result. In this connection, the question arises of whether there is any list of candidate States which would suit everyone. Maybe we should try a different procedural approach which is not based on the search for a "package" and on attempts to make it "balanced".

Today, the Russian delegation would like to suggest such a possible procedural option for consideration by the Conference. Why, for example, at the next official plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, could its President not submit for a decision by the CD all the existing applications by States for membership of the Conference on Disarmament, one by one, in the order in which they were submitted, so that for each application a separate decision could be taken? In other words, why could we not use the well-known and straightfoward procedure which we use every year when we invite non-member States to participate in the CD's work? It seems to us that such an approach is democratic, it does not contradict either the rules of procedure of the CD or its past decisions, nor does it divide the States wishing to become members of the CD into artificial groups, into what you might call passengers on the express train and the suburban commuter train. We would ask you to consider this modest procedural proposal on the part of the Russian delegation and to take a decision on it. We would like to express

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the hope that this proposal will help the President of the Conference in his consultations with a view to achieving a rapid solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me and my country. Now I give the floor to the representative of South Africa, Mr. Goosen.

Mr. GOOSEN (South Africa): Mr. President, I join with previous speakers in congratulating you on the way in which you are presiding over our work.

My delegation has asked to address the Conference in order to express the deep regret of the South African Government at the latest nuclear-test explosion conducted by the People's Republic of China at Lop Nor on 17 August 1995. My Government has issued a statement in Pretoria condemning this nuclear test. This is the second Chinese test in the three months following the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We believe that this test is another step backwards in the endeavour of the international community to ban nuclear testing.

The South African Government is disappointed at the continuation of the Chinese tests, especially in view of China's undertaking at the NPT Conference to exercise "utmost restraint" pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT). As in the case with the test which was conducted on 15 May 1995, the South African Government is of the view that the Chinese test will have a negative impact on the constructive results achieved at the NPT Conference.

The South African Government has made known its strong opposition to this test to the Government of the People's Republic of China and continues to urge China to cease its nuclear-weapons testing programme so as to enhance international efforts towards non-proliferation and disarmament.

As on previous occasions, my delegation calls on the nuclear-weapon States to continue to honour both the letter and spirit of the Principles and Objectives, which they agreed to and helped negotiate at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, and to exercise "utmost restraint" with regard to nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of South Africa for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Mr. Ekwall.

Mr. EKWALL (Sweden): Let me at the outset, on behalf of the Swedish delegation, join others in extending our best wishes to Ambassador Errera in his new important post.

I have asked for the floor to inform the Conference that the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, made the following statement on 17 August 1995 with respect to the nuclear test carried out last week by the

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People's Republic of China: "I deeply regret that China has again conducted a nuclear test. Every new nuclear-weapon test risks disturbing the negotiations in Geneva on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. I urge the Chinese Government to refrain from further nuclear testing."

Mr. MADDEN (United States of America): I would like to read for the record a statement issued by the Press Secretary at the White House on 17 August after China's nuclear test on that day. Since the CD plenary on 17 August had already been adjourned before the statement was issued, I am reading the statement in this plenary.

> "Today China conducted an underground nuclear test at the Lop Nur test site in north-west China. The United States deeply regrets this action. All of the nuclear-weapon States agreed at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in New York in May 1995 to exercise 'utmost restraint' in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). We urge China to refrain from further nuclear tests and join in a global moratorium as we work to complete a CTBT in 1996. We further urge China to endorse President Clinton's recent call for a true 'zero yield' CTBT."

That concludes the text of the White House statement. I will request that it be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): I had no plans to take the floor, but I think that the statement by Ambassador Berdennikov of the Russian Federation seems to be addressed to myself as next week's President. I am obliged to say at least a word or two in response. I would just like to tell him that, from the discussions conducted informally within the Conference, our President, whom I should like to thank and congratulate for a very successful term of office, myself as well as all of us here are extremely mindful of the importance of this matter of the expansion of the Conference, and I am sure that all the members of the Conference on Disarmament are aware of this situation and are determined to seek a satisfactory solution to this matter. For my part, and as President, and without prejudging the positions of the various groups within the Conference, I can assure our colleague from Russia and all the members of the international community, whether the countries on the list of the group of 23 or all the other candidates for the Conference on Disarmanent, that the President, through his prerogatives, will, as the present President has already done, not fail to attach very high priority to this matter, in order to try to find a solution which is satisfactory to everybody and which is commensurate with the expectations of the international community and the prestige of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor before Ambassador Errera makes his farewell statement? I give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Guillaume.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): I am taking the floor again to lend my support to the proposal which the Russian Federation has just made. We believe that we have been deadlocked for a long time on the question of expansion and that we cannot carry on like this and do nothing at least to try to get out of this deadlock. The proposal made by Ambassador Berdennikov has the advantage of being practical and logical, and I do not see why we could not at least try it out, and that is why I would appeal to the Chair to take up his proposal and try to organize this test, so to speak, for next week's plenary.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): Today, in the statements made by a number of countries, mention has been made of the recent nuclear test conducted by China. I would like to take this opportunity to read out the statement issued by a Foreign Ministry spokesman concerning the test conducted on 17 August.

(continued in English)

> "China conducted an underground nuclear test on 17 August 1995. China has all along exercised 'utmost restraint' on nuclear testing and the tests it has conducted are extremely limited in number. China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Its possession of a small number of nuclear weapons is solely for the purpose of self-defence and poses no threat to any other country. China has unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State or nuclear-weapon-free zone. Meanwhile, China strongly calls upon other nuclear-weapon States to respond positively to China's initiative by starting negotiations immediately with a view to concluding a treaty on mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons and an agreement on non-use or threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has taken an active part in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, hoping to see this treaty concluded no later than 1996. Once the treaty enters into force, China will stop nuclear tests."

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, I was greatly touched by your words addressed to me and by the friendship shown to me by the Ambassadors of Egypt, Netherlands, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mexico, Belgium, the Russian Federation and the representative of Sweden, and since a refusal to accept praise apparently only reflects a desire to be praised twice I shall not refuse it, while continuing to regard it as quite excessive.

This plenary is the last one in which I shall be taking part. Consequently, I would like to say goodbye. I would also like to share a few thoughts with you and my other colleagues as I conclude my stay here. The first set of thoughts relates to the growing importance of multilateral diplomacy in the sphere of disarmament and security. Security is based on trust. Trust implies the existence of recognized international rules, accepted by the greatest possible number and respected. Hence the crucial

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importance we attach to the development of credible international verification regimes in disarmament treaties. In this regard, it is obvious that the Conference on Disarmament remains the irreplaceable cornerstone of the structure, and that any weakening of its role would be a detrimental step backwards. Let us bear that in mind. We all know that the Conference is going through a difficult period, during which its minor congenital defects have been compounded for some time by suspicion, squabbling and game-playing from another age. Let us clearly bear in mind the danger we will be running if the situation continues in this way. The danger is clear - it is that of a return to confrontation, and the fact that a stand-off between North and South would replace the one between East and West is not a source of reassurance. The risk is that inequalities between the strong and the weak will be maintained, because the absence of rules is nothing other than rule by the strongest.

Let us also realize how shocking it is that for so long there has been no decision on meaningful expansion of the Conference. How, as international balances change so profoundly and as the Conference on Disarmament has embarked on vital negotiations, how can we justify the fact that it is still trapped in the straightjacket of a membership list inherited from a bygone age? Who can argue against the need to include new members, many of whom have been knocking vainly at our door for many years, and whose military capabilities and strategic roles correspond to present-day realities? Let us take care not to be the object of the disapproval of the entire international community at the next United Nations General Assembly on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Organization. In this context the proposal made by the Ambassdor of the Russian Federation, and the comments made by the Ambassador of Morocco, undoubtedly offer grounds for hope.

Multilateral diplomacy is also a school which teaches you modesty and democracy, one in which there is more to being understood than simply making a statement, more to being a winner than simply being powerful. Constant explanation, justification, persuasion is required. Each of us has the task of defending his or her country's interests - and security interests are among the most fundamental. The uniqueness, the attraction of our work here, but also what makes it difficult, is the fact that day in, day out we have to face other interests, just as legitimate as ours, other views of the world, just as defensible as ours, other constraints, worthy of as much respect as ours. We must also be able to understand exactly what interests are involved, to know what constraints we have to take into acccount. From that standpoint the lack of appropriate forums for consultation in which everyone could and should explain and clarify his or her positions and listen to others' is increasingly sorely felt by all. From that standpoint, there is a need to rethink the system of weekly Presidential consultations to allow delegations to express their views individually and freely. After all, is this not also an application of the rule of consensus? Far from being an obstacle to acceptable compromise, the consensus rule is in fact a precondition for it, because each delegation individually is forced to shoulder its responsibilities and go as far as it can in order to arrive at a satisfactory compromise. However, this does require in return that the rule should not be adulterated and that some parties should not seek to hide behind group

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positions in order to block any chance of agreement and progress. I would like to be clear: nobody is thinking of dissolving or abolishing the groups. But we should all recognize that their make-up, and thus their role and the way in which they function, date back to the past and should be reviewed.

Finally, multilateral diplomacy is the field where the role of men - and of course women - is the most important, where the course of events can be changed through individual action. My greatest pleasure over these past four and a half years will certainly have been to discover and to develop ties of lasting friendship with many colleagues. I shall miss them. This applies both to the representatives of our traditional allies, with whom we have defended common causes, and to the colleagues with whom the opposition of national interests or ideological differences, far from being detrimental to mutual respect, in fact contributed to it. I thank all of them for the friendship they have always shown me. I shall miss their intelligence, their uprightness, their humour, and for some of them, all three.

To these comments on the role of multilateral diplomacy I would add a second one which is rather more personal. I have been fortunate. The time during which I have served here has coincided with a period particularly rich in international disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. I was lucky enough to arrive in Geneva at the start of the final phase of the negotiations on the treaty to ban chemical weapons, which was concluded at the end of 1992 and signed in January 1993. I was lucky enough to be here at the time of the launching of negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, to see my country contribute to moving those negotiations forward at a key moment, with the certainty that this treaty will be concluded next year and the satisfaction that France will have made an active contribution to this success. I was lucky enough to be involved in and a witness to my country's accession to the NPT and then the extension of the Treaty for an indefinite period. And finally I was lucky enough to have with me a remarkable team to whom I would like to pay a public tribute here for their exceptional qualities.

Lastly, I would like to make a comment on present-day international realities which the Conference on Disarmament necessarily depends on when setting its goals. It is a fact that we are receiving ambivalent signals from the present situation. On the one hand, positive trends: the end of the East-West confrontation; the implementation of a genuine disarmament process, conventional and nuclear; the pursuit of a peace process in the Near East, against all opposition. The consolidation of non-proliferation regimes, of which the indefinite extension of the NPT is the cornerstone; the forthcoming conclusion of a treaty for the denuclearization of Africa. On the other hand, dangerous situations, which are continuing or worsening. Some regions are still engaged in a weapons build-up. Major nuclear capabilities remain, in Europe and worldwide. Risks of proliferation remain. The end of the cold war is breeding fresh temptations for regional domination. We are thus at a crossroads.

If we want to go further, it seems to me essential to bear a few simple ideas in mind. There are three which I will mention. First, the

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international community has undertaken commitments in the field of disarmament, in particular during the NPT Extension Conference. These commitments must be kept. The nuclear Powers have a special responsibility in this regard. France will shoulder it. Second, there is a clear link between the results of efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the continuation of the disarmament effort. It is difficult to see how to reconcile the pursuit of such efforts by the nuclear Powers with the maintenance of clandestine nuclear capabilities, or the development of programmes, in violation of commitments undertaken, elsewhere. Finally, it is no longer possible to say that the sole threat to peace lies in the nuclear weapons held by the "big five". Everybody knows that the accumulation of conventional weapons, and the development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in regions of tension, is a real danger, primarily for the great majority of developing countries which are at the same time under pressure from powerful neighbours and suffering from restrictions on the transfer of technology which are the very result of proliferation. One day the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament will really have to reflect this situation.

So the Conference today faces a choice. Either it clings to bygone structures and quarrels from another age - and if it does, once the CTBT has been concluded, it might well lose its central role in the field of disarmament and security. Or it renews its agenda, it expands its membership; it modernizes its working methods; and then, in the eyes of the international community, it will be the essential instrument for the creation of a safer world.

General de Gaulle left us an important message which is at the heart of our foreign policy. This message is a simple one: history is not preordained; it is up to the will of men to control their destiny. For my part, I believe in the virtues of human action. It is my wish that the Conference on Disarmanent should succeed, and if we have the will to do so, it is within our reach. As I say goodbye, I would like to single out the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Petrovsky, and to express my feelings of friendship and gratitude to the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Bensmail, who has always been an able organizer, a cordial colleague and a good adviser. Lastly, I would like to extend my thanks to the members of the secretariat and to the interpreters.

My best wishes for personal success and personal happiness to all my colleagues. I shall miss you.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

As my term of office as President of this Conference comes to an end, I should like to make a few closing remarks. During my four weeks of presidency I have not spared any effort, either at the bilateral level or at the Presidential consultations, in order to bring about agreement on the remaining

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outstanding issues facing the Conference. I have also undertaken a number of consultations with members and non-members specifically on the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, and it is my sincere hope that my successor will be able to move this issue forward. My consultations were based on the invaluable work done by my predecessors, and especially by Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico. Unfortunately, despite all my efforts, I am not in a position to report to the Conference agreement on any of the pending issues for the current session. Nevertheless, I am encouraged by the fact that delegtions agreed to lay the ground for a smooth and effective start to the 1996 session of the CD and begin consideration of the agenda and programme of work for 1996. I believe that my endeavours have proved to be valuable in understanding the positions and concerns of all delegations with regard to the agenda and organization of work of the Conference, bearing in mind the existing consensus that the CTBT negotiations will receive the highest priority next year. I am heartened by the fact that the CTBT negotiations have intensified due to the recent proposals which have brought us even closer to our commonly shared goal, that is, the finalization of the treaty next year. I thank all delegations, the coordinators, and of course the secretariat for their constant support and cooperation and wish Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco every success in his presidency.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 31 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.716
31 August 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 31 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Benjelloun-Touimi (Morocco)

GE.95-63629 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 716th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all, allow me to make a few comments on behalf of my country, the Kingdom of Morocco.

It is an honour and a privilege for me to take up the mantle of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the final weeks of our 1995 session. It is also a redoubtable task, because we have to record in our annual report to the United Nations General Assembly the results of our collective efforts to discharge the responsibilities we have assumed. However, I am sure that I will enjoy your full cooperation and that of the secretariat in carrying out my tasks throughout my period of office, which will continue until 31 December this year.

The contribution made by my predecessors as President, in particular Ambassadors de Icaza of Mexico and Yumjav of Mongolia, who worked hard to bring clarity to our debates and to bring delegations' viewpoints closer together, has been of priceless assistance. I thank them very much for having facilitated my task.

Unfortunately, our Conference is still prey to the obstacles and difficulties we have encountered since the beginning of our session. We all know why we are unable to overcome them, and there is no point in dwelling on that. However, I am encouraged by the will shown by all delegations during my consultations to work together to try to solve these problems.

The intensification of the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is a legitimate source of satisfaction. The fact that the negotiations have avoided the pitfalls that have characterized the rest of our work is to the credit of all delegations. I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our deep gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, and the chairmen of the working groups on verification and institutional matters, Ambassador Norberg of Sweden and Ambassador Ramaker of the Netherlands, for their untiring efforts to move the negotiations forward.

As you know, since I took up the post of President, I have resolutely embarked on a process of intensive bilateral consultations in order to clarify and understand the positions of all delegations on a number of pending issues and to try to bring a solution closer. These individual contacts with all delegations were followed by an informal meeting with all delegations during which I introduced a preliminary report on progress in these consultations, accompanied by a very rewarding exchange of views on all these questions. The usefulness of these consultations has been demonstrated, and I intend to pursue my efforts unstintingly in order to prepare the way for a solution to all the problems. I know that I can count on cooperation from everyone in this task.

On this occasion, allow me to make a few comments which reflect the importance and interest which my country attaches to the Conference on Disarmament and in particular the questions to which we assign priority in its work. The international community has always had great expectations of the Conference on Disarmament. The historic changes which have occurred in the

(The President)

international arena can, we feel, help the Conference to live up to these expectations and to satisfy the profound aspiration for disarmament. Thus it is obvious that the accomplishment of the Conference's task lies in its ability to adapt to the new international equilibria and, in this new context, to devote itself to producing results on the priority issues on its agenda.

First and foremost, we believe that it should be possible for the consensus arrived at during the Conference on the extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, both on the nuclear test ban and on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, to take concrete shape in the work of the Conference. In this respect, the Conference, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, should spare no effort in order to arrive rapidly at a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a ban will not only help to bring nuclear proliferation under control, but also send an important message on the path to halting the increasing sophistication of nuclear weapons. Only a comprehensive nuclear test ban prohibiting all types of test can meet these objectives. In that regard, the recent statements made by France, the United States and Great Britain are encouraging and should allow us to make real progress in the negotiations under way. By the same token, we hope that all delegations will facilitate agreement on this vital issue of the scope of the treaty and that all efforts can thus be concentrated on the other aspects of the negotiations still under discussion, in particular the establishment of an effective and non-discriminatory verification and monitoring system as well as the formalities for the treaty's entry into force, which should take into account the need to produce a text aiming at universal membership.

In the middle of its current session, thanks to the many efforts and the patience of delegations, the Conference took the decision to set up an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty to prohibit fissile material for weapons purposes. This decision cannot but help to put an end to the threats posed to international security by the accumulation of this material and the propensity to use it for weapons purposes. Therefore, it falls to the Conference to embark on negotiations on this important subject and, in a spirit of harmony and understanding, to ensure that these negotiations meet the various expectations that have been expressed on the matter, consideration of which should cover both the non-proliferation dimension and that of nuclear disarmament.

It is just as important to bear in mind the fact that the ultimate objective of the NPT is nuclear disarmament. This is also a priority for the Conference on Disarmament, and nobody can question the extreme importance of nuclear disarmament and the obligations that arise therefrom for the Conference. It is worth remembering that the international community as a whole attaches high priority to this subject. Thus it is vital to make progress at the multilateral level on such an important issue for the future of mankind. The developments which have accompanied the end of the cold war are indeed encouraging, but it must be noted that such developments are volatile in a rapidly changing world if definitive and mutually accepted solutions are not found to the evils that have been engendered by the nuclear arms race. Consequently, the Conference should take up all the efforts made towards this end. In other words, it should effectively participate in

(The President)

discussions aimed at nuclear disarmament and endow itself with the necessary machinery which will allow it to work to achieve the progress which the international community expects of it on the subject. The Conference could thus open up a debate on the progressive stages which need to be mapped out on the path towards general and complete nuclear disarmament. An in-depth exchange of views on security needs in a world freed of the atomic weapon and on means to achieve this would help to build up a climate of trust, and would in particular enable the nuclear Powers to subscribe to the relevant multilateral efforts.

Among the priorities to which the Conference should also devote itself, we should include the threat of the development of various types of sophisticated weaponry whose very accumulation is a destabilizing factor. The ceaseless development of technologies offers disturbing possibilities for the development of this type of weapon. The Conference's role therefore involves the application of instruments which would prevent such a drift towards the use of high technology for weapons purposes. The development of weapons and their sometimes extensive dissemination not only helps to generate tensions but also in fact deprives many countries of the means to address the priorities they have in the field of economic and social development.

As President of the Conference I shall spare no effort in order to bring together the views which are expressed on the various subjects of concern to us. As President I am available to all delegations and I count on their trust and support to provide solutions to the urgent questions we ought to be tackling. Among these I attach very high priority to the question of expanding the membership of the Conference. There is a need to take full account of new international equilibria and to ensure that all the geopolitical approaches which are expressed and which can contribute to multilateral disarmament coexist within the Conference. The Conference must therefore expand its membership, opening itself up to new members who will certainly provide a valuable and direct contribution to its work. This will also help to expand the Conference's audience at the international level and increase its chances in the implementation of the agreements which would emerge and which would by their nature tend towards universality.

Today the mobilization of all concerned is essential to ensure that the Conference, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, becomes the effective instrument which can play a worthy role to serve the cause of peace through disarmament. My country, which fully subscribes to the principle of global and complete disarmament, in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, will spare no effort to ensure that the Conference carries out its noble tasks.

I would now like to bid a welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to the first speaker who is on the list for today, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, who will be speaking to the Conference for the second time this year. His presence among us today is a further indication of his Government's sustained interest in our work and the importance it attaches to this forum.

(The President)

Apart from Mr. Blomberg, I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Poland and Japan, as well as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on the detection and identification of seismic events. I now invite the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Blomberg, to make his statement.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the important office of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I assure you of the Finnish delegation's full cooperation with you in the conduct of your office.

Today, 50 years after mankind learnt of the awesome power of the atom, the international community is anxiously waiting for an end to nuclear test explosions. Nuclear testing was always related to the cold war arms race. As that race is over for good, so should nuclear testing be.

The change in the international situation was recognized by the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May when the Treaty was made permanent. Finland worked actively for permanence. That historic decision, adopted without a vote, as well as the decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the NPT review process, provide a solid basis for further disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The NPT Conference opened a prospect for rapid conclusion of the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT). There is now good ground to hope that the treaty will be ready for signature by next summer. This should become a shared objective of all participants in the negotiations. Time is short.

A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty will end an era in which more than 2,000 nuclear-weapon test explosions were conducted. The treaty will strengthen nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. For us, the treaty is important on both accounts. At the same time, the treaty will prevent environmental damage that is inherent in any nuclear explosions.

At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the States parties agreed that, pending the entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint. Nevertheless, there have already been two new tests by China as well as the decision of France to conduct nuclear tests between September 1995 and May 1996. These regrettable steps highlight the urgency and the importance of a CTBT - the only means to put a definite end to nuclear test explosions. Pending conclusion of the negotiations, we urge all the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further testing.

The early entry into force of the Treaty should be a key objective. This goal should be borne in mind, inter alia, in negotiating the provisions for entry into force, the establishment of the international monitoring system, financial arrangements and the preparatory phase before entry into force.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

Finland has consistently supported a treaty that would be truly comprehensive, banning any and all nuclear test explosions. We welcome the decisions of France and the United States to support a "true zero" test ban. We hope that this will enable early agreement on the language put forward by Australia on the scope of the treaty.

We oppose any language in the treaty that would leave the door open for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Progress could be made here on the basis of the agreement that was recorded in the draft final declaration of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in the part dealing with the article V of the Treaty, which did not give any support for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.

Our understanding is that imminent preparations for a nuclear test explosion would be prohibited even without an explicit reference to them in the treaty. The treaty machinery should not be powerless if a State party were to engage in such activities.

It is important for the credibility of the test ban to ensure that the treaty will be internationally and effectively verifiable. The international monitoring system (IMS) will have to serve the States parties and the whole international community for decades ahead. In our view, the IMS should be operational at the time of entry into force. Due regard should be given to the need to ensure functional flexibility, efficiency and predictability as well as cost-effectiveness. The framework to be established in the treaty should allow future adjustments in order to ensure the efficiency of the IMS at all times. In our view, the monitoring facilities should be based on existing resources to the extent possible.

We welcome the progress that is being made regarding the funding of the IMS. We believe that the monitoring stations should be mainly owned and operated by individual States parties.

The establishment and operation of the IMS is an unprecedented task that will require extensive cooperation among the States parties. The basic commitment to monitoring, which will be included in the treaty text, should be complemented with agreements between the CTBT organization and individual States parties.

Finland will contribute to the IMS by providing her FINES seismic station as a primary station in the global seismic network. We stand ready to provide additional seismic stations for use as auxiliary stations.

The establishment of the seismic monitoring system will greatly benefit from the work by seismic experts over many years, particularly from the ongoing GSETT-3 test, in which Finland too is participating.

Regarding other monitoring networks, much more work will be required. Finland is ready to offer her radionuclide monitoring stations that fully meet the criteria to be established for use by the IMS. At the moment, we are beginning experimental data transmission from a radionuclide station in Finland to the IDC.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

We believe that most of the ambiguous events detected through the monitoring system can be dealt with adequately through a clarification and consultation process. But it is of fundamental importance for the whole treaty and for all States parties that effective provisions for on-site inspections are in place if compliance with treaty obligations is ever in doubt. We believe that the so-called "red light" procedure should be applied to the first phase of an on-site inspection.

I want to reiterate our support for Vienna as the venue for the CTBT organization. The organization should establish a functional relationship with IAEA that would bring both administrative and cost benefits.

The international community is looking forward to a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We regret that the cut-off negotiations are being held hostage to unrelated questions - two years after the international community gave its support to the negotiations by consensus. We urge the Conference to delink the cut-off negotiations from other issues and to start them without any further delay.

On transparency in armaments, we support the continuation of the exploratory process in which the CD has been engaged during the last couple of years. As a concrete step forward in increasing openness and transparency, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms has proven its usefulness. We have faithfully provided our data to this Register and we urge all other States to do likewise.

We deplore the inability of the Conference to agree on its enlargement. The Conference is duty-bound to respond to the unanimous call by the international community in General Assembly resolution 49/77 B to reach an urgent solution on the expansion. The bottom line of a composition of "at least 60 countries" established by the resolution provides the basis for the Conference to do the right thing. Let me encourage you, Mr. President, in your efforts to come to an agreement that would facilitate the earliest possible implementation of the expansion in accordance with resolution 49/77 B. Let me also reiterate our view that each application for membership should be viewed on its own merits, without being held hostage to extraneous circumstances or outdated balance calculations.

Today, more than ever, disarmament non-proliferation is our common endeavour. This year witnessed the success of the NPT Conference. Next year, we expect the conclusion of the CTBT. We also expect the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention, and the strengthening of the biological weapons Convention with verification. This is progress that serves the interests of every one of us.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now given the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Dembinski.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland): Mr. President, allow me first to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial, concluding part of the current session. I am confident that the competent and businesslike manner in which you have taken over the helm of this body - and which you will not let go until the end of 1995 - augurs well for the prospects of solution of the major outstanding problems of the CD. In your endeavours you will have full support of the Polish delegation.

I should like to take this opportunity to express our warm appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Yumjav of Mongolia, for the excellent manner in which he guided our deliberations last month. I should also like to take this opportunity to warmly welcome the distinguished representatives who have recently joined us in this body: Ambassador Arundhati Ghose of India, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada and Ambassador Selebi of South Africa. I look forward to close cooperation with them in our common endeavours.

On the departure from Geneva of the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Gérard Errera, I should like to request the French delegation to convey to him our best wishes for every success in his new assignment. He has left an indelible mark on the CD. We will sorely miss his wisdom and his friendship.

I take great pleasure in informing the Conference on Disarmament that a week ago, on 23 August 1995, the Government of Poland deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations the instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. At the same time, the Polish authorities are undertaking all the mandatory measures under the Convention relevant to its strict implementation.

The Polish ratification of the CWC brings the total number of States parties to 35, that is, 30 short of the number of ratifications required for the entry into force of the Convention. A major accomplishment of the Conference on Disarmament, the chemical weapons Convention represents an unprecedented multilateral disarmament accord. Its singular character stems not only from the fact that it eliminates a particularly abhorrent and inhumane class of weapons of mass annihilation, but also from the impressive number of its signatories - some 160 members of the international community who have supported it since its opening for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993. In the view of my delegation, the pace of ratification of the CW Convention should be accelerated to secure its earliest entry into effect. Indeed, it would be both desirable and appropriate if the deposit of all 65 requisite ratifications could make the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. I am confident that in this regard the CD members, who legitimately pride themselves on the role they played in the CW negotiations, will not fail to set the example and - if they have not yet done so - will deposit their instruments of ratification as early as possible. This action is indispensable and urgent if the international community is to see the treaty provisions any time soon translated into tangible results of effectively enforced prohibitions and progressive destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles.

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

The lessons and experience associated with the CWC negotiations and the current work of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague are very instructive. They should not be ignored as the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban approaches the "end-game" of its negotiations. In my view, we have in fact already entered that crucial phase. We have done so on a highly positive note. The Polish delegation is gratified by the declarations of France, the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the scope of the future test ban. Their unequivocal support of the comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban, along the lines of the Australian draft language contained in document CD/NTB/WP.222, adds critical momentum to the negotiating process. Together with the imaginative and broadly supported United States proposal for IMS funding, these declarations on the key provision of CTBT make the 1996 target date for its conclusion a practical proposition.

Still, despite the growing convergence of views - if not yet full consensus - on key issues, there remain quite a few questions of substance and many loose ends to be tied up. They discourage complacency and a relaxed pace. For this reason, my delegation - like many others - strongly favours inter-sessional work, both in expert format on specific issues and in working group mode. Appropriately timed between the end of the current and the beginning of the next CD sessions, such an accelerated effort should - in our view - aim at a two-fold goal: further streamlining the rolling text that is to emerge from the current stage of the negotiations, and drafting concrete treaty language where it is still missing. The results of the inter-sessional efforts could then provide a useful basis for a purpose-oriented discussion and decisions by the Ad Hoc Committee early in 1996.

That discussion - in our view - should result in the development of a coherent treaty structure, from the preamble down to authentic texts, with "streamlined" provisions, i.e. free of redundancies and dispensable brackets, falling into place. For this to become feasible, from now onwards we need to demonstrate maximum flexibility, good will and a spirit of accommodation. We must also realize that things cannot any longer be put off for later consideration. As the end of the day approaches, there is simply no more time available.

First of all, the growing convergence of views around the formula of a truly comprehensive test ban must be translated into a clear-cut draft of the scope provision. We need to put in draft treaty language many other specific aspects of the CTBT which at this time are still far from agreement. They include questions pertaining to the organization, its governing bodies, the Technical Secretariat and its seat, the possible relationship of the organization to IAEA and many more. Much perseverance will be necessary to develop precise formulae on funding. Last but not least, the basic agreement on the IMS architecture must lead to consensus on the precise form of the respective technology networks. Like many other delegations, we believe that requirements for a cost-effective IMS would best be met by the four-technology monitoring system that could be in place by the time of the entry into force of the CTBT. It is also the view of my delegation that agreement on treaty language of provisions concerning on-site inspection has to be reached before

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

the Ad Hoc Committee reconvenes in 1996. Representing part and parcel of the CTBT verification system, on-site inspection must be equipped with a transparent trigger mechanism. That mechanism must be impervious to easy abuse or confusion by changing red and green lights.

Mr. President, to turn away from a subject in which this delegation may tend to see a vested interest, I should like to commend you, as indeed your predecessors, for the determination and skill with which you are bringing the question of the expansion of CD membership to the forefront of our attention. The delegation of Poland considers that your approach to this pressing issue deserves serious consideration. It clearly is an issue whose time has come. You will have our full support in your efforts to reach a long overdue solution in that regard. Let me also express my gratification at your intention to see to it that the forthcoming CD session has before it, from the outset, a concrete programme of work to consider and approve without unnecessary loss of time. While we consider it indispensable for the NTB Ad Committee to continue its central role in the overall CD programme of work next year, we welcome the prospect that its other important aspects will also stand a realistic chance of receiving careful consideration.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): Mr. President, at the outset, I should like to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this critical period. I wish you every success in discharging your important tasks to guide the work of this Conference with a view to resolving all pending issues of the Conference. I pledge the fullest cooperation of my delegation to your endeavour. I should also like to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Yumjav of Mongolia, for his untiring efforts with which he conducted our work during this month.

At the plenary meeting at the end of the second session of the CD, I emphasized the importance of accelerating the pace of the CTBT negotiations during the third session of the CD. I am pleased to note at this stage of the session that encouraging progress has been made in this regard. I particularly appreciate the political will that some States have shown on critical elements of the treaty, as well as the cooperative spirit of the negotiators and experts which has helped to facilitate progress in many areas of the international monitoring system architecture and to streamline the rolling text.

Today I would like to offer my views as to how our work might be further advanced, particularly by achieving a convergence of views on three specific issues and forging a commitment to a single, common goal. Let me state at the outset that it is of crucial importance to further progress in our negotiations that each State shows the utmost flexibility and clearly commits itself to achieving a convergence of opinions before the first session of the CD in 1996. For this purpose inter-sessional periods should be utilized to the maximum extent possible.

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

The first point on which a convergence of views must be reached and which is the most central issue of the negotiations is, needless to say, the scope of the treaty. I am pleased to reiterate Japan's appreciation for the recent announcements made by France and the United States in this regard. I also welcome the statement made at this conference by Mr. Roland Smith of the United Kingdom on 17 August, which reaffirmed the United Kingdom's support for the ban on all nuclear explosions. Japan strongly hopes that all nuclear-weapon States will agree unequivocally to a true zero-yield threshold as soon as possible.

Japan has repeatedly stated its position that a CTBT should prohibit all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and thus supports working paper 222 proposed by Australia. I would like to call upon all negotiating States to support the Australian text. As for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE), the rationale repeatedly cited is not persuasive because the practicality of its application for peaceful purposes is doubtful and we see no need for such technology. It would be very dangerous to allow such a wide loophole under a CTBT. Japan, therefore, appeals to all States participating in the negotiation to agree at the earliest possible date that the concept of PNE does not have a basis for justification under a CTBT.

The second issue I wish to emphasize concerns verification. Thanks to the contributions of experts and negotiators, significant progress has been made at this session on the IMS architecture. I highly appreciate that an agreement has been made on the number and location of primary stations in a seismic network and believe that a general consensus is emerging on other issues in IMS technologies. I strongly hope that further progress will be made on IMS architecture at the meeting of experts. It is important that experts and negotiators continue their work and make further progress in this field during the coming autumn, and I am confident that every participating State shares this view.

As for on-site inspections, I would hope that a basic agreement will emerge soon on such matters as the basis for OSI requests, on an access regime, and on the relation between consultation and clarification and the OSI process. As regards phasing, we find merits in a two-phase approach as a means to ensure timely implementation of OSI which will facilitate the detection of such time-critical phenomena as the presence of noble gases and aftershocks.

While a consultation and clarification process is important for its own sake as well as in keeping unnecessary inspections to a minimum, I do not share the view expressed by some delegations that a request for consultation and clarification should be a prerequisite to an OSI. Moreover, I do not subscribe to the view that the basis for an OSI request should be limited only to data and information detected by the IMS, since the coverage of the IMS network cannot be 100 per cent comprehensive.

The third issue on which efforts should be made to reach agreement is the question of the seat of a CTBT organization and the organization's relations with IAEA. At the plenary during the second session, I indicated that Japan is favourably considering Vienna as the seat for a CTBT organization. It does

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

so in the interest of ensuring that it remains a small, efficient and highly cost-effective organization and is able to fully utilize the expertise of IAEA. The Government of Austria's offer to host a CTBT organization is thus, in our view, most welcome. I hope that the exchange of views with Austria will further progress.

It is also encouraging that efforts are under way to study the functions of IAEA and to examine a possible relationship with a CTBT organization. Although I recognize that the specific outlines of the relations between a CTBT organization and other international organizations are yet to be determined, I hope that efforts in this regard will be accelerated so that we can have a concrete basis for a discussion of the matter in the very near future. I cannot but think that convergence of views on the issue of the seat of a CTBT organization, with basic understanding on its appropriate relationship with other organizations, will be an important step to show that the negotiations are in progress.

As stipulated in the Principles and Objectives decided at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the international community has committed itself to completing the CTBT negotiations no later than 1996. But Japan and a number of other countries are advocating that the negotiations should be completed as early as possible in 1996, and not simply by the end of that year. The endorsement of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty by the General Assembly in the fall of 1996 would be a worthy accomplishment for the United Nations, which will have just celebrated its fiftieth anniversary and embarked upon its next half-century of activities.

Permit me to take this opportunity to urge all participating States to make every effort to realize the goal of signing a CTBT by the fall of 1996 at the very latest. This means that it will be necessary to have a clean text available during the second session of the CD in 1996. Considering that an appropriate amount of time must be allowed for technical and procedural arrangements, it is important that we reach an agreement on the substance of the treaty by the beginning of the first session of the CD in 1996. I sincerely hope that all States will summon the political will to conclude the negotiations within this time-frame.

I should now like to explain briefly Japan's activities which have direct relevance to the CTBT, especially the IMS. Utilizing its financial resources and the experience it has gained in seismology, Japan has been engaged in the education and training in this field of experts from other countries. It is gratifying to note that experts who have participated in these training programmes have gone on to become members of and active participants in the GSE.

Once a CTBT enters into force, it will be essential to improve global monitoring technology based on seismology. Japan is planning in this fiscal year to launch a new programme in an effort to enhance the capability of other countries to detect nuclear tests. Under this programme, five trainees from various countries will be invited to participate each year; applications are now being accepted for the first group.

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

With regard to funding for the IMS, Japan joins those delegations which have expressed their basic support for the new position outlined by the United States. Japan is of the view that each State should assume its share of the responsibility in a new international regime, and is ready to bear its proper share according to an appropriate international scale.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to touch briefly upon two issues not related to the CTBT. First, with regard to the cut-off treaty negotiations, I believe it is important to select a chairman for the Ad Hoc Committee and begin negotiations during this session and continue them in 1996. It is my hope that this question can be resolved as soon as possible under your presidency. The second issue concerns CD expansion. I share the concern with my colleagues regarding this issue, and it is our hope that the President will do his utmost to guide us to reach an appropriate solution. I would like to assure you of our readiness to cooperate fully with you in this endeavour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now call on the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for the detection and identification of seismic events, Dr. Dahlman, who will present the Group's progress report on its forty-first session, which bears the symbol CD/1341.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): The progress report of the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group contained in CD/1341, is in front of you. Scientific experts and representatives from 34 countries attended the session. I would from the outset like to express the Group's appreciation for the eminent services provided by the secretariat during this session and prior to it in support of our efforts to increase participation in GSETT-3.

The Ad Hoc Group is now focusing its attention on the conduct and the evaluation of GSETT-3. This large-scale global test, which began its full-scale operation on 1 January 1995, had, as stated in CD/1254, the following main objectives: to develop and test concepts for an international seismic monitoring system; to provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the CD with timely technical information; and finally to develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be specified for an international seismic monitoring system.

The concept of an experimental seismic monitoring system being tested during GSETT-3 includes a single IDC for data collection, routine analysis and distribution of results, a global network of some 50 primary stations to provide on-line data continuously for event detection and preliminary location and some 100-150 auxiliary stations to be used for improved event location and characterization. The purpose of GSETT-3 is thus not to establish an operational system, but rather to provide knowledge and experience to facilitate decisions on the final IMS system and thereby reduce the uncertainties and the risks involved.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

GSETT-3 is now providing results, which makes it possible for the GSE to draw a number of concrete conclusions which are summarized in the progress report. I will draw your attention to some of those having more general interest.

The experimental IDC in Arlington, Virginia, United States, has, with few interruptions, been in continuous operation since 1 January 1995. As of 18 August this year, 37 primary and 75 auxiliary stations are participating in the experiment. This participation is detailed in the progress report. Information provided during the session indicates that 5 primary stations are likely to be added to the experiment before the end of September 1995 and another 5 later this year, thus bringing the number of primary stations to 47 towards the end of this year.

Although the global coverage is presently uneven and the number of stations currently falls short of that envisioned when the experiment was planned, it is possible to start drawing conclusions of a practical nature on several aspects of the ISMS. Many of the conclusions are based on observational data from regions where the station coverage corresponds to what was originally planned. These, sometimes limited, observations are supplemented by theoretical modelling.

An important conclusion is that, from a technical perspective, the overall concept of a system based on a single IDC, NDCs in participating States and a two-tiered network of primary and auxiliary stations is an efficient concept for an international seismic monitoring system.

It has also been demonstrated that a single IDC, of the size and structure now being tested, can fulfil the required tasks of collecting data routinely and on-line from the primary stations and when required from the auxiliary station through an automatic request procedure. The issues of redundancy, reliability and data security are most important and GSETT-3 is expected to provide further experience on these issues useful in the final design of the ISMS.

It has further been demonstrated that the IDC can routinely analyse the seismological data anticipated in the ISMS and in a timely manner provide useful analysis products to participating States. Additional work is, however, needed to further develop methods to provide parameters to characterize observed events and to provide user-friendly products.

The seismological stations are key elements of a seismic network. The experiment has shown the importance of having stations installed at locations where the background disturbances are low. It has further confirmed the necessity for stations to meet defined minimum technical requirements. GSETT-3 has also shown the value of upgrading three-component stations to arrays. The Group concludes that seismic arrays at low-noise sites will be the most valuable type of installation in the primary seismic network of an IMS.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

There has been a costly and lengthy effort to establish the infrastructure needed for GSETT-3, including high-quality stations, NDCs, the International Data Centre and the communication links. The Group considers it essential that the operation of key elements of this infrastructure that could contribute to the future IMS be maintained.

The Working Group on Verification has agreed on a list of 50 primary seismic stations to be included in the ISMS. Twenty-seven of these stations are already operational and participating in GSETT-3 and nine more are expected to be included before the end of the year. Efforts are also under way to establish the majority of the remaining stations.

The fact that it will be possible to utilize so many of the facilities existing today in the ISMS will most significantly reduce the need for new investments. The total investment cost for all the facilities planned for GSETT-3 is US$ 180 million, out of which facilities with an estimated value of US$ 150 million are already established. GSETT-3 has confirmed earlier estimates that the yearly operational costs for the primary and the auxiliary stations, the communication links and the IDC are about US$ 30 million.

In addition to technical experiences, GSETT-3 is also beginning to provide scientific results and demonstration of operational capabilities. As such analysis takes time and requires large amounts of data and good operational coverage, the conclusions are so far preliminary.

The first such conclusion is that it takes considerable operational experience to achieve the full potential capability of a seismic monitoring network. In other words it takes time and effort to fine-tune the system and its components, to adjust the stations and the processing methods to obtain an optimized system. Steps towards such an optimalization are continuously taken as GSETT-3 proceeds.

When it comes to detection capability, it is concluded that in regions of the world such as North America, northern Europe and Australia, in which the planned primary network is nearly complete, events with magnitude of 3.5 to 4.0 are detected with high probability. This supports and gives confidence in the theoretical estimates to the global detection capability earlier made by the Group. In regions of the world where the station coverage still is incomplete, the current capability is significantly lower.

In particular, GSETT-3 has shown that the current seismological network is inadequate for monitoring the southern oceanic areas. It might therefore be essential to use data from a hydroacoustic network in conjunction with seismic data to monitor events in these areas. More work is needed on this topic.

The capability of accurately locating observed events is most important in CTBT monitoring. To obtain high location accuracy you need stations in various azimuths around the actual event and accurate, that is well-calibrated, models for the velocity of seismic waves in the actual region. In this respect, the Ad Hoc Group reached the important conclusion that a combination of the primary network and an auxiliary network should be

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

able to achieve a location accuracy of within 1,000 square kilometres. In the well-covered regions of the world the location error of the primary network is estimated to be 20-50 km for seismic events of magnitude 4. The use of auxiliary stations can reduce this to 15-25 km, based on GSETT-3 experience in the same areas. Previous work has demonstrated that the location uncertainty can be further reduced by calibration of the network using events for which the location is known or accurately estimated from a local seismic network.

GSETT-3 will provide further information on the extent to which auxiliary stations are needed to provide a location accuracy within 1,000 square kilometres and thus on the required distribution of such stations globally. GSETT-3 will also demonstrate, in selected regions, the improvements in location accuracy that can be obtained using calibration events.

The conduct of GSETT-3 requires comprehensive documentation. The operational manuals compiled for seismic stations, national data centres and the International Data Centre have proven to be essential to guide and support the experiment. These manuals should also prove useful models for the operations manual for the ISMS.

The successful conduct of GSETT-3 is dependent on dedicated efforts of well-trained personnel around the globe working in close cooperation. In particular the experience from the international team at the International Data Centre is most satisfactory. GSETT-3 has demonstrated the importance of training of staff at national data centres and at the International Data Centre. This training is already taking place and should continue and be expanded. We heard the distinguished representative of Japan touching upon their programme.

GSE is critically dependent on informal work going on between the sessions. This includes routine operation of the experimental system as well as informal workshops and seminars. The Group noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop "From GSETT-3 to IMS" in Baltimore, Maryland, United States in late June 1995. The workshop was attended by 55 experts from 20 countries. The objective of the workshop was to stimulate discussion on the evaluation and evolution of GSETT-3 and to consider ways to facilitate the transition on the basis of the experience gained from GSETT-3 to meet the needs of the CD and of the future organization to be established under a CTBT.

The Group also noted with appreciation the convening of two informal technical seminars. One was conducted in Zurich, Switzerland in early June 1995 on "Design, usage and implementation of an automatic data exchange manager". This seminar, which considered common procedures for automatic data exchange, was attended by 18 experts from 12 countries. The second seminar was held in Bruyères-le-Chatel, France in mid-July 1995 and was attended by 17 experts from seven European countries. The aim of this seminar was to review initial results of what is called the EUROBULL experiment, which is an effort to produce a high-quality European seismic bulletin. Such high-quality regional or national bulletins are of great importance for the evaluation of GSETT-3 and might prove valuable also in connection with an ISMS.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

I would also like to acknowledge the initiative announced by the delegation of Argentina in the CD on 17 August to host a regional workshop for diplomats and seismic experts to strengthen participation on the South American continent in GSETT-3 and in the international verification system for a CTBT. Efforts are also under way to convene a similar workshop in Africa.

In discussing its future plans the Group took into account the views expressed by the Chairman of the NTB Committee's Working Group on Verification when briefing the Group. The Group agreed on a work programme and schedule presented in the progress report. This work programme contains three main issues: the development of the GSETT-3 system, the evaluation and completion of GSETT-3 and the transition following the GSETT-3 experience.

As to the development of the GSETT-3 system, there will be a continuation of the step-by-step implementation of new facilities around the world. Priority will be given to implementing the remaining primary stations agreed upon by the NTB Working Group on Verification and improving the global network of auxiliary stations. The International Data Centre will continue its daily service, develop its processing methods and, most important, develop its products to include additional parameters that characterize the observed events. The goal is to develop user-friendly IDC products that are useful to support national verification needs.

The GSE will further complete a comprehensive evaluation of the first year of the GSETT-3 experiment, with emphasis on specific issues of importance to define the IMS. Such issues include the network of auxiliary stations, network calibration, the characterization parameters and improved capability estimates.

The GSE will also examine the issues to be addressed in a transition from GSETT-3 to IMS operations. The GSE will develop a plan to address these issues and would thus be prepared for a possible request by the Conference on Disarmament.

To be responsive to the needs of the NTB Committee and especially its Working Group on Verification, the Group decided to intensify its efforts to provide information relevant to the negotiations in a timely manner. The Ad Hoc Group therefore suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 27 November to 1 December 1995, followed by a session from 12 to 23 February 1996.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. Dahlman for introducing this report. I intend to submit to the Conference for approval the recommendation contained in paragraph 14 of the report concerning the dates for the Group's coming sessions, at a subsequent plenary meeting of the Conference.

I have come to the end of the list of speakers for today. Would any other delegation like to take the floor at this stage?

(The President)

I see none, and therefore I would now like to inform you of my intentions concerning the organization of our work for the coming weeks. As you know, the immediate task to which we will have to address ourselves will be to consider the draft annual report of the Conference to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. In accordance with the provisions of the rules of procedure of the Conference, I have, with the assistance of the secretariat, prepared a draft of that report which is contained in document CD/WP.466. This document has been distributed today in English in delegations' pigeon-holes, and it will be available in all languages on Monday, 4 September. With your agreement, therefore, I intend to start consideration of this report at an informal meeting that we will hold immediately after the plenary meeting on Tuesday, 5 September 1995.

In response to the incessant appeals made by the members of the Conference, as well as many others in this room, concerning the question of expansion, I hope to be able to submit a positive report on this subject next week and perhaps a draft decision on the subject. I think I can tell you today that I am optimistic, and I hope I will still be optimistic after consulting all the members of the Conference on this matter.

I would now like to turn to the informal paper distributed by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual it is merely indicative in nature and can be changed if necessary. On this understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The next plenary meeting of the Conference will take place on Tuesday, 5 September 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.717
5 September 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 5 September 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Benjelloun-Touimi (Morocco)

GE.95-63636 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 717th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representative of China, Ambassador Sha. I therefore give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Sha.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, may I begin by warmly congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The Chinese delegation is convinced that with your outstanding talent and rich experience in multilateral diplomacy, with your dedication and enthusiasm for the cause of disarmament, you are sure to guide this Conference to progress and success, thus contributing to international peace and security. I would like to assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I would also like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my delegation to your predecessors, the distinguished ambassadors from Mongolia, Mexico and Japan, for their tremendous efforts and achievements during their respective terms of office.

Nineteen ninety-five is a year full of special meanings. This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of victory in the world anti-fascist war and victory in the war to combat Japanese aggression against China, the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, the most universal international organization in the world, as well as the fiftieth anniversary of the use of the nuclear weapon, the first use of the greatest weapon of mass destruction in human warfare. People all over the world, while commemorating these events, are reflecting upon history and drawing lessons from past experience. Likewise, the Chinese people have also held series of commemorative activities in order to "review and learn", to educate the Chinese people, especially the young, so that future generations will forever remember that "fire and blood" chapter in our history and strive for a strong and prosperous China and for world peace.

On 2 September 1945, the Japanese Government signed the instrument of surrender. 3 September thus became V-Day for both the Chinese people's war of resistance against Japanese aggression and the world anti-fascist war. That day is a day of triumph for the peoples of China as well as other countries in the world, a day to mark the end of a war of aggression which had brought mankind unprecedented suffering in the twentieth century. It is also a day leading us towards new and peaceful days of progress. August and glorious, that day has forever been inscribed both in Chinese and in world history.

The Japanese militarists had long sought to annex China. Since the latter half of the last century, Japan had joined other imperialist Powers in carving up the territory of China. For over 70 years after the Meiji Restoration, Japan had launched and participated in a series of aggressive wars, the majority of them against China. Japan invaded Taiwan in 1874 and provoked the Sino-Japanese war of 1894. Taiwan was occupied by Japan from 1895 and was subject to Japanese colonial rule for half a century. In 1931, Japan engineered the "18 September incident" and in 1935 the North China Incident, with its ambition to swallow up China ever growing.

(Mr. Sha, China)

On 7 July 1937, the Japanese aggressors bombarded Wanping and attacked Lugouqiao (Marco Polo) bridge, thus starting a full-scale war against China in an attempt to subject the whole of China to its colonial rule.

The Japanese war of aggression inflicted untold suffering and damage unprecedented in scale on the Chinese people. According to incomplete statistics, 35 million Chinese were killed or wounded by the Japanese aggressors. In the notorious Nanjing massacre alone, more than 300,000 people were killed. Well over 2 million labourers who were fraudulently recruited inside Shanhaiguan Pass to be taken to north-east China died of maltreatment and torture. In addition, the Japanese invaders also resorted to germ and chemical warfare. Based on the 1937 exchange rate, the Japanese aggressors caused direct economic losses of US$ 100 billion, and indirect losses of US$ 500 billion to China. The crimes committed by the Japanese aggressors against the Chinese people represent the most barbarous and most brutal page in history.

The eight-year-long Chinese war against the Japanese aggression was an important part of the world anti-fascist war. Since the Opium War in 1840, China had been subjected time and again to aggression, bullying, humiliation and exploitation by imperialist Powers. Time and again the Chinese people rose against oppression and fought for national liberation. All ended in failure. The war against Japanese invasion was the first national liberation war waged by the Chinese people against foreign invaders in modern history that ended in complete victory. United by shared hatred, an unyielding and indomitable spirit, the poorly armed Chinese people fought against and defeated the much better-equipped and economically strong enemy, thereby creating the miracle of a semi-colonial and weak nation defeating an imperialist Power, wiping out the humiliations of a century. As our late Chairman Mao Zedong pointed out, it was "a wonder in the history of war, a heroic undertaking of the Chinese people and an epoch-making triumph".

To review history is to understand it in a proper perspective and to draw due lessons from it, thus avoiding a repetition of history. Only by remembering historical lessons, sincerely repenting of its criminal acts of aggression and persisting in following the road of peaceful development can Japan gain the understanding and trust of the Asian peoples and the international community as a whole and prevent repetitions of historic tragedies.

The atrocities inflicted upon the Chinese people were caused by the war of aggression by Japanese imperialism and militarism. Like the Chinese people, the people of Japan were also victims of that war. The Chinese delegation wishes to take this opportunity to express its deep sympathy for the over 200,000 innocent civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who were killed by the atomic attack and its appreciation of the anti-nuclear-weapon sentiment of the Japanese people for the last 50 years. Like the Chinese and other Asian peoples, the people of Japan were innocent victims of a small group of militarists in Japan. We sincerely hope, however, that today when we commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all of us can understand the true cause of that unfortunate event

(Mr. Sha, China)

and, what is more important, draw proper lessons from it. We cannot but wonder at the attitude and intention of such a course of action: elaborately describing oneself as a victim while deliberately covering up or writing off one's own crime of bringing atrocities to peoples of other countries; talking about the destructiveness of atomic bombing but without saying a word as to its cause; and preaching about the significance of a nuclear test ban while keeping silent on one's enjoyment of the protection of someone else's nuclear umbrella and one's support for a doctrine of nuclear deterrence founded on the possible use of nuclear weapons. The mayor of Hiroshima, Mr. Takashi Hiraoka, pointed out rightly in a recent article that the Hiroshima incident was not an isolated one and has to be understood in the context of history and the history of war. It should be understood both from the perspective of the victim and from that of the victimizer. The fact that Hiroshima suffered an atomic attack will not write off Japan's crimes of aggression. Unless Japan itself repents of its past record of war crimes, no matter how much is said about the atomic attack on Hiroshima, it will simply not find resonance in the hearts of the people of the world - the people of Asia in particular. The Chinese delegation finds wisdom in those words.

In the last 50 years, especially since the beginning of the 1990s, the world has gone through fundamental changes. With the end of the cold war and East-West confrontation, the nuclear Powers have started to embark on the course of nuclear disarmament. That is the background for the ongoing multilateral negotiations on the CTBT and the yet-to-start negotiations on the "cut-off" convention, and a reflection of the positive worldwide trend towards peace and development. On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the existence of such negative phenomena as hegemonism, power politics and doctrines of nuclear supremacy and deterrence, as well as frequent instances of interference with other countries' internal affairs, infringements of their sovereignty and undermining of their unity. In this international environment, the Chinese people have to live by the wisdom of "living in safety but thinking of danger", to redouble their efforts to promote peace, development and disarmament while working hard for their own economic prosperity at home.

It is a fact that China has not stopped nuclear testing and has conducted two underground tests so far this year. It is also a fact, however, that China has exercised the utmost restraint on nuclear testing and that the scale and number of its nuclear tests have been extremely limited. For decades, it has never been China that has held up negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. This is known to all. Not being superstitious about nuclear weapons, China has never joined the nuclear arms race. The small number of nuclear weapons it possesses are for the sole purpose of self-defence. We may recall that from the very first day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China unconditionally undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In addition, it also unconditionally undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Chinese Government is insistent that other nuclear-weapon States should respond to its call for early negotiations to conclude a no-first-use

(Mr. Sha, China)

treaty and to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones in a legally binding international instrument. In fact, as early as 1985, at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Chinese Government put forward a proposal that the nuclear-weapon States, once they had undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, should move on to negotiate an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. In the light of the changed international situation following the end of the cold war and the East-West confrontation, Qian Qichen, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of China, proposed at the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly the negotiation and conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons on the model of the ban on chemical and biological weapons. Unfortunately, for reasons known to all, such negotiations have yet to get under way. Recognizing and assessing positively the significance of the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the framework of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, China is now taking an active, responsible and constructive part in the current negotiations, with a view to concluding not later than 1996 a good, comprehensive, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty with universal participation banning all nuclear-weapon test explosions.

Being an independent and sovereign country, China has always opposed hegemonism and China itself will never practise it. China does not belong to any military alliance, nor does it enjoy the protection of any nuclear umbrella. It is true that China has never been a victim of a nuclear-weapon attack. Yet China has long been living under the shadow of the threat of nuclear weapons. While China will never invade other countries, it will never allow any country to encroach upon its sovereignty or territorial integrity or undermine its national unity. In so far as the countries concerned refuse to accept the above-mentioned proposals, China needs, for the sole purpose of self-defence, to possess a small number of nuclear weapons and to conduct an extremely limited number of nuclear tests. China has time and again stated that once the CTBT enters into force, it will cease nuclear testing. The Chinese delegation believes it improper and totally unacceptable for certain countries to point their fingers at China and make artificial issues out of a limited number of nuclear tests while those countries themselves are members of a military alliance, enjoying the protection of the nuclear umbrella of a certain nuclear super-Power and supporting the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

The CTBT negotiations have traversed one year and eight months. Despite the short lapse of time, the CTBT rolling text has been revised four times, and by the end of this session, the CD will submit a fifth revision to the General Assembly. The Chinese delegation rejoices at any progress achieved in the CTBT negotiations. The Chinese delegation is particularly satisfied with the substantive progress made at this session on the architecture of the IMS. The Chinese delegation knows full well that the CTBT is unprecedented. For the NTB Ad Hoc Committee to accomplish its mandate before the target of 1996, it will have to count on the participating countries' resolve to overcome all difficulties and continue their constructive efforts. The Chinese delegation

(Mr. Sha, China)

remains convinced that so long as all parties concerned cherish genuine political will, the target of concluding the CTBT negotiations in 1996 is achievable. In this respect, I wish to take this opportunity to explain the position of the Chinese delegation on some important issues under consideration by the two working groups for the negotiation of the CTBT.

First, on the preamble of the CTBT and its entry into force, the Chinese delegation has put forward its own views and textual suggestions and listened attentively to the comments from other delegations. As the result of our own further study and to promote progress in the CTBT negotiations, the Chinese delegation is now ready to consider the reasonable suggestions from some delegations and proposes the following adjustments in the relevant texts.

Under the preamble, China agrees to replace the present text proposed by China on nuclear disarmament with the relevant reference from the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Furthermore, proceeding from our respect for the position of the non-parties to the NPT, China suggests deleting the reference to the NPT in the relevant paragraph.

Under the entry-into-force article, the Chinese delegation is ready to withdraw its proposed text stipulating that the participation of CD members is a condition for the entry into force of the CTBT.

The Chinese delegation will provide further detailed explanations when Working Group 2 discusses the relevant part of the rolling text.

Secondly, on CTBT verification issues - the international monitoring system and national technical means. The IMS will be a comprehensive monitoring system with global coverage, a system specially designed and established for the sole purpose of the CTBT. As such, the IMS will be the fundamental technical means to ensure the effective verification of the CTBT. The Chinese delegation believes that a sound and effective IMS will be sufficient to detect instances of non-compliance on a global scale. As the IMS will be established as the result of extensive negotiations and consensus and serve all future States parties, it will not only embody the principle of equality amongst all States parties, but also prevent the inevitable inequality and discrimination resulting from disparities among States parties in their levels of national technical means for monitoring.

The Chinese delegation recognizes that all sovereign States are entitled to develop their own technical means for the purpose of conducting activities within the scope of their sovereignty. Meanwhile, the Chinese delegation believes that to ensure that the international verification regime is objective, no NTM should be allowed to find a place in the IMS and no country should be allowed to substitute its own NTM for the IMS. It is unacceptable to any country that believes in sovereign equality that one country or a number of countries should take advantage of their exclusive NTM and monopolize international verification in disregard of the IMS with a self-assumed mandate as a "world police". We may ask, if we have no faith and trust in the IMS even at the time of the negotiation, why should we bother

(Mr. Sha, China)

creating such a system? On the other hand, it is well known to all that as NTMs are under national control, it will be up to the State concerned to decide what monitoring data to provide and how. Therefore, NTMS are inherently selective, arbitrary and subjective. The institutionalization of NTM in the CTBT would be tantamount to legalizing the ability of one State party or a small group of States parties with superior technical means to police the world, conduct all kinds of activities, including espionage, against other States parties and keep watch over the majority of States parties that do not have such means. This would make the CTBT a truly discriminatory international treaty and its verification would unavoidably involve abuse. For the above reason, the Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate here that China will not accept the integration of NTM into the CTBT verification regime and will not accept the triggering of an OSI by NTM data or "any other information".

As to the purpose of OSI, the Chinese delegation is of the view that the primary issue in discussing OSI under the CTBT is to clearly define the purpose of such an undertaking and then proceed to the question of procedures and technologies. Without a clearly defined purpose, OSI would lack guidance and criteria. China believes that the sole purpose of an OSI is to identify whether or not an ambiguous event detected by the IMS was a nuclear-weapon test explosion carried out in violation of the scope of the CTBT and conducted after the entry into force of the treaty and, to the extent possible, to attribute the event to a violator. Needless to say, the on-site activities carried out by the inspection team must accord with the purpose of OSI and be conducted in a minimally intrusive, highly cost-effective and timely manner in order to accomplish the sole task of collecting evidence regarding whether or not a nuclear test has taken place within the inspection area. Once the evidence has been obtained, the inspection should be considered accomplished, and if no "smoking gun" is found, the inspected party should then be cleared of any alleged acts of non-compliance with the treaty.

Turning to the OSI triggering mechanism, the Chinese delegation believes that the process of consultation and clarification is a mandatory step before the triggering of an OSI. The IMS is the main organ of the international verification regime for the CTBT and consultation and clarification is an important measure for the settlement of disputes among States parties. An OSI itself is not a routine inspection but the last resort following an inconclusive process of consultation and clarification. In this respect, consultation and clarification, if properly conducted, will drastically reduce the occurrence of OSI. In the light of the importance and political sensitivity of OSI and the serious damage that could result from its abuse, the issue of OSI must be treated with caution and an OSI triggered only after a two thirds majority of all the members of the Executive Council have cast their affirmative vote, i.e. by way of a "green light".

The CD has succeeded in negotiating and concluding the CWC and it will be equally successful in negotiating and concluding the CTBT. The delegates of various countries participating in the negotiations bear on their shoulders not only the mission to safeguard their legitimate national interests but also the task of preserving the common interests of the international community.

(Mr. Sha, China)

The Chinese delegation will continue to contribute to the best of its ability towards the conclusion of a good CTBT which will help enhance the security of all countries and bring about early realization of the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Sha for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. Do other delegations wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the Ambassador of Japan, Mrs. Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): The distinguished Ambassador of China, in his statement, referred to past history. Since the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Murayama, made a clear statement on this issue on 15 August, I do not see any need to repeat it here, since I believe that this is a forum to negotiate future international legal regimes in the field of disarmament. Japan has been advocating consistently a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and it has been against any nuclear testing by any country. I believe that it is not only the wish of Japan but also the wish of the international community as a whole to realize a world without any nuclear explosion and, eventually, a world free from any nuclear weapons. I would like to take this opportunity to express once again the strong wish of Japan for the early conclusion and early entry into force of a CTBT.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador of Japan for her statement. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor? If not, I wish to inform you that I would like to submit to the Conference for approval at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 14 September the recommendation contained in paragraph 14 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on the detection and identification of seismic events, document CD/1341, relating to the dates of the next two sessions of the Group of Experts, namely from 27 November to 1 December 1995 and from 12 to 23 February 1996.

As I said at the last plenary meeting, I have been intensively continuing my consultations on the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. On concluding these consultations, I prepared a draft decision on the issue which I submitted for consideration by all groups. I firmly hope that this draft decision will constitute an acceptable basis for solving this problem, which everybody agrees is important and urgent. I would therefore like to appeal to all delegations to ensure that flexibility and a spirit of compromise prevail so that the Conference can take a decision at the next plenary meeting on Thursday, 14 September on this important issue. In any event the Chair is determined to achieve a solution, with cooperation from everyone and support from all delegations, to respond to the pressing recommendation from the United Nations General Assembly on this issue.

(The President)

I now turn to the informal paper distributed by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. This timetable was drawn up in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual it is merely indicative and can be changed if necessary. On that understanding I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before I adjourn this plenary meeting I would remind you that immediately afterwards we will be holding an informal meeting to study the technical parts of the draft annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. I would also like to inform you that starting next week i.e. as from Monday, 11 September, as I told you at the bilateral consultations and in the informal consultations, I will be conducting other bilateral consultations with all delegations on the work programme for the rest of the year 1995, and the preparations for 1996.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 14 September at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.718
14 September 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 14 September 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Benjelloun-Touimi (Morocco)

GE.95-63719 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 718th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Conference, I would like to welcome among us the new representative of France to the Conference, Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois, who will be our first speaker today. I would like to assure her of our full support and our entire cooperation in the performance of her new responsibilities.

Besides the representative of France, I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Brazil, Japan and Belarus, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Algeria, Argentina, the United States of America, Canada, Slovakia, Romania, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Norway, South Africa and the Republic of Korea. I invite the representative of France, Ambassador Bourgois, to take the floor.

Mrs. BOURGOIS (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time before the Conference in my capacity as the new Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, I am very happy that this should take place while you are in the Chair. You represent a country with which France maintains long-standing and very close relations of friendship and cooperation. Therefore, I have very special pleasure in congratulating you on taking up your post. You can be assured of the full cooperation of my delegation. I know how much talent and energy you plan to devote to moving our work forward, at a particularly important time for the Conference. You can rest assured of France's fullest support.

On 5 September, my country carried out the first nuclear test in its final series, in accordance with its announcement on 13 June. An official communiqué stated that this test was carried out at the Mururoa site, that it was designed to refine simulation techniques and that it had a yield of less than 20 kilotons. In this connection, I wish to emphasize the following points.

France's resumption of this series of tests must be viewed for what it is. This is the last series. It is limited in number and it will be completed before May 1996, as the President of the Republic stated on 5 September. Above all, it falls within the context of a final and complete halt to nuclear testing next year. France has made a commitment to sign the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the autumn of 1996. It has already taken major initiatives to move the negotiations forward. It will continue to act to ensure that the treaty is concluded in 1996, so as to honour the commitment to this effect entered into by the international community during the NPT extension Conference. Next year, when this objective has been attained, this will be a considerable achievement, a major step forward in the spheres of disarmament and non-proliferation, in so far as it is indeed a universal treaty.

It is in this context that one must view the decision taken by France to sign the CTBT in the autumn of 1996 and to resume a final limited series of

(Mrs. Bourgois, France)

tests. The two facets of this decision do not have the same scope: the resumption is limited and temporary; the treaty will be comprehensive and definitive. But these two facets are inseparable: our commitment to sign the CTBT could not have been taken without our decision concerning the resumption of testing. Because this final round is indispensable to guarantee the credibility of our deterrent force in its present state, to verify the security and reliability of our weapons and to acquire the data that are indispensable for the development of simulation instruments, so that we will be able to dispense with tests once and for all from 1996 onwards. It is thanks to this decision that France has been able to come out in favour of both a treaty of unlimited duration and a ban on all nuclear explosions whatever their level may be. Indeed, in adopting the toughest position on the scope of the treaty, France has greatly contributed to the reactivation of the negotiations, as many countries have emphasized here. Therefore this fundamental aspect should not be lost sight of: without a brief resumption of its tests, France would not have been able to sign a comprehensive test-ban treaty next year; without the signatures of the nuclear-weapon States, that treaty would have no meaning.

Lastly, with regard to the conditions in which this final round of tests is taking place, I think it would be fair to recognize the concern for transparency - unprecedented on the part of a nuclear Power - that France has shown from the outset.

Transparency with regard to its intentions: from the very beginning of the negotiations on the CTB, France clearly stated that it reserved the option to resume testing, and that for this reason it denied the alleged incompatibility between the negotiations and the carrying out of a final round of testing. This is also the reason why the NPT extension Conference, in its declaration on principles and objectives for disarmament and non-proliferation, spoke of "restraint" and not a "ban" on testing before the entry into force of the CTBT. France was therefore clear about its intentions, and it is abiding strictly by its commitments.

Transparency with regard to the number and purpose of the tests: this information was made public as early as 13 June, that is to say, more than two months ahead of time, and this is unprecedented.

Lastly, transparency with regard to the environment: no nuclear-weapon State has to date been as open as France has been in allowing international experts to verify that these tests are harmless for the environment. And none has invited scientists to come and see for themselves on the spot, as France has done.

It is France's wish that what is truly at stake in the negotiations should be kept in perspective. In this connection, it appeals once again to the members the Conference to do their utmost to attain the objective entrusted to us by the international community, namely, the conclusion in 1996 of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a treaty which will put an end to nuclear tests next year once and for all.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of France for her statement and for the very friendly and particularly warm words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Lafer.

Mr. LAFER (Brazil): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to congratulate you for your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to express my delegation's satisfaction, as well as my own, to have an illustrious representative of the Kingdom of Morocco conduct our work. Your well-known diplomatic skills, of which frankness and transparency are marked traits, ensure this Conference is in good hands. Be assured of my delegation's full cooperation in the discharge of your responsibilities now and in the months to come.

I also pay tribute to two of your predecessors: Ambassador Shirchinjavyn Yumjav of Mongolia, who directed the Conference's proceedings in his usual able and amiable manner; and Ambassador Antonio de Icaza, who during his incumbency sought tirelessly and tenaciously to get the Conference moving on all the substantive issues before it. In pursuing this task, Mr. de Icaza displayed the same acumen and outstanding diplomatic qualities I personally came to know during the time he was the Mexican Ambassador to Brazil. I also welcome in our midst Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois of France.

As this is my first statement of a more global nature to the Conference on Disarmament, allow me to share with you all some preliminary reflections on the theme of disarmament before addressing the more pressing issues in our agenda. At this juncture, when the 1995 CD session is close to its conclusion, it seems a good opportunity to take stock of what we have accomplished and what we have been unable to accomplish against the background of some relevant trends in international relations.

Brazil emerged for multilateral diplomacy at the Second Hague Peace Conference, in 1907. The nature of our participation in that event was coherent with our status as an intermediate country, which intended to play a constructive role in the elaboration of the norms which should govern the great questions included in the international agenda of the time. Since then, Brazil has always acted in the international sphere on the basis of the importance of consistent argument as well as on our conviction in the rule of law. This diplomatic tradition continues to inspire our insertion in the world today. It is on its behalf that I will make these considerations.

This year we commemorate the bicentennial of Immanuel Kant's Project for a Perpetual Peace, published in 1795. In the first preliminary article of his project, Kant proposes that "no treaty of peace shall be held to be such, which is made with the secret reservation of the material for a future war." We can interpret this idea as relating to the principles of transparency, confidence-building and verification, so essential in the theory and practice of disarmament nowadays. As the philosopher Jaspers once observed, "lies are the beginning of war and of every policy inspired in war. That is why truthfulness is the powerful weapon of peace".

(Mr. Lafer, Brazil)

At the end of the treatise I mentioned, Kant advanced a related principle of public law: "All maxims which require publicity in order not to miss their purpose agree with right, law and politics." And the German thinker added that if maxims of international law agree with this precondition, "they must be in accord with the general purpose of the public, namely happiness".

Our forum, by making possible open and transparent negotiations among States on disarmament agreements, which themselves include important clauses relating to verification, fulfils the role envisaged by Kant in his famous work. We should devote our best efforts to preserving and enhancing such an important international body.

Philosophers may indicate measures we ought to adopt in trying to build a better world for the future, but diplomats have to work and make progress in the world as it is. The lofty goals of peace and disarmament have to be pursued in a specific historical context. Ours is the one resulting from the end of the cold war, and diplomats, scholars and the media have not yet finished assessing the opportunities and risks it has engendered.

Raymond Aron coined the famous phrase "paix impossible, guerre improbable", to describe the nuclear stalemate that left its indelible imprint in those years. We could say today that at the global level peace has actually become possible and war even more improbable, if not outright impossible. On the other hand, in certain regional scenarios peace has become difficult and war not only probable, but a sad routine. Some observers have noted that the strait-jacket of bipolarity seemed to give some kind of order to the diversity of the world. The newly acquired freedom enjoyed by the actors in the international system has also freed forces of disintegration that have clouded the hopeful climate pervasive in the first moments of the post-cold-war era.

Disarmament or arms control, as it was called, not innocently, in the jargon of the super-Power relationship, was a main element of the structure of a bipolar world. It was not only a means of managing, both in terms of risks and of costs, a dangerous rivalry with global implications, but also of signalling the state of the overall relationship.

With the end of the cold war, it was assumed in some quarters that the huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles amassed in the context of the bipolar competition were not a pressing problem confronting humankind any more.

That this assessment was not shared by the world's public opinion has become evident in recent weeks. The repulsion caused by nuclear weapons is obvious 50 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by its States parties was advanced as an answer to this question. The need to proceed to nuclear disarmament has to be recognized as the other and necessary part of the answer.

(Mr. Lafer, Brazil)

Horizontal proliferation has been addressed through multilateral mechanisms such as the NPT, nuclear-weapon-free zones like those established through the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties, and the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Vertical proliferation and nuclear disarmament are subjects Brazil deems as equally belonging to the multilateral sphere. The Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, has a central role to play in these matters.

The issue of disarmament, and mostly of nuclear disarmament, appears to have lost priority to certain countries not only because of the welcome evolution that led to enormous changes that were the result of the end of East-West relations as they were, but also because new and unexpected security problems came to the fore. While a movement of convergence was obvious in developments like the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the spread of the values of democracy and human rights in most regions of the world, and the various schemes for economic integration and free trade, at the same time forces of fragmentation were also at work, tearing States asunder and creating conflicts with nationalistic, ethnic or religious overtones. Security because more central a concept than disarmament, and the use of force in response to threats to international peace and security was a central aspect of the conception of security that seemed to prevail.

The fact that international security was again thought of as better assured through the show of force has drawn apart in a very artificial way the concepts of security and of disarmament, when humankind as a whole would benefit from having the maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, as envisaged in the United Nations Charter.

The relative neglect of disarmament has also been detrimental to the relevance of this body. In our working agenda today we have only one negotiation going, which, although important, nevertheless cannot be considered a real measure of disarmament, as was the chemical weapons Convention, but rather a preliminary measure that helps prevent horizontal and vertical proliferation. When we complete our treaty next year we will have contributed to these aims and also to building a safer world, but we will not have reduced by a single unit the number of nuclear weapons in existence world wide.

The artificial separation between the concepts and practices of disarmament and security, and the pre-eminence conceded in the latter, does not take into account the fact that the regional scenarios that are of concern to the international community will be much more scary if proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not adequately controlled. In our view, the only effective check on proliferation is universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament agreements, which may be acceptable to all and thus draw strength from their intrinsic legitimacy.

Measures in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can be important elements in the maintenance of international peace and security only if they are perceived as a step towards a more comprehensive

(Mr. Lafer, Brazil)

process of disarmament. It is difficult to convince Governments and peoples around the world to keep their commitment to give up nuclear weapons when they hear emphatic defences of the sovereign right to nuclear deterrence and the need to keep the credibility of nuclear arsenals coming from nuclear-weapon States.

Nuclear deterrence theory was based on the premise of rationality of political actors. The resurgence of conflicts based on a volatile mix of political and emotional factors have shown how fragile this general assumption may prove to be. The eventual intersection of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction with regional scenarios of instability is not a frightening perspective only in regions of the developing world.

A global approach to disarmament and non-proliferation, openly and freely negotiated in this forum, could represent, in the face of the new urgent threats to international security, the same kind of organizing logic that, without any claim to legitimacy, the bipolar structure of the world was able to represent. Parallel to the topical solutions the international community may give to the many regional conflicts now under way, the Conference on Disarmament could be the forum for a concerted endeavour to progressively prevent the risks of war and primarily to inhibit proliferation, in all its aspects, of weapons of mass destruction.

My Government is prepared to work with all States members of the Conference on Disarmament and observer countries in every aspect of this agenda for disarmament, beginning with the issue that presents the highest priority, nuclear disarmament. This would be the answer to the dangers of an eventual withering of our forum, by injecting more relevance to our debates and negotiations. The recent events have showed that international public opinion is attentive to disarmament and that when our body addresses its concerns we can count in its unfailing support.

I have addressed what I would call a forward-looking approach to the Conference on Disarmament. These ideas stand, I recognize, in sharp contrast with what we were able to achieve this year. In these final weeks of the 1995 session of the Conference, we can only lament the fact that this session most probably will go on record as having been unable to address, except for the comprehensive test-ban treaty, any of the various substantive issues in the Conference's agenda.

It is particularly vexing to find ourselves in such a situation when consensus seems to exist for treating most of these questions, one of which - the fissile material ban - in fact merited the actual establishment of an ad hoc committee last March. Consultations held this summer showed consensus could have been obtained on the establishment of other ad hoc committees, even to address the delicate question of transparency in armaments. A display of real determination towards finding an acceptable format for the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament would certainly be instrumental for breaking the deadlock we now find ourselves in.

(Mr. Lafer, Brazil)

This addresses the substantive part of my reflections on the challenges facing this body. I shall now focus briefly on the procedural aspects of our work, which bear a direct relationship to the preceding part.

I could not comment on the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament without stressing that no international body was ever most influenced from birth by the cold war that the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor bodies. The initial division among the two military alliances corresponded to the spirit and the realities of the time. The inclusion of the non-aligned and neutral countries introduced a new element, but those were not capable of altering the logic of negotiations. Disarmament was not thought of or conceivable as an undertaking of humankind as a whole, a global theme as it later became fashionable to call them, but as a painstaking negotiation between the two military blocs, under the scrutiny and stimulus of the non-aligned and neutral countries. Even when a global subject such as nuclear non-proliferation was addressed, it was, as we know, fundamentally through a joint initiative by the leaders of the two blocs, which was then presented for multilateral approval.

It is high time that this body overcomes the heavy heritage of the past and begins to offer answers to the expectations of the international community. Many delegations around this room, if not all, share this analysis and know that change is long overdue in terms of membership, methods of work and agenda. Many among us may fear that these changes could eventually turn out to be for the worst, not for the best, that the expansion of membership, the overhauling of our working methods and modification of our agenda could mean not more but less disarmament. Even if my delegation considers these apprehensions to be understandable, and shares them to a certain extent, we hold that the time has come for the CD to try steps in new directions. In this context, there are two issues that are intimately related to the need to heed the voice of the international community and make this body more responsive to it.

One is the question of expansion. The limitation in membership itself goes against the definition of the CD as a true multilateral negotiating body. It is our conviction that the O'Sullivan report (CD/1214) still offers the best basis for any solution. This body owes it to itself and to the outside world to take the long-overdue decision on its expansion as soon as possible. We praise and express our support for the efforts of the President of the Conference in this area.

The other issue was recently raised in this chamber by Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt in his address to the plenary on 24 August: the fact that non-governmental organizations find themselves excluded from the work of the CD. Such a state of affairs seems to us unjustified, given the important contributions that NGOs could make to discussions in this forum by bringing in valuable inputs and insights from various sectors of organized society. As is well known, NGO participation in other bodies, particularly those in the human rights and environmental fields, has been greatly enriching in fostering debate and exchange of information on issues under discussion. Brazil therefore shares the opinions and supports the proposal put forward by Egypt

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for the question of NGO participation to be considered by the Conference. The format and modalities of NGO contribution to our work stand to be defined, but my delegation is confident that their contribution would be relevant, as in a way they represent international public opinion and a collective awareness of the value of peace.

The spate of nuclear tests that regrettably have taken place this year gives a renewed sense of urgency to the conclusion of the CTBT negotiations. We consider that the world can wait no longer than 1996 to turn this decisive page. Nuclear testing has always done a great disservice to both disarmament and non-proliferation. It has invariably been associated with the perverse logic of development, proliferation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly, in today's post-cold-war world carrying out nuclear tests meets generalized and unequivocal reprobation not only on the part of Governments but also of broad political constituencies within countries. This helps bring home the point that not only nuclear testing but nuclear weapons themselves and the political and doctrinal clutter which for so many years were used to justify their development and stockpiling now seem, if I may borrow a word from the French language, passé.

From the beginning of this year, the CD was able to dedicate virtually all its time and resources to the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations. But as with all matters of a political nature, progress on the CTBT negotiations really depends on whether or not there is a will to advance and to conclude a truly comprehensive treaty, especially on the part of those States with a testing capacity. In this regard, we have been encouraged by the positive substantive developments that have occurred in this third part of the 1995 session, particularly on scope, funding and the architecture of the international monitoring system (IMS).

Movement on such issues allows us to set our sights on what could be the best target date for CTBT signature next year. Signing the treaty as one of the final acts of the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly is, in our view, the goal to be pursued. Not only would such an occasion highlight the historic significance of the CTBT, it would also give us a more precise time-frame within which to plan for the resolution of those issues still outstanding and to engage in the final stage of substantive negotiations. Failure to reach agreement on holding formal inter-sessional meetings in the remainder of this year should not weaken the resolve to view the northern hemisphere fall of 1996 as our target date for signature.

This objective would become all the more feasible if recent significant advances with regard to certain key questions could lead to wider convergence when negotiations resume. First and foremost among these is of course the scope of the treaty. Last March, my delegation stated on record that in our view the Australian proposal contained in working paper 222 offered the best way forward. We note the growing support this text is enjoying.

It has always been Brazil's position that the CTB treaty must be comprehensive and prohibit all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. Commitments recently made to a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban that

(Mr. Lafer, Brazil)

includes low-yield explosions have given fresh impetus to the negotiations. We expect all nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so to make explicit pledges in favour of a true zero-yield comprehensive test ban with no loopholes.

Another area where recent decisions and new proposals could stimulate further rapid progress is treaty verification. The international monitoring system begins to take actual shape with the agreement on 50 seismic stations to conform the primary seismic network, one of which is the University of Brasilia's Seismological Observatory station, located in the western central region of Brazil. With respect to the use of the four envisaged IMS technologies, Brazil recently submitted its views in the form of answers (CD/NTB/WP.263) to the questions formulated by the Chairman of the Group of Experts in document CD/NTB/WP.225.

With regard to funding of the IMS, the acceptance by the United States of sharing costs on the basis of the adjusted United Nations scale of assessments is a step in the right direction, even though the full implications of the proposal to offset costs already incurred are still to be worked out. One question to be addressed among several others is just how much time and resources of the Technical Secretariat would need to be employed for regularly figuring out credit values for a wide range of IMS activities and for setting up and administering a special budget system to accommodate contributions in kind. These and other concerns which have already surfaced need to be discussed further, but already within the context of a generally agreed principle of cost-sharing for all IMS activities.

Another major area in which we see opportunities for progress close at hand is the Organization. The main issues still to be resolved are the nature and extent of the CTBT Organization's relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency; International Data Centre (IDC) product analysis; and composition of the Executive Council. As stated by the Brazilian delegation last March, our preference is for a small, treaty-specific organization co-located with IAEA in Vienna which would make as much use as possible of IAEA installed capacity and available expertise. There seems to be a growing body of opinion in favour off concepts such as these. Responses by both the Austrian Government and IAEA to the two questionnaires recently elaborated by Working Group 2 will no doubt help delegations to make the necessary political decisions in defining the seat of the Organization as well as the nature and form of the IAEA-CTBTO relationship. In purely financial terms, the benefits from establishing an association with IAEA speak for themselves: in the administrative field alone, they might result in global savings in excess of US$ 10 million annually, as indicated in paragraphs 14 to 21 of document CD/NTB/WP.196.

With regard to the IDC product, we consider it indispensable that the Technical Secretariat or the IDC be in a position to analyse IMS-monitored data for event identification so as to permit States parties to properly consider events indicating possible non-compliance with the treaty. We look forward to examining criteria for event identification to be presented by the recently appointed Friend of the Chair on IDC.

(Mr. Lafer, Brazil)

Finally, the general trend of negotiations seems to show that definitive solutions on matters such as the composition of the Executive Council, on-site inspections, use of national technical means and provisions for entry into force of the treaty may continue to elude us until the actual end-game phase. It is up to us to use the coming months to build on whatever common ground there is on these issues, so as to foster convergence.

Brazil is seriously engaged in the negotiation of the CTBT. We hope this forum will be able to present the fruit of its work to the international community as soon as possible. But let us not be content with just this step, albeit significant. The Conference on Disarmament has a mandate to negotiate disarmament agreements, not a mandate to indefinitely negotiate mandates. I sincerely hope the 1996 session will show we are hearing the voice of the real world outside this room.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind and encouraging words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): First of all, I would like to extend my heartfelt welcome to our new colleague, Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois of France. It is my great pleasure to work with her and I am confident that she will make an outstanding contribution to the important work of this Conference, as her predecessor did.

Today I have asked for the floor to inform the Conference of the statement made on 6 September 1995 by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the official spokesman of the Government of Japan, concerning the nuclear test conducted by France. I would like to read his statement to the Conference, as follows.

"It is extremely regrettable that the French Republic has resumed nuclear testing, despite the decision made on the utmost restraint on nuclear testing at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, at a time when Japan and the international community are renewing their desire for peace and nuclear disarmament on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the atomic bombing.

"Japan has always regarded the nuclear test ban as one of the highest priorities in the field of nuclear disarmament, and it is very seriously concerned that France has conducted nuclear testing today, despite Japan's repeated requests for the reversal of its decision to resume nuclear testing. Japan strongly urges France not to conduct any more nuclear testing in future. It is also very important that all the nuclear-weapon States refrain from conducting nuclear tests. Japan, while strongly urging all the nuclear-weapon States and other countries concerned to make efforts at the Conference on Disarmament to complete the negotiation on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996, intends also to continue making efforts on its part."

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

That concludes the statement. I would like to reiterate on this occasion that Japan opposes any nuclear testing by any State.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to touch upon another subject briefly. I am pleased to announce that the Government of Japan will complete the ratification procedure in a few days concerning the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. It is Japan's strong hope that, with the participation of as many States as possible, the Convention will enter into force at the earliest date possible. We urge every State which has not yet done so to join the Convention.

Mr. AGURTSOU (Belarus) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on taking office as President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced that your leadership of this forum during the concluding part of the 1995 session will live up to the hopes of delegations for the Conference to yield practical and tangible results. The work of the Conference, which made it possible to achieve the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in New York, has demonstrated that its potential is quite considerable. We hope that the next priority objectives - the development and adoption of a CTBT and the completion of the cut-off process - will also be successfully attained in the near future.

While attaching great importance to nuclear disarmament and nuclear security issues, we are deeply convinced that the Conference on Disarmament is called upon to carry out its mandate fully in the field of conventional weapons as well. In connection with the conference which is just starting in Vienna on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, we would like to state the following.

The President of the Republic of Belarus, Aleksander Lukashenko, consistently pursuing the principles of national policy in the field of disarmament, and also following the spirit of United Nations initiatives in the field of mine clearance in the desire to limit the spread of the most dangerous types of conventional weapons having indiscriminate effects, has issued decree No. 355 of 22 August 1995 introducing a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines applicable in the Republic of Belarus from 1 September 1995 until the end of 1997.

In taking this decision, the Republic of Belarus had in mind that not only participants in military actions but also to a considerable extent the civilian population fall victim to this type of weapon, a fact which underlines the inhumane nature of anti-personnel mines. In view of its scale at the present time, the problem of mine clearance is regarded by the Republic of Belarus as a priority issue in international relations.

A press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus on the subject has been distributed as an official document of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Belarus for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Dembinski, who will present the report of the Committee on the results of its work during this session.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland) (translated from French): Before addressing the subject of my statement, allow me to welcome here the presence among us of the new representative of France, Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois. Because of the ties of friendship that bind my country and hers, I would like to assure her that, for my part, I will do ny best to ensure that the excellent relations between our two delegations develop in the months and years to come.

(continued in English)

It is an honour for me to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which is contained in document CD/1346. This report represents a very significant effort on the part of many delegations, and I believe we should be proud of the results of this work, particularly in the areas of the international monitoring system, the implementing Organization, and even scope. There has been remarkable progress in particular on the section of the text dealing with seismic monitoring, with the inclusion of a list of stations. I certainly hope that similar progress will be made during the inter-sessional period in December on the auxiliary stations as well as on the other monitoring technologies. This report also registers substantial achievements in the rolling text on the implementing Organization, which we certainly welcome.

Nevertheless, while I express a certain amount of satisfaction on these points, I believe many of us share a sense of disappointment at the lack of consensus on some basic issues involved in the negotiation of this treaty. I have stated in my national capacity in the plenary, and I reiterate here, that a breakthrough must come soon on the most fundamental obligations or scope of the treaty. After presiding last year over the Working Group on Legal and Institutional Issues and this year over the Committee itself, it is frustrating not to discern convergence on this issue. While we are certainly gratified about the recent announcements by France, the United Kingdom and the United States in this regard, the Committee as a whole still needs to come to grips with the substantive differences to reach consensus language on this article.

The negotiations on this treaty must not be put on hold; nor should they continue indefinitely. The international community has crusaded for these negotiations for decades. Let us seize the opportunity and strive to complete it within the widely stated goal, "as soon as possible and no later than 1996", as states the report, among other documents. Unless the pace of the negotiations accelerates dramatically we will be hard pressed to meet that goal. There are many outstanding issues and details to be resolved, inter alia, on-site inspections and the notification time lines to precede

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

them, the so-called "red light" or "green light" decision, the role of the international data centre and, last but not least, the issue of funding, the crucial question of entry into force, just to name a few.

I need not remind delegations that there are still as many pairs of brackets in the rolling text as in the rolling text of a year ago. While this fact should not necessarily stand as a litmus test to indicate the measure of achievement or otherwise, it is certainly not a cause for celebration. That fact shows, however, how much time and effort is still needed to achieve real progress in drafting treaty language. In this connection I cannot but express my deep disappointment that despite my sustained efforts it proved impossible for the Ad Hoc Committee to reach agreement on an intensive inter-sessional negotiating effort till the end of this year. I therefore urge delegations to at least use that inter-sessional break to obtain fresh instructions on the rolling text which will allow us to promptly reach consensus on both major political issues and the technical details of the future treaty and its implementing Organization.

In its report the Committee on a nuclear-test-ban treaty recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that the rolling text as well as documents listed in the report and other relevant documents be used for further negotiations and drafting of the treaty. It is further recommended that expert work on the international monitoring system proceed during the period 4 to 15 December 1995 and that the Ad Hoc Committee's work continue during the period 8 to 19 January 1996. Finally, the Committee recommends that it be re-established at the outset of the 1996 session of the Conference with its present mandate, with a view, as I stated earlier, to completing the negotiations as soon as possible and no later than 1996.

This report, CD/1346, was adopted by the Committee on 6 September 1995. As the Committee has continued its work since then, subsequent changes to the report will be reflected in an addendum, CD/1346/Add.1, to be considered and adopted in the Ad Hoc Committee on 19 September 1995, and in the plenary on 21 September. The changes appearing in the addendum will be incorporated into the annual report of the Conference on disarmament to the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, which, of course, will be produced in all languages.

Allow me to conclude by offering my sincere appreciation and gratitude to the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassador Lars Norberg of Sweden and Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, as well as the many very good Friends of the Chair, convenors, experts and our indefatigable and competent Secretary, Ms. Jenifer Mackby, who have exerted all their energy and time on this endeavour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Dembinski for introducing his Committee's report to the Conference. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, first let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and express my admiration for the way in which you are tackling the Conference's problems. I am not sure whether to compare you to Hercules or Sisyphus or Job; perhaps you need - certainly you have - the attributes of all three. Secondly, let me welcome our new French colleague and congratulate her on her clear explanation of her Government's policy on testing and the CTBT negotiations which she gave us this morning. I look forward to working with her as closely as I worked with her predecessor. She and her delegation will have the British delegation's full understanding and support at all times.

The purpose for which I have asked for the floor is to make a short statement about the scope of the comprehensive test-ban treaty. Since the negotiations began in January 1994, the United Kingdom's policy on scope has consistently been determined by two considerations. First, we sincerely accepted the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a complete ban on nuclear tests. At the same time, we have made clear that, in common with the other nuclear-weapon States, we will continue to bear the responsibility for maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent. It therefore follows that the treaty must not prevent us from fulfilling this responsibility. These two principles have informed our position in the various discussions on scope.

We are determined that the CTBT should make an effective contribution to fulfilling the objectives set out in the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" agreed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The multilateral nature of the negotiations is a vital element of this, as is (in our view) the need for a common understanding among the nuclear-weapon States of the activities they may need to carry out in order to ensure the safety and reliability of their nuclear weapons under the CTBT. We have therefore worked hard with the other nuclear-weapon States towards this common understanding. I reiterated in Working Group 2 on 24 August our support for the language on scope proposed by Australia. My Government has studied carefully President Clinton's recent statement that a CTBT should mean an absolute ban on test explosions involving the release of nuclear energy and his comments on the conditions under which the United States will enter into a CTBT. Such conditions would be acceptable to the United Kingdom also. We have also noted the remarks in similar vein by the previous Ambassador of France. In the light of these statements, the two of which have given a widely welcomed boost to the negotiations of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, I wish now, by way of further clarification (although in the light of the statement this morning of the distinguished Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, I am not sure it is strictly necessary), to put on record my Government's position that the CTBT should not permit any nuclear-weapon test explosion involving any release of nuclear energy, no matter how small. We believe that it would contribute greatly to the progress of the negotiations if those nuclear-weapon States who have not already done so would confirm that they share this view too.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, it is a real pleasure for me to congratulate you on taking up the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament and to express my deep satisfaction at seeing the work of this important body guided by a representative of a country of the Maghreb at such a crucial stage in the 1995 session. At the same time as I wish you every success in your work, I would like to assure you of the full cooperation of the Algerian delegation. Allow me also to thank your predecessors for the praiseworthy efforts made during their terms of office. I would also like to welcome among us the new representative of France, Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois. I can assure her that we listened very carefully to the statement she has just made to the Conference.

On 9 February 1995, speaking before this august assembly, Mr. Mohammed Salah Dembri, Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that "Algeria places all its trust in multilateral action in the field of disarmament" and, on that occasion, referred to the deposit of instruments of accession to the Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation on 12 January 1995. He stressed that, through that action, Algeria confirmed, for those who needed that confirmation, that it intended to use nuclear energy for strictly civilian purposes, and reiterated its faith in the non-proliferation regime. In the same statement, the Minister announced that the process of ratification of the chemical weapons Convention was under way. Today it is an honour and pleasure for me to take the floor to inform you that, on 14 August 1995, Algeria deposited the instruments of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. In so doing Algeria has become the 33rd country to complete the ratification procedure. I would like to reaffirm my country's unshakable faith in the advent of a world free from all weapons of mass destruction, a world where peace and security would prevail. This is why we would like the Convention to enter into force as soon as possible and we appeal to all signatory States to complete their ratification procedures as soon as possible.

As we approach the end of this session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Algerian delegation is experiencing a feeling of frustration. It is true that we have made much progress in negotiating a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, although appreciable obstacles still need to be overcome. However, it is regrettable to note that we have not made progress in the other fields. It is entirely up to us to put an end to this stalemate so as to allow the Conference on Disarmament to continue its work and to justify the confidence placed in it by the international community. As all of us have seen once again in recent days, the international community is increasingly alert to non-proliferation and disarmament issues.

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

Mr. President, while reiterating to you my best wishes for success, I would like to assure this Conference of Algeria's steadfast support for the cause of peace which unites us.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Mr. Hernández.

Mr. HERNANDEZ (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): First of all I wish to welcome the representative of the French Republic to this Conference on Disarmament on behalf of my country and to say that we listened most carefully to her statement made to this Conference on Disarmament. I wish to refer briefly to the French Government's detonation of a nuclear device at Mururoa atoll on 5 September and to request that the note sent by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of France on 6 September in Buenos Aires should be distributed as a document of this Conference on Disarmament. In this connection I wish to restate yet again my country's position against all nuclear tests whatever their origin. The Argentine Government regrets that the French Government deemed it necessary to carry out the aforementioned nuclear explosion. As a member country of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, and in its capacity as a member State of the NPT, the Argentine Government wishes to place on record its deep disappointment and concern and to repeat that the final cessation of all nuclear tests is the best most effective means to progress towards the strengthening of the world regime of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Therefore my Government once again urges the French Government to reconsider the implications of that decision.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, please accept also my congratulations on your assumption of the CD presidency. You are assured of the full support of my delegation as you pursue your difficult tasks. I also join in the expressions of warm welcome extended here this morning to our new French colleague, Ambassador Bourgois.

I take the floor to read for the record a statement by the Press Secretary of the White House, issued in Washington on 5 September, with regard to the nuclear test conducted by France on that date.

> "Today, France conducted an underground nuclear test at the Mururoa test site in the South Pacific. The United States regrets this action.
>
> "All of the nuclear-weapon States agreed at the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in New York in May 1995 to exercise 'utmost restraint' in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We continue to urge all of the nuclear Powers, including France, to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join in a global moratorium as we work to

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

complete and sign a CTBT in 1996. In this regard, we take note of President Chirac's strong commitment to sign a CTBT banning all nuclear tests regardless of level no later than the fall of 1996."

That ends the White House statement. I would ask that the secretariat issue this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Moher.

Mr. MOHER (Canada): Mr. President, I wish first to congratulate you on your presidency of our Conference and to express the appreciation of my delegation for your energetic efforts to enhance the work of this body. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleague, Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois of France. I am sure that France will continue, through her participation in our work, to make a positive and wide-ranging contribution to the work of this body.

I listened carefully to the French statement made here earlier this morning and, in that context, would like to state that Canada's position on nuclear testing is well known, and has been referred to most recently in this Conference on 15 June and 17 August. Following the recent French nuclear-weapons test explosion, Canada's Foreign Minister, André Ouellet, reaffirmed that position in a statement on 5 September 1995, in which he deplored that test. While expressing his regret at the French action, Mr. Ouellet did welcome the affirmation by President Chirac that France supports a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that will prohibit all nuclear test explosions.

Canada's policy on testing is clear; in Mr. Ouellet's words, "no testing by any nuclear-weapons State and speedy progress towards concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty".

As a final point, and while I have the floor here this morning, I wish to take the opportunity to welcome the statement by Ambassador Weston of the United Kingdom. I urge all nuclear-weapon States - if they have not done so - to make statements to the same effect as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the flor to the representative of Slovakia, Ambassador Krasnohorská.

Mrs. KRASNOHORSKA (Slovakia) (translated from French): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your distinguished presidency, allow me to congratulate you on taking up the important office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to express our appreciation for all your efforts in guiding the work of the Conference, and to wish you every success in performing your important duties. I assure you of my delegation's

(Mrs. Krasnohorská, Slovakia)

full support and cooperation. Allow me also to thank His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference, and Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, for their support for the Conference's work. I should also like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to the new Ambassadors of South Africa, Brazil, Canada, France, India and Ireland.

(continued in English)

The purpose of my address today is to share with you some deliberations on certain elements of the CD's work in 1995.

The main achievement of the disarmament agenda this year was, without doubt, the success of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Slovakia views the NPT as an exceptionally important global mechanism for dealing with the issue of non-proliferation on nuclear weapons. The NPT has played a positive role in the modern history of mankind. We consider it the cornerstone of the whole international non-proliferation regime. Slovakia particularly welcomed the indefinite extension and strengthening of the review process of the Treaty, at the same time appreciating that the Review Conference proved to be an important landmark in the goal of achieving the universality of the non-proliferation regime.

A highly important part of the non-proliferation regime is the CTBT. Slovakia therefore expresses its deep regret about the decision of some nuclear-weapon States to further conduct nuclear tests explosions. We believe that the tests stand in clear contradiction to the principles and objectives agreed upon at the NPT Review Conference. These tests represent a step backwards in our endeavour to conclude rapidly the comprehensive test-ban treaty, thus banning all nuclear testing. The Slovak Republic hopes that all nuclear-weapon States will honour both the letter and the spirit of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and exercise utmost restraint with regard to nuclear testing. Bearing this in mind, we note the commitment made by all nuclear-weapon States to sign the CTBT not later than in 1996. Nevertheless, the present situation underlines the urgent need for early completion of the treaty. The achievement of the CTBT will be the attainment of one of the most important goals of international non-proliferation efforts.

Encouraging progress has been made in the CTBT negotiations during the third part of this year's session. My delegation pays tribute to all those who have worked so hard to achieve the current results embodied in the rolling text. As Slovakia has advocated a comprehensive test ban prohibiting all nuclear test explosions without exception, we especially hail the far-sighted decision by France, the United Kingdom and the United States to accept the principle of a complete test ban without thresholds. At the same time I should like to use this opportunity to restate our strong opposition to the possibility of including in the treaty text language permitting so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.

(Mrs. Krasnohorská, Slovakia)

We encourage the Conference to ensure maximum utility of the time available and to work hard for the convergence of positions on the remaining open issues (IMS, verification) so that the treaty can be ready for signature at the fifty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly.

An important nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issue is the ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Slovakia profoundly regrets that the CD failed to meet the requests by the United Nations General Assembly and the NPT Review and Extension Conference in this regard. The failure of the CD to start the negotiations on the cut-off in spite of the fact that an ad hoc committee was established is striking. We can hardly believe that the procedural polemic could defeat the interest of some CD members in negotiating the convention in spite of the fact that it is widely considered that the convention would be one of the cornerstones of the non-proliferation regime. Slovakia looks forward to the commencement of the negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices at the beginning of the next year's session.

Recognizing the legitimate aspirations of the candidate countries to participate fully in the work of the CD, the United Nations General Assembly gave the CD a very precise mandate - to make it duly representative - together with a definite time-frame, the beginning of the year 1995. We profoundly regret that the CD has repeatedly not reached a consensus resulting in the expansion of the Conference in spite of United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/77 B. We believe that the Conference must be enlarged by a significant number of new members in order to ensure its representativeness which will be more appropriate to the current political situation. In principle we hold that the Conference should admit all countries which applied for membership. Unfortunately I have to express our regrets that the issue of expansion has been artificially linked to other issues to which in reality it is not related and point out the improperness of this approach. This approach cannot but lead to an impasse. The procedure enabling some countries to hide behind their respective group positions we also find rather unhappy.

I take the liberty to believe that everybody in this room is well acquainted with the specific case of Slovakia. Therefore I shall not restate the argumentation several times elaborated in detail by representatives of Slovakia - recently by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 710th plenary meeting of the Conference on 29 June 1995. Let me simply reiterate that the Slovak Republic continues to believe in the legitimacy of its request to fill the vacant seat left by the former Czechoslovakia. We ascribe to membership of the CD paramount political importance. We also assume that after the formal recognition of Slovakia as one of the two successors of the former Czechoslovakia and the only candidate for the vacant seat, the admission of Slovakia to the CD would be a logical and just culmination of the whole issue.

At this stage I should like to express our gratitude for the support that has been explicitly and unambiguously accorded to the Slovak request by almost all member and observer States of the Conference.

(Mrs. Krasnohorská, Slovakia)

Let me simultaneously convey my feeling that in spite of the intensive consultations conducted by the Presidents of the CD in this regard, the CD as a body has failed to show sufficient good will. I would like to appeal to the CD to do so and to break the deadlock as quickly as possible. For Slovak public opinion it is incomprehensible that the international community, which is at present paying such a high price for obtaining peace in the case of another country which was dissolved, is not able to honour, through admission into the CD, the fact that Slovakia and the Czech Republic divorced peacefully, even reaching an agreement on succession in international organizations and the United Nations specialized agencies. I am sure that a sign of this kind would positively change the atmosphere reigning in the CD in regard to the expansion.

Mr. President, Slovakia highly appreciates your sincere efforts aimed at achieving progress on the issue of expansion. We believe that the CD should adopt a decision which would satisfy all interested countries and enable the Conference to submit it to the United Nations General Assembly with a clear conscience and report on real, not only formal progress. We are afraid that the Conference's lack of progress in this regard would undoubtedly influence the way the United Nations General Assembly will view the overall work of the CD in 1995.

Let me share with you some remarks of a back-bench participant of the CD negotiations. The work of the CD remains complicated by some features inherited from the time of bloc confrontation and stalemate. Sometimes the spirit of confrontation and suspicion is tangible. The imposition of preconditions, hiding behind group positions and the insufficient transparency of consultations are among the elements that unnecessarily complicate the work of the Conference. Some of the Conference procedures also deserve revision. The time wasted for lengthy discussions of the yearly agenda and report-writing could be used in a more efficient way. We especially deplore that issues so important as the cut-off negotiations and expansion are linked to others and held hostage. We believe that if the Conference wants to meet the expectations of the international community and the challenge of the day, it is high time to cope courageously with these problems.

There still remains a lot of work to be done in the non-proliferation and disarmament field. Slovakia strongly believes that the CD is willing and capable of meeting the new challenges, and wishes it every success in doing so.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Slovakia for her statement and the very kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania) (translated from French): As I am taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, allow me to congratulate you on taking up the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament, and to welcome warmly the efforts you have been making to help our Conference move forward on the major problems in its work programme. You may count on my delegation's full support and cooperation. I would also like to associate

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

myself with the other speakers before me who paid tribute to our new Colleague Mrs. Joëlle Bourgois, the representative of France at the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to assure Mrs. Bourgois of the wholehearted cooperation of the Romanian delegation in the spirit of the traditionally friendly relations between Romania and France.

(continued in English)

I have asked for the floor in order to inform the Conference on Disarmament that the Romanian Government has decided to support Vienna as the seat of the future CTBT Organization. Apart from a lasting tradition of friendly cooperation between Austria and Romania, this decision was premised upon our firm belief that the expertise and infrastructure of IAEA are instrumental for the good functioning of CTBTO and for the accurate implementation of the treaty, respectively. The relationship between the two bodies should be best construed on a contractual basis, by means of arrangements concerning verification activities, technical and logistical support. We share the view that such arrangements would be far more cost-effective than a formula of a CTBTO completely on its own.

Preferably, the future Organization should be separate but co-located with the IAEA, relatively small in size and personnel, requiring the minimum possible financial resources from contributing member States and enjoying, at the same time, a sound functional relationship with the Agency.

Romania noted with satisfaction the statement delivered on 16 February 1995 by the Secretary-General of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which the offer to host in Vienna the CTBTO, its organs and - presumably - a Preparatory Commission was reaffirmed. We welcome the announcement that Austria will take all necessary measures in order to ensure the establishment of the CTBTO on the best conditions applicable to international organizations already having set up their headquarters in Vienna, which include in particular, diplomatic privileges and immunities in conformity with standing Austrian legislation and practice, as well as adequate office space free of charge.

Undoubtedly, this generous offer will be further detailed in the light of recent developments in the CTBT negotiations, taking into account the set of questions now under consideration within the CD, which indicate possible areas of interest regarding the seat of the CTBT Organization. I am convinced that the Austrian Government will respond most favourably to such questions, and in particular to those related to communications facilities. We share the view that access to international tariffs equal to the best available in the world is much needed in order that transmission of large amounts of verification data be cost-effective. Such access would be, in our view, a strong incentive for broadening the existing support for Vienna within the CD.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of office at this important stage of the Conference's working year. My delegation is deeply appreciative of the personal energy and vision you have brought to the tasks before us. It is high time we, collectively, gathered the determination to cut through procedural debates and to move forward the real and substantive agenda of the Conference. We thank you for your strong leadership in this endeavour and I wish to assure you of the full cooperation and support of my delegation. I would also like to welcome to Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament our new French colleague, Ambassador Bourgois. I look forward to working with you, Madam, in this forum constructively.

It is however with regret that I must turn to address the issue of nuclear tests, specifically the re-commencement of nuclear testing by France in the South Pacific which has taken place since the Conference's last plenary meeting. The Prime Minister of Australia has expressed condemnation of last week's nuclear-weapon explosion at Mururoa, and the Australian Government has protested strongly to the Government of France. As the current Chair of the South Pacific Forum, the Prime Minister has also issued a statement on behalf of the 15 countries of the Forum. That statement condemns the test and notes the particular concern of South Pacific countries over the need to address fully the environmental and health risks posed by the testing. It calls on the French Government to acknowledge the weight of opinion against nuclear testing and abandon immediately its testing programme in the South Pacific. I ask that these statements be circulated as Conference documents.

Australia is strongly opposed to nuclear testing by any country, anywhere, at any time. This position is long-standing and accords with Australia's consistent policies and efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We warmly welcomed the contribution which the earlier French decision to suspend nuclear testing made to the commencement of international negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We also welcomed the recent decisions and commitments by the French Government on a true zero-testing ban, on the precise expression of this intention in the article on the scope of the treaty, and on the signing of a comprehensive test-ban treaty by the northern autumn of 1996. The clear and commendable logic of such decisions is fully in accord with the spirit of our times, a spirit decisively reflected earlier this year in New York when, with the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the international community entrenched nuclear non-proliferation - in all its aspects - as an enduring legal norm of international behaviour. By contrast, the re-commencement of nuclear testing, particularly at this critical stage of the finalization of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, belongs to the behaviour of a different era, to a different time, and to the logic of a world we, the international community, have deliberately and decisively put behind us.

Like the great majority of peoples and nations, we in Australia cannot accept that continued or resumed nuclear testing by any country can make easier the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This was self-evident to us all in New York four months ago, and is reflected in the

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

language we agreed upon there by consensus. We, and others, believe firmly that any State continuing to test bears a particularly heavy responsibility for the future health and timely conclusion of our negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and the particularly kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Armstrong.

Mr. ARMSTRONG (New Zealand): At the outset, I should like to welcome to the Conference on Disarmament those newly arrived representatives, including most recently Ambassador Bourgois of France, and to say that New Zealand looks forward to continuing to work together with her delegation in this body.

Following France's detonation of a nuclear device in French Polynesia on 6 September, the New Zealand Prime Minister announced the recall of New Zealand's Ambassador in Paris for consultations and made the following statement. "France is flying in the face of world opinion. Just a short time ago 18 nations of the Asia-Pacific region called for an immediate end to all nuclear testing. France has turned a blind eye to the storm of protest that its decision to resume nuclear testing has stirred up in recent weeks. The opposition to the tests has come from around the globe including significantly, from Europe itself. A majority of the French people say the policy is wrong. We live in an interdependent world. It defies explanation that the French Government sees itself as somehow standing apart."

Prime Minister Bolger noted with regret that by using its presence in the South Pacific to pursue its national defence policies, France was totally disregarding the views and interests of the States of the South Pacific. Its actions also ran counter to the worldwide movement away from nuclear weapons and complicated the chances of the international community realizing its broader goal of a truly comprehensive and internationally verifiable test-ban treaty. The Prime Minister said that New Zealand had "welcomed recent French statements that France could support a treaty that prohibits any nuclear test explosion. It is a step in the right direction. But New Zealand also wants France to close for all time the testing sites at Mururoa and Fangataufa and to sign the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga."

The Prime Minister concluded: "New Zealand's main objective up to this point had been to persuade President Chirac to rescind his decision to resume testing. New Zealand deeply regretted his refusal to do so. New Zealand would press ahead with its appeal to the International Court of Justice for an interim injunction. France must realize that its actions have caused deep concern and anger among countries in the Asia-Pacific region and deep disquiet in the wider international community."

(Mr. Armstrong, New Zealand)

That concludes the statement. While I have the floor, may I also take the opportunity to welcome the earlier statement of the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland clarifying his country's position on the scope of the CTBT and confirming that his country supports a true zero-yield comprehensive ban?

Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my delegation warmly congratulates you on the way in which you have been conducting the work of the Conference on Disarmament in this final phase of its annual session. We are grateful to you for your efforts and dedication and we reiterate our support and friendship. Allow me also to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois, the representative of France, and to thank my old friend Ambassador Celso Lafer for his kind words about my term of office as President.

On 24 August I informed this Conference that my Government regarded as very regrettable the conduct of a nuclear test by the Peoples Republic of China. On that occasion my Government reiterated its appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting tests of such weapons and to declare an immediate and complete moratorium so as to encourage intensified negotiations leading to a treaty that will be opened for signature before the commencement of the fifty-first United Nations General Assembly and will, as proposed by the Group of 21, provide for a complete ban on all nuclear tests by all States, in all environments and for all time, with no test permitted for any reason or with any justification, including those linked to the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.

Today I am informing this Conference that on 5 September the Government of Mexico deplored and condemned the conduct of a nuclear test by the Government of the French Republic in the South Pacific on that day and reiterated its determination to work with the member countries of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the States parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga to urge the next United Nations General Assembly to adopt a moratorium with immediate effect on this type of testing pending the entry into force of the treaty that we are now negotiating in this Conference on Disarmament in order to ban them completely.

The Government of Mexico will also propose that if a State violates this moratorium it will be held legally responsible for the damage to population groups, security or the environment resulting from the test, as determined by an impartial international authority. As we all know, in the recent Conference for the review and extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States undertook to make systematic and progressive efforts to reduce these weapons, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them. The conduct of nuclear tests is not in keeping with this solemn commitment which was entered into along with the decision to extend the application of the Treaty indefinitely, nor with its purposes. Speaking before Congress on 12 September, my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs said that in a world characterized by globalization, international security is indivisible and has to be safeguarded for all nations regardless of their military might or economic position. He went on to highlight the clear link between the

(Mr. de Icaza, Mexico)

consolidation of an effective non-proliferation regime and progress towards the early abolition of weapons of mass destruction. We should remember in this respect that in adopting the decision to extend the application of the non-proliferation treaty, strengthened machinery was adopted for review and periodic evaluation of the commitments and obligations entered into by the States in the matter. On 5 September, on the occasion of the nuclear test in the South Pacific, the Government of Mexico stated that it is obvious that if in any of the periodic evaluations we reach the conclusion that the nuclear Powers are not carrying out what they agreed to, we always have at our disposal the possibility of taking drastic measures, including that of revising our position with regard to the non-proliferation Treaty, on the basis of article X of the aforesaid international instrument.

International public opinion demands that, in the present circumstances of détente, efforts should be speeded up to remove the threat that nuclear weapons represent for the community, and it is not prepared to tolerate this historic and possibly unique opportunity being wasted through acts that show an anachronistic attachment to security doctrines which, though at one time they had their own logic, are now in themselves a threat for the security of all. In this respect, on 5 September in Quito, Ecuador, the Presidents of the Rio Group, as leaders of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the first nuclear-weapon free zone, placed on record their "profound concern at and rejection of the resumption of nuclear tests by the Peoples Republic of China and the decision of the French Government to resume testing in the Pacific, a geographical area of which the majority of the member countries of the Rio Group form part. In view of the fact that these actions affect the environment for the pursuit of the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty", the heads of State and Government urgently called on the Governments of States that possess this type of weapon "to suspend all nuclear testing through unilateral or agreed moratoriums, in order to speed up the negotiation of a multilateral, effectively verifiable treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests."

The same views were expressed by the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, which yesterday, 13 September adopted a declaration deploring the recent conduct by the French Government of a nuclear test, appealing to that Government to reconsider its decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific and stating that the conduct of nuclear tests in the South Pacific is a potential risk for the health and safety of the peoples of the coastal States, their living resources and their environment, and ignores the precautionary principle endorsed in the Rio Declaration on environment and development and other regional agreements.

The Government of Mexico knows how complex it is to make progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, it reiterates its firm decision to pursue this effort despite the obstacles it may encounter in order to attain such a noble objective, and will continue to urge the speediest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty despite the fact that those tests being carried out now are regrettably hampering the negotiating process to which we all say we are committed.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of South Africa, Mr. Goosen.

Mr. GOOSEN (South Africa): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of the important office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am particularly pleased that you as a fellow African are presiding over the Conference. I would also like to express the appreciation of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Yumjav of Mongolia, for the creditable way in which he guided the work of the Conference during his term of office.

I would also like to use this opportunity, also on behalf of my Ambassador, to warmly welcome the distinguished representatives who have recently joined us in the Conference on Disarmament. They are Ambassador Arundhati Ghose of India, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada, Ambassador Péter Náray of Hungary and Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois of France. The association between South Africa and Ambassador Bourgois will, I am sure, be the basis for continued close relations between our two delegations. I would appreciate it if the French delegation could also convey my delegation's best wishes to Ambassador Gérard Errera in his new assignment.

I have asked for the floor in order to inform the Conference of a statement issued on 6 September 1995 by South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alfred Nzo, in which he expressed my Government's regret at the French nuclear test explosion on Mururoa atoll. The text of my Minister's statement, which was entitled "South African Government condemns France's nuclear-weapons test", reads:

> "The South African Government objects to and deplores the nuclear test explosion which was conducted by the Government of France on the Mururoa atoll on 5 September 1995. It had been the South African Government's hope that France would heed international concern about their decision to abandon the moratorium on nuclear tests and to resume their testing programme in the South Pacific.
>
> "We are deeply concerned about the potential negative effects of underground nuclear testing on the environment. We reaffirm our solidarity with the States in the South Pacific and will continue to support their strong opposition to the resumption of the French tests in their region.
>
> "The South African Government firmly believes that the French test is in contradiction with the agreement on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament', which were adopted by consensus at the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference. In that agreement, which France helped negotiate, the nuclear-weapon States undertook to exercise utmost restraint with respect to nuclear testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) in 1996. The French test is also of particular concern coming as it does during sensitive negotiations for a

(Mr. Goosen, South Africa)

CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. This explosion is furthermore in contrast with the announcements made in the context of the CD negotiations by several of the nuclear-weapon States regarding the acceptance of the proposal to ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, irrespective of its size.

"South African diplomats and representatives have in international forums protested against the two Chinese nuclear tests conducted so far this year, and also against the policy of the French Government to resume their nuclear testing. Work is also being done to bring a resolution on nuclear testing before the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

"We urge the Government of France, as well as the Government of China, to reconsider their nuclear testing policy, to abandon plans for further nuclear tests and to join in a global moratorium. We believe that this latest test is a further step backward in the endeavours of the international community to ban nuclear testing. In addition South Africa also wishes to call on all the other nuclear-weapon States to maintain their commitment to their moratoria and to continue to 'exercise utmost restraint'."

That concludes the statement of my Foreign Minister.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of South Africa for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Hwang.

Mr. HWANG (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation, I congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency at this year's last session of the CD. My delegation sincerely hopes that this session of the CD will be able to conclude with fruitful results under your wise guidance.

My Government has the conviction that the supreme need of today after the cold war is to build an enduring structure of lasting peace in the world. We believe that the first step towards that goal is building trust within the international community. In this sense, any nuclear test by any country at this time, we think, runs counter to the principle of bona fides in the light of the spirit expressed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference held in May this year. From this conviction, my delegation would like to make known to this forum the statement of 6 September 1995 by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea concerning the recent French nuclear testing. The statement reads as follows:

(Mr. Hwang, Republic of Korea)

"The Government of the Republic of Korea is highly disappointed that France went ahead with a nuclear test, breaking its own moratorium on nuclear testing of April 1992, despite strong protests and deep concerns registered by many countries all over the world. As an Asia-Pacific country we especially regret that France conducted the test in this region.

"We urge again France to immediately halt all nuclear testing in order not to obstruct global and regional non-proliferation efforts especially at the time when the negotiations for any early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty are progressing."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to congratulate you on the outstanding manner in which you are conducting the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We have been deeply impressed by your commitment and determination to ensure that the CD, despite the difficulties which have plagued it throughout this year, concludes none the less its final session on a successful note. In this endeavour, you will have the full cooperation of the Pakistan delegation.

I would also like to express appreciation to your predecessor once again, Ambassador Shirchinjavyn Yumjav of Mongolia, who guided the work of the Conference with notable skill, competence and dignity. I would like to take this opportunity also to welcome our new colleague, the Ambassador of France, and to assure her of our full cooperation in the work we shall be conducting here and later this next year in the Conference.

The Conference will, in a few days, conclude its 1995 session. This year the CD's work has produced mixed results. While it was unable to resume its work on a number of important disarmament issues, we can take satisfaction in the progress achieved in the CTBT negotiations. There remain important issues on which agreement will need to be reached at an early stage when the Conference resumes its work in 1996 so that we are able to conclude the CTBT before the end of next year. I would like to present our views on these salient issues. Consensus on these issues will pave the way for the successful completion of the CTBT negotiations.

For some time the negotiations came under a deep shadow of positions seeking to create threshold exemptions in the scope of the CTBT. In my statement of 24 August 1995, we welcomed the French and United States announcements, as we do the United Kingdom statement today, supporting a truly comprehensive treaty. However, another session of the CD will end without an agreement on the most basic issue in the CTBT negotiations, namely the scope of the treaty. The importance of achieving agreement on this issue cannot be overstated. The language of the scope article must not leave any room to allow loopholes which can be exploited in contravention of the objective and

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

purpose of the treaty. It must also be consistent with the long-standing objectives of a CTBT, namely, to put an end to weapons-related nuclear testing of any kind.

An important issue pertaining to Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB concerns the question of the membership of the Executive Council, on which there has been little progress. We believe that a prior understanding on the principles which will govern the membership of the Executive Council is necessary before any fruitful drafting work can be undertaken. These principles must be relevant to the context of the CTBT rather than a transposition of provisions from other agreements to ensure privileged positions for some countries. The membership of the Executive Council must be based on technical as well as political criteria.

The highlight of this session of the Conference was the progress achieved in regard to the architecture of the international monitoring system. We note with satisfaction the convergence of views on the number of primary seismic stations required for the IMS. We are confident that a consensus will soon be possible on the number of auxiliary stations for the seismic network.

This progress augurs well for agreements in regard to the other facets of the IMS (namely, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring stations). An effective and efficient IMS is essential for a sound verification system for the CTBT. This can be achieved only if there are no gaps in the coverage of the IMS both in terms of geography and detection of low-yield nuclear explosions. For this reason it may be essential for the IMS to be strengthened by the addition of satellite monitoring and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) detection.

We do not favour the use of the so-called national technical means which are not part of the recognized monitoring network, either as a supplement to the IMS or as a parallel mechanism for verification of the CTBT. We do not anticipate the use of NTMs either as a trigger for OSI or subsequently. To acknowledge the validity of NTMs in the context of CTBT verification is tantamount to undermining a priori the credibility of the IMS which is being constructed so painstakingly and which will entail considerable expense. NTMs also raise a host of legal issues, since some of the activities associated with them, both technical and non-technical, may be considered "illegal" and in violation of the sovereignty of States concerned. Furthermore, since NTMs are currently owned by only a few countries, their use on a selective basis outside the IMS framework will make the treaty discriminatory.

The question of on-site inspections and the role of OSI in the CTBT represents a sensitive issue. In any multilateral treaty OSI should be the measure of last resort in resolving compliance questions. Provisions for OSI need to be formulated with great care and deliberation and must necessarily contain proper safeguards against abuse. When inevitable, OSI must be conducted in the least intrusive manner consistent with the objective of timely and effective detection of treaty violations. The sequence of events leading to an OSI must involve the detection of an ambiguous event by the IMS, a mandatory process of consultation and clarification, which if unsuccessful

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

must oblige the Executive Council to consider all the relevant information from the IMS before authorizing by a two-thirds or three-fourths majority to conduct an on-site inspection.

The so-called "green light" procedure for the Executive Council to authorize OSI constitutes an indispensable mechanism for ensuring that on-site inspections remain an exception and will only be conducted strictly in accordance with the purposes of the CTBT.

The principal reason cited by supporters of the "red light" procedure concerns the need to gather time-critical evidence by the inspection team before such evidence dissipates. It is mainly the possibility of noble gas releases in the atmosphere and to an extent after-shocks from a nuclear explosion which are considered time-critical evidence. According to the experts, however, the probability of release and detection of noble gases in a well-camouflaged test is extremely low. With low detection probability, the relative merits and demerits of launching OSI in a hasty manner need to be more carefully assessed, specially since such "exploratory" missions may have far-reaching consequences for the CTBT verification regime. The mechanisms for conducting OSI should be consistent with the principles that on-site inspections be rare, non-intrusive, effective and cost-efficient.

Hard evidence on the other hand will continue to remain at the site of an underground nuclear explosion and again, according to expert opinion, can be detected months, years and even hundreds of years after the nuclear explosion. These factors must be given due consideration in endeavours to devise a sequential and orderly OSI regime for the CTBT. Arguments based on the notion of loss of time-critical evidence cannot become the basis to support the so-called red-light approach which has abundant scope for misuse. In any case, it is our view that the process of consultations and clarification and the approval of OSI by the Executive Council would allow adequate time to collect time-critical evidence.

While we are gratified at the progress made during 1995 in the CTBT negotiations, it is a matter of disappointment that the CD was unable to address numerous other important issues on its agenda. My delegation has consistently expressed its willingness to begin work on all items simultaneously. We are especially disappointed that there is a persistent reluctance to open negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament - an objective which has been accorded the highest priority by the international community. Pakistan hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to establish early in 1996 an ad hoc committee to commence concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on taking up the responsible post of President of our Conference. We are convinced that under your active and energetic leadership we will be able to resolve the problems on which there has been no progress for so long and which have been preventing us from making satisfactory progress in our work. I am also pleased to welcome the new ambassador of France among us and to express the hope that there will be a continuation of the close and friendly relations between our delegations.

I asked for the floor in order to draw the attention of distinguished colleagues to document CD/1347, which has been circulated at the request of the Russian delegation. This document contains a statement dated 20 July 1995 by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation concerning its attitude to the resumption of nuclear testing by France and also a statement dated 6 September 1995 by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in connection with a nuclear test carried out by France. The latter statement notes that:

> "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation expresses profound regret at the fact that, despite the serious concern which has been expressed by the entire international community, including the Russian Federation, France has nevertheless embarked on implementation of the programme of nuclear tests scheduled for the current year."
>
> "The breach of the current moratorium applied by the four nuclear Powers constitutes a serious blow to the agreements which have successfully been reached recently in the field of disarmament and the strengthening of regimes for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resumption of testing runs counter to the spirit of the joint decisions reached at the conference in New York and directed towards the speedy cessation of all tests by all nuclear Powers. All of this, of course, cannot but further exacerbate an already complex international situation."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. We have come to the end of the list of speakers. Would any other delegations like to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Bourgois.

Mrs. BOURGOIS (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all allow me to thank the representatives who have extended such a warm welcome to me, and all those among them who have said that they wish to continue the existing cooperation with France. Allow me also to give an assurance to each and everyone that I will do my best to make the most positive possible contribution with them to the progress of our work. I also wish to take this opportunity to say how much we welcome the announcement made by the United Kingdom delegation with regard to the scope of the treaty, an announcement which I think is an important event in this plenary session.

(Mrs. Bourgois, France)

With regard to the remarks that have been addressed to France, I would first like to say briefly that, as far as the environmental effects of our tests are concerned, I note that some are continuing to cite damage which is not substantiated by solid proof. For our part we prefer to rely on analyses by scientific experts. Indeed, as you know, we have invited scientists to come and see for themselves on the spot, at the end of this final series, that our tests present no danger for the environment. I think that this demonstrates our confidence in the guarantees that have been offered in this regard. Finally, with regard to the argument that this round of tests jeopardizes the negotiations on the CTBT, I have already said in my opening statement that the reverse of this was true. Without this last round, France would not have been in a position to sign the treaty next year, and without the signatures of the nuclear Powers, this treaty would have no meaning. In contrast, and many of you have emphasized this, France was able to agree that the treaty should be of unlimited duration and was able to enter into a clear and definitive commitment with regard to scope, that is, the prohibition of all nuclear explosions, whatever their level. The Conference on Disarmament has been entrusted with a fundamental mission by the international community; the Conference must rise to the task that has been given to it and the time has now come to avoid debates and endeavour to redouble our efforts so that we are in a position to conclude and sign the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in 1996.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): If there are no further speakers I would like to move on to other matters. As I announced last week, I now propose to place before the Conference for approval the recommendation contained in paragraph 14 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on detection and identification of seismic events concerning the dates for the next two sessions of the Group of Experts, that is, from 27 November to 1 December 1995 and from 12 to 23 February 1996, respectively. May I take it that the Conference accepts this recommendation?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): As you know, over the past few days I have stepped up my consultations, both at the bilateral level and among the group coordinators, with the aim of solving the problem of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. Following these consultations, I have sent all the coordinators, and through them all delegations, a draft decision on this subject. During the President's consultations I held yesterday afternoon, a proposal was made that consideration should be postponed until a later plenary session, to allow for consolidation of the consensus that seems to be emerging on this matter. In accordance with the practices of this Conference, and inspired by a wish to take all opinions into account and to spare no effort to find a solution to this problem, which we all consider to be a matter of importance and priority, I have acceded to this request in order to allow the consultations under way to produce the desired result.

(The President)

I would like to add the following. I have been extremely touched by the words of encouragement and the very kind words that have been addressed to me today, and earlier in private, and I would not be living up to this confidence or the responsibilities incumbent upon me as President if I did not make a few observations, if I did not sound a note of caution. I believe that there is a very clear saying that some things are better left alone, and another that one should never miss an opportunity when the time is ripe, because in multilateral negotiations, if an opportunity is missed when it arises, all our efforts may come to nothing. I would like to emphasize that we all agree that this is an extremely important question for all of us, for all the reasons we have mentioned, and that is why we have devoted many bilateral meetings and several informal meetings to this subject, and I think we all know the positions of the various parties.

We have prepared a text which I believe takes into account the positions of all. Of course, it is a text which cannot satisfy all delegations in the Conference, but it is a compromise text, and hence by definition a text which cannot fully meet all concerns. It is for that reason that I appeal for your understanding, which I think I secured in private during our informal consultations. I have really appreciated the sense of duty that we all have towards the other delegations sitting in the second row in this hall and to the international community, and that we must act without haste, and that is why I agreed with great hesitation not to ask for a decision on this text today, because there is a very clear distinction between haste and determination. I understand that certain delegations wish to look at the text again, perhaps make a few suggestions, but as I have said so often, one person's suggestions may be negative for others; so balance is in a way what the President has tried to put into this document, which will be distributed tomorrow in all the official languages in delegations' pigeon-holes. It bears the symbol CD/WP.467 and is dated 13 September 1995. Of course, this does not mean that the text cannot be amended, but I must say in all frankness that I think it would be difficult to amend it in any substantial manner if we want to retain a consensus on this issue. I repeat once again: there is a very clear distinction between haste, which I do not want - that is why I very reluctantly agreed not to discuss this today - and determination.

I come to my second proposal, which is that at a future meeting - I think fairly soon, before the end of next week - I will submit this text to the Conference for a decision. I also understand that many delegations have a great deal to say on this. I understand this - my delegation also has a lot to say - so with your consent I would like to devote a plenary session to the adoption of this text. In this way everyone will be able to make any comments he or she deems appropriate.

Mr. BERGUÑO (Chile) (translated from French): Mr. President, it is on listening to your wise words that I would like to make a preliminary statement on behalf of the Group of 23. However, before doing so I wish to extend my very friendly congratulations to you and extend a welcome to Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois of France, and, while taking note of the important statement she made, and recalling my own statements on this subject, I would

(Mr. Berguño, Chile)

ask for my Government's official condemnation of France's latest nuclear test to be circulated as a Conference document. I now switch to English to read out the declaration of the Group of 23.

(continued in English)

We understand that the proposal on expansion that you have been advocating would do the following. It would adopt the report of the Special Coordinator in document CD/1214, which provides for the expansion of the Conference's membership to include 23 additional countries. It would not give these countries the right to exercise a veto consistent with our national security interests. In this I have to say that this is a matter of considerable disappointment to our Governments, that the CD has not been able to reach a consensus on an expansion in accordance with General Assembly resolution 49/77 B. This proposal also recognizes, by recalling General Assembly resolution 49/77 B, the legitimate rights represented in the membership applications of all 35 current applicants, naturally including the 12 applicants not listed in the O'Sullivan report. It recalls also rule 2 of the CD's procedures, which provide for regular review of membership, and it states that the current decision does not prejudice the consideration of applications of other candidatures listed in the 1994 CD report. This must mean that the expansion of the CD's membership cannot end with the entry of our 23 countries but must be regularly reviewed in a dynamic way. This is only common sense - the CD, to be effective, cannot stand still in time and refuse to continue to adjust itself to the international realities of any given period.

Your proposal establishes a process which does not fulfil the terms of General Assembly resolution 49/77 B, nor the expectations of any applicant country, but rather is a step towards meeting the General Assembly's requirement that the CD expand to a membership of at least 60 countries. There surely can be no delegation in this room that believes that in adopting this decision the process of ensuring continued CD effectiveness and legitimacy over time, through subsequent balanced expansions, will stop forever.

We therefore urge any member delegation which may have any particular concerns to consider positively the terms of this decision. We also urge any delegation to reflect very carefully whether their national security interests require them to prevent the adoption of your proposal, Mr. President, and the serious consequences of such an action. The General Assembly has placed upon the CD a responsibility regarding its membership. Surely it will draw a most unfavourable conclusion regarding the CD's competence to resolve this issue itself if the CD once again fails to report any progress to the fifty-first session. We obviously expect that the outcome of your initiative, for which we thank you warmly, will be accurately reflected in the report of the CD this year.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now turn to the informal paper distributed by the secretariat which contains the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. This timetable

(The President)

has been drawn up in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual it is merely indicative and can be amended if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before adjourning this plenary meeting I would like to remind you that this afternoon we will be holding an informal meeting to continue to examine the technical parts of the draft annual report to the United Nations General Assembly, as contained in document CD/WP.466. I would also like to announce that this afternoon's meeting will be held in this room at 3 p.m. and that consequently the meeting of Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will take place in room VII at 3 p.m. I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): I apologize for asking for the floor at this late stage. I wanted to refer briefly to the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which we have just completed, and to say that my delegation would like to register the fact that, in joining with others to note the content of the report of the GSE and to endorse the recommendations contained in its paragraph 14, we are proceeding on the basis that the draft schedule of work contained in pages 6 and 7 of the report has been adjusted in accordance with assurances given by Dr. Dahlman to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and formally conveyed by Ambassador Dembinski to the Committee. These assurances were to the effect that the complete report of the GSE on recommendations for seismic auxiliary stations will be available to the IMS Group of Experts meeting in the period 4-15 December 1995, when all the necessary technical input will be required in accordance with the decisions of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and the Conference affecting our inter-sessional work programme.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday 21 September 1995 at 10 a.m. unless we decide, if matters proceed as I hope they will, to hold a plenary meeting before next Thursday to consider and examine the decision on the expansion of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.719
21 September 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 September 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Benjelloun-Touimi (Morocco)

GE.95-63823 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 719th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Conference, I would like to extend a welcome to the new representative of Hungary to the Conference, Ambassador Péter Náray, who will be our first speaker today. I would like to assure him of our full support and total cooperation as he carries out his new tasks.

Apart from the representative of Hungary, I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of India, Norway, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the representatives of Sri Lanka, South Africa and Slovakia. However, before I give them the floor I would like to propose that the Conference should adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, published as document CD/1346. May I take it that the Conference adopts this report? There is apparently no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would like to take this opportunity to express on behalf of all of us our gratitude to Ambassador Dembinski for the efforts he has made to achieve progress in the negotiations.

I would also like to inform you that, as I announced last Thursday, once we have run through the list of speakers I intend to submit to the Conference for a decision the Presidential draft decision contained in document CD/WP.467/Rev.1, concerning the expansion of the membership of the Conference, which I submitted to all delegations following the intensive consultations I conducted both bilaterally and in informal meetings with all delegations.

I invite the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Náray, to take the floor.

Mr. NARAY (Hungary): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am particularly pleased to make my first statement in the period when you are presiding over our proceedings. My delegation commends highly your dynamic efforts allowing us to discuss in depth some of the sensitive outstanding issues on our agenda. May I also thank your predecessor, Ambassador Yumjav of Mongolia, for the way he fulfilled his duties as President?

As the annual session of the CD draws to a close, one can look back at 1995 as a year that has brought the international community closer to the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear testing in a comprehensive and verifiable manner. In this context I should like to reiterate that Hungary has always been and continues to be a strong supporter of the total prohibition of all nuclear explosions, in all environments, for all time, and advocates the earliest possible implementation of a nuclear test ban. It follows from this that my delegation is ready to lend its support to the draft

(Mr. Náray, Hungary)

article on the scope of prohibition submitted by Australia and contained in document WP.222. The chances of the successful completion of the CTBT negotiations in 1996 have been significantly enhanced by the decisions of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to seek a ban on any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other explosion, including explosions of low yield, in the ongoing talks on a comprehensive test ban. We strongly hope that these steps will set a pattern of a responsible attitude on behalf of all nuclear-weapons States and others will also contribute to this trend of convergence of positions on this crucial issue of the future treaty.

As far as other yet unresolved issues are concerned our expectation is that if the corresponding political will prevails, a relatively early agreement on many aspects of the future organization is possible. I should like to reiterate our position that the goals and purposes of this legal instrument can best be promoted and implemented by an independent organization which, however, will draw on the expertise and existing infrastructure of a major international organization, namely the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hungary attaches high importance to finding through such an arrangement the most cost-effective ways of operating the verification regime. In this context I should like to reaffirm my Government's strong preference for Vienna as the seat of the CTBT organization.

Next year the Conference will face the challenge of implementing those aspects of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, which have direct relevance for our work in this room. We add our voice to those who envisage the completion of the CTBT negotiations by the end of the second part of next year's session, allowing the signature before the end of the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The resumption of nuclear testing by certain nuclear-weapon States only stresses the importance of meeting this deadline. While expressing our regret over the nuclear explosion tests carried out since last May, we welcome France's strong commitment to sign a CTBT by autumn 1996.

Another important item of the programme of action that the CD cannot neglect is the call for immediate negotiations on a fissile material cut-off. In the view of my delegation the conclusion of such a treaty would mean another breakthrough in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. I cannot but urge this body to overcome the present procedural deadlock and to start substantive negotiations on the subject early next year on the basis of the carefully worded mandate contained in the report of Ambassador Shannon.

I would be remiss in my first address to the Conference on Disarmament if I did not mention a special field of arms control to which, in our judgement, not enough attention has been devoted and which has not yet found its appropriate place in our agenda. It is the question of conventional armaments that I am referring to. One should not lose sight of the fact that all major conflicts and wars of the past decades have been fought with this category of weapons. This delegation is firmly convinced of the necessity of including

(Mr. Náray, Hungary)

this item in our programme of work for next year and the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments without linking it to any other issue.

In concluding, I express my commitment and that of my delegation to promote the activities of the Conference on Disarmament. I look forward to working closely with all members and observers of the CD in meeting the challenges ahead of us.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Ghose.

Ms. GHOSE (India): Mr. President, may I start with a warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada, Ambassador Joëlle Bourgois of France and Ambassador Péter Náray of Hungary, and at the same time thank all colleagues who have earlier in the session addressed their words of welcome to me? As this is the first time that I am taking the floor under your presidency, I would like to formally congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Conference and assure you of the continued and what should by now be evident to you cooperation of my delegation. I would also like to take this opportunity to assure all delegations as well as the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, and the Deputy Secretary-General Mr. Bensmail of the earnest wish of my delegation to work together in the CD to obtain those results towards which our negotiations are aimed.

Mr. President, we have noted with appreciation your continuing efforts to introduce some flexibility and forward movement in the work of the Conference this year and we hope that these efforts will be rewarded with success. One of the issues which you have chosen as a possible area for forward movement is that of expansion of the membership. On the important question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, India appreciates the concern expressed by several countries who are waiting to become members of the CD. It was this sympathy with their point of view which had governed our decision to support the O'Sullivan package. We continue to believe in the validity of this expansion and trust that it can take place as soon as possible. However, the debate on expansion has also brought to light a fundamental issue about the role and functioning of the CD. We believe and we are sure most delegations agree that the CD is the sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament issues. The operative word here is, of course, "negotiating" and we must, I feel, keep this characteristic of the CD in mind. Any further expansion should, in our view, therefore only follow a full discussion in the CD of the optimum number of members of the CD which would, on the one hand, balance the legitimate interests and aspirations of applicant countries and, on the other, the need to retain the efficacy and efficiency of the negotiating body.

Besides the issue of expansion, there remains the matter, yet unresolved, of the setting up of ad hoc committees on the other pressing questions on our agenda. As a co-sponsor of United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L, India had welcomed the establishment of [illegible]

(Ms. Ghose, India)

committee to negotiate the convention to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We trust that these negotiations can begin as soon as possible. We would also like to see an early establishment, now unfortunately only possible in the next session, of the ad hoc committees on negative security assurances, prevention of an arms race in outer space and transparency in armaments.

The single major issue that has been the subject of some considerable, albeit informal debate this year was on how and even whether to address the question of nuclear disarmament in the CD. I must say that I am at a loss to understand the attitudes of some of our colleagues on this issue. If they are asked why they are reluctant to discuss the issue, we are told they are not, but they demand to know what we wish to negotiate. If this is indicated, we are accused of insatiable appetites and any multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament are ruled out. Apart from this somewhat cyclical and sometimes even hypnotizing game, we are taken aback by the resistance to discussing and negotiating nuclear disarmament in the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. This is all the more surprising given the priority attached to nuclear disarmament by the international community, since the first special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly. The CD can hardly ignore the repeated and increasingly persistent desire of the international community to urgently move towards the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

India has long believed and continues to believe that the only answer to the nuclear threat is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We understand that this cannot be done overnight but we are convinced that this can and should be done in a phased and time-bound framework. This demand has been seen as unrealistic and idealistic on the grounds that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. This we feel is a disingenuous argument. If the international community can ban and eliminate biological and chemical weapons, then the same international community should also have the courage to negotiate a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons which are far and away the most highly developed and extensively stockpiled of the weapons of mass destruction.

We understand and appreciate that governments work under domestic political, academic and media pressures, constraints and compulsions. This is a fact of life which is true for many, if not all of us. In my country, too, international negotiations on nuclear issues are carefully monitored, and nuclear disarmament is an issue on which Indian opinion is united. The CTBT and the proposed cut-off convention are seen as essential steps towards total nuclear disarmament. They are indeed, in our view, steps towards the eventual goal which will be meaningful only if they are linked firmly to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within a well-defined time framework. Otherwise they will be seen as narrow and futile exercises aimed only at controlling non-nuclear-weapon States, further strengthening the discrimination inherent in the non-proliferation regimes which exist today. India is committed to the CTBT and has been participating constructively in the negotiations with the aim of an early and successful conclusion of the

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At the moment such an effort is conspicuous by its absence. We are not "greedy" but we are dogged and persistent in our belief in the self-evident justness of our cause.

I would also like to take this opportunity of addressing some of the issues currently before the CTBT negotiators. We recognize that the pace of negotiations has been satisfactory over the last month or so and yet disagreements remain in many vital areas. It is imperative that the gaps in different positions be closed through sincere negotiations conducted in good faith and taking into account all genuine concerns. Only on this basis will we eventually have a good treaty which is voluntarily accepted and fully implemented.

First and foremost, we believe for reasons which I have already mentioned, the preamble of the treaty will have to clearly define the linkage of the CTBT to the overall framework of nuclear disarmament. The scope of the treaty should cover complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time. We do not believe that there should be any exceptions for carrying out nuclear tests under any circumstances and should thus inhibit, in a non-discriminatory manner, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in both the horizontal as well as the vertical dimensions. We trust that this fundamental article of the treaty can be resolved to meet these concerns.

There has been considerable progress during this session on other legal and institutional issues such as the articles on duration and withdrawal and on amendments. The text on some of the other articles in this group has also been considerably rationalized though crucial issues like the composition of the Executive Council have to be looked into more closely. Responses to the questionnaires issued to IAEA and for the seat of the organization will facilitate our decision-making process.

We believe that the verification system being designed for the CTBT should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory and should guarantee equal access to all States. We believe that important progress has been made during this session to clarify the relative advantages and disadvantages of various options and we hope an even clearer picture will emerge after the expert work scheduled to be held in the inter-sessional period is completed. We are glad to see that work is also beginning on developing the functions and role of the International Data Centre. In our view, the International Data Centre working as an integral part of the Technical Secretariat should have the capacity to receive, assess and analyse data from the International Monitoring System. It is vital that based on this assessment the judgement in any case of non-compliance should be the responsibility of the organization.

I would like to specifically address now the question of on-site inspections as a part of the verification regime as an issue of critical importance to us. My delegation is of the view that on-site inspections should be carried out only in rare circumstances and in the least intrusive and cost-effective manner possible. We believe that the design of the OSI

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realistically retaining its effectiveness. Accordingly, we believe that the on-site inspection request should be based on IMS data. Full opportunity should be provided to the State party to be inspected to assist in clarifying the situation through a mandatory consultation and clarification procedure. The Executive Council should thoroughly examine the request and take a decision by a three-fourths majority of its members on whether or not an OSI is warranted. A managed access regime should operate during the on-site inspection to maintain a balance between the rights and the obligations of the State party being inspected. Such an approach will deter frivolous or abusive requests and would add to the credibility of the treaty.

At this time when we are so intensively engaged in negotiations on the CTBT, nuclear tests are still being conducted by some nuclear-weapons States. In this context, may I now read out to the CD a statement delivered in New Delhi on 15 September 1995 by the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs?

"We are dismayed by the recent nuclear tests carried out by some nuclear-weapons States. That these steps are being taken by States which are parties to the NPT, soon after its indefinite extension, highlights the inherent defects of the Treaty. These developments represent a serious setback to the ongoing negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) and undermine its successful conclusion.

"India has taken a consistent and principled position on nuclear disarmament. This is why, from 1954, when Prime Minister Nehru called for a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, we have urged that a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) must be adopted. We view the CTBT as an important step towards nuclear disarmament. India is actively participating in the negotiations at Geneva which should not be impeded by continued tests by nuclear-weapon States. We hope that all countries will negotiate in good faith for a universal, comprehensive, non-discriminatory and effective CTBT and, meanwhile, refrain from actions contrary to its objectives."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of India for her statement and the very kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Skogmo.

Mr. SKOGMO (Norway): Mr. President, allow me to join others in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to express our full appreciation of all your efforts in guiding the work of the Conference. I also assure you of the full cooperation and support of my delegation. I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome the newly arrived Ambassadors of Brazil, Canada, France, Hungary, India, Ireland and South Africa.

The negotiations on the completion of a CTBT has been the most important task for the CD this session. The work on this issue has progressed, if not rapidly. We are encouraged by the progress made in this third part of the 1995 session, in particular on scope, funding and the International Monitoring System (IMS). We welcome the commitments of

(Mr. Skogmo, Norway)

important contribution to the negotiations if all nuclear-weapons States could confirm identical views. There is reason for cautious optimism that with continued good will and hard work a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty can be concluded early next year and be ready for signature by the outset of the fifty-first United Nations General Assembly.

It has been a long-standing position of the Norwegian Government that continued or resumed nuclear testing by any country may complicate the negotiations on a CTBT, and furthermore not make universal ratification and implementation of, as well as adherence to, a CTBT easier. As was expressed in a joint statement by the Nordic Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 6 September, Norway strongly deplores the nuclear test carried out by France in French Polynesia. We are deeply disappointed at both the French and the Chinese nuclear tests in the light of the commitment undertaken by the nuclear-weapons States at the NPT Conference earlier this year to exercise the utmost restraint as regards future nuclear testing. These tests represent a setback for international non-proliferation efforts and may constitute a risk to human health and the environment in the areas affected. Norway therefore again urges the Chinese and French authorities to abandon current testing programmes and refrain from any further nuclear testing.

Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for your sincere efforts to achieve progress on the long overdue issue of expansion aimed at fulfilling the clear mandate given to the CD by the United Nations General Assembly last year. There is now an urgent need for expanding CD membership. The Presidential draft decision before us negotiated by you, Mr. President, represents a step in the right direction. It is not a sufficient step since countries on the list under the formula contained in the decision will still not be able to take part fully as equal partners in negotiations that are important also to their national interests. We would therefore express our strong hope that the members of the CD will make the proposed review of the final decision to include the 23 countries on the O'Sullivan list as full members at the earliest possible date and in good faith, and that the proposed review will not be a mechanism for further postponement. Norway is also of the opinion that an expansion of the CD by 23 countries on the list should not exclude further the admission of other countries willing to undertake the obligations of CD membership. Once again, Mr. President, I would like to thank you for your efforts on this issue which have finally produced a positive development on an issue which is important to a lot of countries. We hope that the members of the CD will support your draft decision.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Dembinski, who will be introducing the addendum to the Committee's report. This addendum contains the results of the work carried out in the Committee over the two weeks following the adoption of its report.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland): Last week when I introduced the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1346), I noted that the Committee had continued its work since the adoption of the report in the Committee. I also mentioned that there would therefore be an addendum which would reflect the changes to the report. I am pleased to introduce here the addendum, CD/1346/Add.1, which was just adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Tuesday, 19 September. Delegations have, therefore, been able to work on the treaty text until the end of the session.

Upon adoption of this addendum in the plenary, the secretariat will incorporate the changes contained therein into the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament to the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. The secretariat will also re-number the paragraphs and update the list of documents. Thus delegates will have one coherent rolling text to work on when the Ad Hoc Committee resumes its meetings.

I would like to remind delegations that important expert work on the International Monitoring System will take place from 4 to 15 December and all delegations who are able to send experts are encouraged to do so. The experts are invited to convene in room V at 10 a.m. on Monday, 4 December, and a more detailed timetable will be available then.

Regarding the Ad Hoc Committee work during the inter-sessional period 8 to 19 January 1996 under my chairmanship, the secretariat will distribute in due time a tentative timetable of meetings. I wish to note at this point that there will be an open-ended Bureau meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Monday morning, 8 January, at 9.30 a.m., followed by a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee at 10 a.m. I look forward to seeing you then.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Dembinski for introducing the addendum to his Committee's report to the Conference. I intend to put this addendum before the Conference for adoption at our plenary meeting tomorrow, Friday, 22 September. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): I have several statements to make this morning, firstly as the representative of Sri Lanka and secondly as the Coordinator of the Group of 21. First of all, permit me to make a statement on the recent nuclear-weapon test explosions.

Sri Lanka notes with deep concern the two nuclear-weapon test explosions carried out on 17 August and 5 September by two nuclear-weapon States. The sentiments expressed, both individually and collectively, by the international community following the recent tests reflect the strong opposition to such tests, for they vitiate the current favourable international political and security climate.

Sri Lanka believes that such tests are neither desirable nor do they help enhance the confidence indispensable to the ongoing CTBT negotiations which are in their final stage.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

In this context, Sri Lanka wishes to remind the nuclear-weapon States of their undertaking given at the Fifth NPT Review and Extension Conference, inter alia, to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear-weapons testing.

Sri Lanka would, therefore, urge them to refrain from any action that could adversely affect the conditions conducive to the expeditious conclusion of the CTBT negotiations.

Mr. President, my delegation wishes to request you to release this statement as an official document of the CD and distribute it accordingly. May I now proceed to deliver the general statement of my delegation.

Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. The CD stands to gain from your reassuring pragmatism and personal charm, which you have so effectively brought into disposing of the Conference's unfinished business, as its 1995 session draws to a close. I wish you well in your relentless efforts and extend to you my delegation's full support and active cooperation for the success of your laudable endeavours. Allow me also to express the deep gratitude of my delegation to your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Yumjav of Mongolia, Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico and Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan, who did their utmost for the success of the CD during their respective tenures of office.

It gives me great pleasure to welcome those who joined the Conference recently: Ambassador Arundhati Ghose of India, Ambassador Péter Náray of Hungary, Ambassador Jôelle Bourgois of France and Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada. Their predecessors had made substantial contributions to the work of the CD. I am confident that the newly joined Ambassadors, too, would do their utmost for the success of the work of this Conference. May I request the delegation of France to convey our best wishes to Ambassador Gérard Errera, who has departed our company after many years of distinguished service to the Conference, to assume higher responsibilities?

We are gathered here for our one but final plenary meeting of the 1995 session of the CD. This is a good occasion for us to take stock of our performance and to review our progress during the year. Such an exercise would no doubt enable us to prepare the final accounts of our work and arrive at its balance sheet. Such an endeavour should reflect our successes and failings, and our strengths and weaknesses. It is in this spirit that my delegation wishes to approach the 1996 session of the Conference. By drawing lessons from our shortcomings and failings we may succeed in agreeing upon a work programme for 1996, which will hopefully be more productive than the current session.

Looking back at the progress we have made on the draft CTBT, none of us would dare say that we whittled away the resources and time allocated to the Conference this year. On the other hand, we all share the view that much more could have been done, if we were able to decide on the programme of work at the beginning of the 1995 session of the CD and conducted our work according to that programme. That was regrettably not possible. However, it will not be a productive exercise to examine who should be blamed for that lapse. In

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

recognizing the realities and making demands that were clearly difficult to achieve from the perspective of existing political considerations. In view of this situation, which was clearly unproductive, my delegation fully supports the endeavours of the President of the CD to address the issue before the present session comes to an end. If we succeed, we would be able to reach an understanding perhaps now, on the agenda and organization of work for 1996. By doing so, we could avoid the pitfalls of 1995 next year and help the Conference to discuss substance rather than having another year-long debate on what to discuss. While we are engaged in this exercise, we should be conscious of the time available to us next year, and the quantum that has to be realistically apportioned for concluding CTBT negotiations during 1996. Having reached such an understanding, we can take a decision on what other work we can undertaken in 1996.

Whilst granting that our failures are many, it stands to reason to claim that our Conference has single-mindedly forged ahead in its quest for a CTBT. None of us here, I am confident, would gainsay this claim. This has, however, cast on us an added responsibility to finalize the draft CTBT treaty during the first half of 1996. My delegation will extend its wholehearted support towards realizing this goal by that target date. With a view to achieving this objective, my delegation desires an early resolution of the question of the future CTBT's scope, its verification regime and its monitoring process which are fundamental to the conclusion of the draft treaty. With regard to the scope of the treaty, my delegation deeply appreciates the significant contribution of the Australian delegation contained in document CD/NTB/WP.222 of 9 March 1995. Sri Lanka is pleased to join the convergence of views on the Australian proposal. In this connection, we are heartened by the lead taken by the United States followed by France and the United Kingdom. Sri Lanka always believed that in the environment envisaged under a CTBT there could be no room for peaceful nuclear explosions, however small the yield of such explosions. Time has come for us to agree on a total ban on all nuclear explosions. We would, therefore, urge the remaining nuclear-weapon States and other members of the Conference to support the Australian formula.

Sri Lanka has already made a statement of its position on the subject of recent nuclear-weapon testing and therefore does not propose to dwell on it at this stage. My delegation expresses its solidarity with those members of the international community who have expressed their deep concern on the recent nuclear-weapon testings, especially at a juncture when a multilateral treaty seeking to impose a total ban on testing is currently under way and well within its grasp. At the same time, we applaud those nuclear-weapons States who, notwithstanding the recent tests carried out by two nuclear-weapon States steadfastly observe moratoria in nuclear-weapon testing.

One of the important issues that has to be resolved by the Conference immediately is the question of expansion of its membership. Mindful of the call made by the forty-ninth General Assembly in its resolution 49/77 B, my delegation lauds your relentless efforts at finding a solution to this vexed problem and wishes you good luck in your endeavours.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

To begin with, we have to be alive to the fact that many members of the United Nations have been knocking on the portals of this Conference since 1979 with the intention of gaining entry to it and contributing their share to the work we are engaged in here. These countries, 35 in all, have been waiting patiently for many years expecting us to reach a decision. We simply cannot delay a decision on this matter any further. Simple logic demands that the CD should permit all those who have shown an interest in serving the body to do so. However, we have to be mindful of the unique role of the Conference. It is not a deliberative body as is the case of the UNDC. The CD is a negotiating forum. When the CD was established, its composition was deliberately kept at a limited number and that was done with the purpose of maintaining a delicate strategic and geographical balance. With the dramatic changes that have taken place in the international arena, the status quo has changed. We, therefore, along with the overwhelming majority of the membership of the Conference, supported the O'Sullivan package contained in document CD/1214 and presented in August 1993 which intended to seat 23 new members at the start of the 1994 session. Unfortunately, the package did not see the light of day and two years later, Mr. President, you are making a bold attempt to unwrap the package once again.

My delegation is not confident that the formula presented by you would entirely satisfy those who were waiting in the wings for so many years. In reality, it is a step backward from where we stood in August 1993. The question that comes to my mind is: What would happen if the same force that prevented the O'Sullivan package from being implemented thus far blocks assumption of membership of the Conference by these 23 countries for several more years? Would it not adversely affect the interests of those who are being admitted under the proposed package from effectively functioning as members of the Conference for an undetermined period? Yet, if this is all we can achieve, my delegation is willing to join the consensus on the understanding that they be permitted to assume membership if not immediately, within months, preferably at the beginning of the 1996 session of the Conference. If they are prevented from assuming membership for an indefinite period, the present package will be no more than a red herring.

Finally, I wish to add a few words on another important subject which we have ignored so far wishing that the problem would go away. This year's session saw many delegations taking the floor and urging in the strongest fashion that the CD should treat the subject of "nuclear disarmament" with the high priority that it deserves. There is a school of thinking that "nuclear disarmament" should be on the agenda of the 1996 session of the Conference. Sri Lanka belongs to that group. There is another group which has expressed the view that time is not ripe for taking up that subject in this negotiating forum. With these seemingly intractable points of view, some of us wish to introduce a "linkage" and others vehemently oppose it. If we continue to proceed on these lines, we are bound to face a "gridlock" in 1996 which certainly does not augur well for the work of the CD in a narrow sense, and our efforts in the field of disarmament in a broad sense. Meanwhile, you have urged the members of the Conference in your consultations not to attempt to take too many steps at the same time fearing that such ambitious ventures may not be productive in the end. What we have to do in the coming weeks is to be realistic and respect each other's points of view and be accommodative, to the

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

extent possible. After all, what we "give" or "take" are not losses or gains, but sensible contributions we thoughtfully make with a view to discharging our responsibilities, and thereby make this world a safer place for us and our children. In the circumstances, the request of my delegation is that the President of the Conference should, during the inter-sessional period, make sincere efforts to continue consultations with a view to resolving the issue before the commencement of the 1996 session. If we are able to resolve this matter, it will certainly help the Conference to begin its work in 1996 smoothly.

Finally, Mr. President, please permit me to make two statements, one on the agenda and organization of work for the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament and the other on nuclear-weapon test explosions in my capacity as the Coordinator of the Group of 21. The first statement is on the agenda and organization of work for the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Group of 21 recalls that at the outset of the 1995 session, the Conference on Disarmament had provisionally adopted its 1994 agenda for 1995, pending agreement on the review of the agenda. The Conference had also agreed, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of the other items, to begin its work immediately on a "nuclear test ban".

During 1995, considerable and encouraging progress has been made in the negotiations relating to the CTBT. These negotiations must be concluded as soon as possible in 1996.

Unfortunately, the CD was unable to establish other ad hoc committees, as well as appoint special coordinators on the review of the agenda, expansion of CD's membership and CD's improved and effective functioning, in spite of extensive efforts made by the G-21.

The Group of 21 recalls that in the discussions within the CD it has consistently pressed for the inclusion of an independent item on the CD agenda and commencement of negotiations on the item on nuclear disarmament which has been accorded the highest priority by the international community.

The Group of 21 requests that at the outset of the CD's 1996 session, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban be re-established in order to conclude CTBT negotiations by the middle of the session. The Group also urges the establishment, on a priority basis, of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the beginning of 1996, and a balanced consideration of all other outstanding issues on the CD's agenda.

My final statement is on the nuclear-weapon test explosions again in my capacity as the Coordinator of the Group of 21.

The Group of 21 recalls its previous statement contained in document CD/1329 (CD/NTB/WP.248) of 30 June 1995, wherein the Group had clarified its principled position on nuclear-weapon tests.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

Consistent with its principled position as clearly stated in the aforementioned document, the Group of 21 reiterates its concern on the two nuclear-weapon test explosions recently conducted by two nuclear-weapon States. Such tests could undermine the multilateral negotiations currently in progress at the Conference on Disarmament for the successful conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The States parties to the NPT of the Group of 21 are of the view that such nuclear testing runs counter to the decisions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The Group of 21 reiterates its earlier calls and those of the international community upon the nuclear-weapon States to eschew nuclear testing in the interest of the CD's ongoing multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than the fall of 1996.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of South Africa, Ambassador Selebi.

Mr. SELEBI (South Africa): Mr. President, allow me to commend you on the dedicated way in which you have approached your responsibilities since assuming the office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. Your untiring efforts in achieving a successful conclusion of the 1995 session of the Conference is an example to us all. Please rest assured of the full cooperation and support of my delegation.

I have asked to address the Conference today to inform the participants of South Africa's ratification of the chemical weapons Convention, and of our accession to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its protocols. Both of these instruments were deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 13 September 1995.

South Africa's ratification of the CWC underlines my Government's strong commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation. We believe that disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin and that they should receive equal emphasis and attention. The CWC which was negotiated by this body is an example of such an approach where States have undertaken to ban these weapons, to destroy existing stockpiles and to prevent their continued proliferation. The treaty also provides the basis for the international exchange of technology, equipment and material for peaceful purposes.

Our accession to the inhumane weapons Convention emphasizes my Government's commitment to promote international peace and security, to limit and alleviate the suffering caused by war and armed conflict, and its own responsibility to implement arms control policies to this end.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of South Africa for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Slovakia,

Mrs. KRASNOHORSKA (Slovakia) (translated from French): I have the honour and pleasure of taking the floor today in order to tell you very briefly that on 8 September 1995, the Parliament of the Slovak Republic approved the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. While expressing the hope that the Convention will enter into force as rapidly as possible, I would at the same time like to appeal to all signatories of the Convention to complete their ratification procedure as promptly as possible.

Mrs. BOURGOIS (France) (translated from French): I think it is useful to respond to some of the comments which have been made this morning about the continuation of nuclear testing, one of which felt it necessary to refer to France's resumption of a final series of tests. Last week I had an opportunity to explain the context in which the French decision was taken. Today I would simply like to note and regret the fact that, despite our efforts as regards transparency, certain people are continuing to make certain statements which we are not alone in considering to be contrary to the facts. In the first place I am thinking of the accusations relating to the supposed effects of our testing on the environment. These accusations are not supported by any serious evidence whatsoever. We, for our part, prefer to rely on analyses by scientific experts. These are clear, even though some people choose to ignore them. As you are all aware, we have invited scientists to come and confirm on the spot, on the completion of this final campaign, that our tests inflict no harm on the environment. This clearly shows the confidence we place in the guarantees which have been offered in this regard. How could it be otherwise when these tests are being conducted on our own national territory? We hope at the end of this session, which as several speakers have noted has been a very productive session, that next year the Conference will continue its efforts with renewed energy and will avoid pointless argument, so that, in keeping with our firm resolve, we are in a position to conclude the nuclear-test-ban treaty in good time to enable us to sign it in the autumn of 1996.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We have come to the end of the list of speakers. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor at this moment? None do.

As I announced at the start of this plenary meeting, I would now like to submit to you for approval the Presidential draft decision on the expansion of the membership of the Conference, as contained in document CD/WP.467/Rev.1. I do not think it is necessary to linger over introducing this draft decision which is before you. The draft I am submitting to you is the result of the intense efforts I have made since taking up the Chair. It is a compromise text that takes due account of the recommendations made to the Conference by the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 49/77 B adopted by consensus. This text is a first step towards solving this issue, whose important and urgent nature is acknowledged by everyone. I hope therefore that it will meet with the assent of all delegations. May I take it that the Presidential draft decision on the expansion of the membership of the Conference is acceptable?

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The secretariat has drawn my attention to an error in the Spanish version of the document we have just adopted. It goes without saying that this error will be corrected in the final version that will be included in the Conference's annual report to the United Nations General Assembly.

Before giving the floor to those who have asked to speak, I would like to make a statement myself, if you will permit me.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to all delegations for the flexibility and spirit of compromise they have displayed, which have enabled us to take a decisive step in solving this important question. The decision we have just taken is to the credit of all the members of the Conference, who have been able to rise to the expectations of the international community. As I said during my bilateral and informal consultations, I will not fail to continue to address this issue during the inter-sessional period, taking due account of paragraph 1 of the operative part of resolution 49/77 B of the United Nations General Assembly, which "recognizes the legitimate aspirations of the candidate countries to participate fully in the work of the Conference on Disarmament", as well as the need to safeguard the character of the Conference as a negotiating body. Of course, there is no reason for this first decision on the membership of the CD to prevent our Conference from considering other proposals which have been formally introduced or which may be submitted to the Conference in the future, concerning the subsequent stages outlined in this decision that we have just taken.

A number of delegations have asked to take the floor concerning the decision we have just adopted. I give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, I am taking the floor for a variety of purposes. First, to congratulate you on the draft decision on which you have worked so hard to bring to consensus a task that you began even before your presidency started. I also fully acknowledge the special responsibility of my country in delaying the first small step that we achieved a few minutes ago. I think the CD also deserves credit for showing the wisdom of finally stripping the membership expansion question away from other problems that have plagued us during 1995. I know that the 23 countries that we have just referred to in your working paper 467 are, of course, anxious to expedite the second phase, or decision, that is being called for in this document. The United States believes that this second decision could be taken today, right now before lunch. I would like to recall that the United States has been saying since 1993 that all 23 countries on the O'Sullivan list could assume their seats in this body with but one qualification, and that would be that no member State, either a new member or an existing member, should have the right to deny consensus on any decision that would be adopted by the Conference on Disarmament if it should happen that such a member State is, at the time of the decision, the subject of comprehensive enforcement measures imposed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. We believe that this is a logical connection since all members of this Conference, as well as all Members of the United Nations,

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

should respect the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council. I have, therefore, taken the liberty of circulating a proposal this morning to members and observers, which I hope is now before you, that would enable us to take immediately the second decision called for in this morning's first decision. You will see that it is a two-part decision and is quite straightforward. I can understand that if you are inclined, Mr. President, to give this the consideration I think it deserves and which I think the 23 members of the Conference on Disarmament would like to have it given, you may wish to pause this plenary for a few minutes so that delegates can read, digest and consult upon this initiative.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement and for his proposal, to which I am not going to respond now. We have spoken at length on this issue both bilaterally and informally. I will revert to this when those who have asked to speak have made their statements. I give the floor to the representative of South Africa, Ambassador Selebi.

Mr. SELEBI (South Africa): Mr. President, thank you for giving me the floor once again. At the outset, I would like to share the appreciation of my delegation for the work that you personally have put in in attempting to resolve the issue of expansion of the CD. We take much pleasure and want to pay our respects to your efforts for what you have done. Briefly, we would certainly like to thank the members of the Conference on Disarmament for the decision that they have just taken; it is a decision, although not really satisfactory for those of us who have been outside, but it is a giant step towards finding a solution to the problem. Added to that decision, we think that the proposal that has been made by the representative of the United States, in effect attempts to put into effect the decision that has been taken. We, as South Africans, strongly believe we have a role to play, we think it is important for us to become part and parcel of the CD and we support the American proposal because it seeks to put into effect all that we have been talking about on the expansion of the CD. With these few comments, I would like to urge the members of the CD to give careful consideration to the proposal that has been made by the United States.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, first of all, let me also express the gratitude of my delegation for all the efforts you are putting into making our work float, and this is one part of it. My delegation, of course, accepts the draft decision as it stands, but I would like to make two short comments.

One is that we really regret that it was not possible to give Slovakia the seat in the CD that is due to Slovakia; this is a point where my delegation is really disappointed that we were not able to solve this problem and now it is part of this package.

The second remark I want to make is that, of course, Germany is, with all the other members of the European Union, of the opinion that all members of the European Union who wish to participate in the work of the CD as full members (and this, in fact, is all of them), should be admitted to the CD. We have said so on many occasions and I repeat it here. I accept that not all of them can enter the CD at the same time, but it will be our endeavour to have

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(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

every one of them come into this important work and in this context I can only repeat what I have already said many times before, that it is nice to have regional distribution but this is not a regional conference or a conference on regional subjects - it is a conference on global disarmament and everyone who has the interest, whatever corner of the world he comes from, should be admitted here to take part in our deliberations.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, I would like to begin by joining others in congratulating you on the decision which the Conference has just taken. That we have been able to take it is a real tribute to your determination, your patience and your diplomatic skill. That said, I must confess that my delegation went along with the decision to adopt Ambassador O'Sullivan's report with considerable reluctance, not because we do not wish to see the CD expanded - on the contrary, we continue to believe that all those who have applied to date should be admitted immediately and unconditionally. If you were to put this proposal to the Conference now, my delegation would certainly support it. Our reluctance is due to the fact that, quite frankly, we believe that the proposal which was before us and which we have adopted was not really a good one. It represented, at most, half a step forward for the 23 countries on Ambassador O'Sullivan's list. Our concern, and the reason why we suggested amendments to the draft text, was that it should not at the same time represent a step backwards for the other 12 candidate countries, including 4 of our European Union partners. With some difficulty, we were able to convince ourselves that the amended draft satisfied this requirement.

As I have just said, the United Kingdom's position is clear. We would like all 35 candidate countries admitted as soon as possible as full members with full rights. We do not believe that this would in any way alter the nature of the Conference or harm the Conference as a negotiating body. We certainly do not accept that the admission of 35 countries would affect the organization and efficiency of the Conference any more than the admission of 23. Clearly, both would require us to make some changes in our working methods, but after our experiences this year I am not sure that we feel that we necessarily have the most perfect working methods, so that might not be a bad thing. The main objection which has been raised to such a solution is balance, or rather, imbalance, but as Ambassador Berdennikov rightly pointed out in his plenary statement of 24 August, in a body where every member has the right of veto, the balance argument simply does not hold water. But if, despite that, people really want a truly balanced membership, I would still suggest that we have a simple solution before us. We could admit all 35 applicants and, if necessary, 3 or 4 other non-aligned countries to restore the existing balance, provided, of course, that volunteers among the non-aligned could be found. I hope that despite my pessimism today's decision will prove to be the key which unlocks the door to full membership, not only for the 23 but also for the other 12 candidate countries whose legitimate aspirations to join the CD I hope we all share. I am glad to hear you say, Mr. President, that you are continuing your efforts. I hope that at the end of the year you will at least be able to secure agreement on the appointment of a Special Coordinator to continue your work and to pursue a solution which will really be in the interests of the Conference and the international community as a whole.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement. I would simply venture to say that I am maybe a little more optimistic than he is. I am hoping that by the end of December I can have a positive report that there is consensus of some kind on this situation. But in any case, as I said before, I will do my best. This is the only thing we can pledge. I give the floor to the represent of China, Ambassador Sha.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, the Chinese delegation would like to express its support for your decision on the expansion of the membership of the CD. However, at the same time, I would like in the name of an independent group of countries to make the following points on the expansion of the membership of the CD. It is the view of my delegation that the O'Sullivan list is the result of consultations over a long period of time among the CD members, and it had obtained almost universal support from the membership of the Conference.

It is the view of my delegation that the 23 countries on the O'Sullivan list should participate in the CD at the same time and with the same rights. We are of the view that they should have been admitted as full members of the CD long ago, but up to now they have only been able to wait in the wings. For that we express our regret. We hope that this issue can be settled at an early date as called for in the decision.

Secondly, it is the view of my delegation that the proper expansion of the membership of the CD is required by the situation and will contribute to the better representation and the effectiveness of the CD. The O'Sullivan list embodies the important principle of geographical and political balance. Certainly it is necessary to admit these countries as early as possible.

Thirdly, the reason for the delay in the admission of the 23 countries into the CD is known to all. We would like to express our appreciation to the President for his efforts in trying to settle the issue. The decision that has been adopted today is the result of tenacious efforts and serious and patient consultations. Although the result is disappointing, it reflects a positive step in the right direction. It is the hope of my delegation that such a step will not be used as a pretext for further delaying the settlement of the issue.

Fourthly, my delegation has also taken note that there are other countries which have applied for membership of the CD. And proceeding from the principle of political and geographical balance and in the interest of effective functioning of the CD, we should give positive and serious consideration to these applications.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, since this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor under your presidency, allow me to say how much I have appreciated your diplomatic skills in the difficult post that you are now occupying. Not contenting yourself with chairing this assembly, you have made considerable efforts to preside over its destiny and to endeavour to make progress on matters which were

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

sometimes seriously deadlocked. The expansion of the very membership of this assembly is one of these issues which has been at a standstill for many years, and you made it a point of honour to try at least to make things move. I pay tribute to your courage and your resolve.

My delegation did not wish to hinder your efforts, and that is why I told you from the outset that should you arrive at a formula which secured consensus in this assembly, my country would not oppose it, and this is what has happened. However, I must say that I do not find this solution satisfactory, far from it, either for those who have been selected or for those left out in the cold, and that is something we regret very much. For those selected, the decision is purely symbolic, because it will have to be followed by a second decision before it has any effect whatsoever, and since any flexibility has already been ruled out regarding the choice of countries affected by this second decision, you have made the task all the more difficult for your successors. As for the countries whose names have not been put on the list today, it is wrong to say that their situation has not changed. You know that Belgium has always supported the idea of accepting all the countries that had submitted requests for membership to date, and we reject the arbitrary nature of the "O'Sullivan list". I understand the disappointment of those who today rightly consider that they have been excluded, without any guarantees for the future. For them I have a proposal to make to you, Sir, to ensure that arbitrary decisions are not worsened by injustice. In adopting this measure today, we have not only made a selection among a number of countries, but we have also adopted a procedure, whereby we will henceforth consider this list of countries as an indissociable group. In order that the CD should not be accused of applying double standards, depending on affinities or periods of time, just as we consider the 23 to be an indissociable group, we suggest that we should henceforth also consider the remaining 12 as an indissociable group, and, when the time comes, identical treatment should be applied to each of them, just as we have decided for each of the 23 selected today. I think that is the very least we can do for them, giving them an assurance that the procedure will not be changed when their turn comes.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and his suggestions. Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I would merely like to say that all these arguments that have been put forward to date by all delegations to explain their positions have been conveyed to me by all of you during the many bilateral and informal consultations, and that naturally, up to the present, if there had been consensus on any of these ideas, it would feature in the decision. I would just like to point out that all the proposals which have been made, from the first until now, are proposals which were not accepted by the members of the Conference, and that is why in fact the decision which we have adopted today is a first step, a modest step maybe, perhaps not satisfactory to any of us, but that is the very nature of a compromise, and fortunately or unfortunately this is perhaps the lowest common denominator, but it is the only common denominator. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile.

Mr. BERGUÑO (Chile): I would like to state the following on behalf of Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

The urgent need to expand the membership of the Conference on Disarmament has been recognized by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 49/77 B. We therefore welcome the Conference's decision today to adopt the report of Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, Special Coordinator for expansion during the Conference's 1993 session, in which he recommended an expansion of the Conference's membership to include our countries. In doing so we wish to pay special tribute to you, Mr. President. Your skill and determination have brought about this result, and we are grateful to you for your efforts on our behalf.

We regret, nevertheless, that the Conference has been unable to reach a consensus which would result in the immediate acceptance of all our countries as full members, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 49/77 B. This must continue to be the Conference's urgent goal. We therefore call on the Conference to make every effort to ensure that our countries gain full membership at the earliest possible date, and in any case no later than 1996. Until that time, we look forward to the fullest possible cooperation with members on all questions with which the Conference is tasked.

We request that this statement be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and we reserve our right to address again the consequences of the decision adopted today in a more comprehensive manner, as well as the various remarks made by CD members on this occasion.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, first of all, let me join others in the congratulations which have been extended to you so profusely from all quarters regarding the persistent efforts which you made and the diplomatic skills which you employed in order to secure consensus on the issue of expansion of the Conference. The need for expansion in the membership of the CD has been indisputable in the face of a rapidly changing world. The membership of this Conference must reflect the new realities of the world. It must be made more representative so that there is wider participation in the important work of this Conference and greater persuasiveness in the decisions which we reach with regard to disarmament. The painstaking effort which was made by Ambassador O'Sullivan and which led to the formulation of the list of 23 countries left no doubt in anyone's mind that this represented the best chance for the first stage of the CD's expansion. Pakistan therefore supported that proposal. The unfortunate result of the 664th plenary meeting of the Conference, however, frustrated the legitimate aspirations of the 23 countries, most of which are friendly and even fraternal States. My delegation would like to extend our felicitations to these countries which have now been formally designated to become members of the Conference on Disarmament. The Pakistan delegation would have wished that the date for their admission would have been at the 664th meeting, or at least today, and not "at the earliest possible date to be decided by the Conference". This phrase in the decision needs to be clarified and it must be stated

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

emphatically to the world community that the membership of this Conference as a whole is in no way responsible for the further delay in accepting the 23 countries as full members of the CD.

The Conference on Disarmament will also have to give consideration to further expansion in the near future. We have 12 additional indications of interest in membership. My delegation is positively inclined towards this interest. Further expansion would, however, need to be carefully devised to take into account considerations such as the balance in the representation of regions and of strategic interests. Most of all, further expansion will need to be addressed in a manner which enhances the CD's role and effectiveness as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

Ms. ANDERSON (Ireland): Mr. President, I would like to join with other delegations in paying warm tribute to the commitment and dynamism you have brought to your presidency role.

In keeping with your own approach of tackling issues with honesty and transparency, I would propose to speak frankly and directly about the decision on expansion which has just now been adopted by the Conference.

Like a number of other delegations, we found ourselves in a dilemma in considering this draft. For many years we have wished to see an enlarged and more representative CD. We believe that, as long as it remains confined to its present limited membership, the Conference will not achieve its full potential. We are conscious of the serious dissatisfaction among the members themselves at the manner in which the CD functions at present. Few would feel that the Conference is adequately discharging the responsibilities entrusted to it by the international community. Of course enlargement of itself will not resolve all the problems which are paralysing important areas of the Conference's work. But an overhaul of the membership is an urgent and necessary part of a wider effort to give new impetus and direction to the work of the Conference.

We have listened to and sought to understand the concerns of those delegations who fear that enlargement might erode the character of the CD as a negotiating body. We remain convinced however that the enlargement will strengthen, not weaken, this body. It is the will of delegations which will determine the outcome of negotiations; their success will not be put at risk by the creation of a more broadly based Conference. Our position of principle therefore remains as it has always been - that membership of this Conference should be open to all United Nations Member States who wish to join.

We recognize, Mr. President, that the draft you presented today is a brave attempt to move matters forward. As regards the list of 23 countries, we know that many of them will make an extremely valuable contribution as full members of the Conference. We would not wish their prospects of assuming full membership of the Conference at the earliest possible date to be prejudiced in any way. However, I must clearly and unequivocally state our view that this text does not go far enough. What we have here is a palliative rather than

(Ms. Anderson, Ireland)

a cure: the underlying problem has not been satisfactorily addressed. Twenty-three applicants are to be admitted at an uncertain future date and the other 12 applicant countries are left without any clear sense of their situation.

Permit me to dwell for a moment on our national situation. I would remind delegates that Ireland submitted its application for membership of this Conference on 6 July 1982, 13 years ago. Our application was based on our long involvement in multilateral disarmament negotiations and a strong belief that our record provided a solid foundation for admission to the Conference. The lack of a concrete response to our application throughout the 1980s was perhaps understandable given the international political climate of those times. In common with many other countries we refrained from actively pressing our application in recognition of the delicate political situation in which the Conference found itself. Following the end of the cold war and the submission of further applications for membership, we judged it appropriate once again to press our case. We strongly believe that the changed political landscape should be reflected in an expansion of the Conference to enable it to deal effectively with its complex agenda.

Frankly, we found it incomprehensible that Ireland should have been omitted from the list appended to the report of the then Special Coordinator in August 1993. Because no criteria were presented, the basis on which the list was compiled remained - and remains - opaque. If weight was to be given to the chronology of applications or to the record of the applicant countries in the disarmament area, Ireland had every right to expect to be included in any such list. If the concern was for a proportionate strengthening of groups within the CD, a different selection would still have been possible. In short, we could find no basis in equity or logic for our omission from the list.

We are deeply disappointed that the decision now adopted - the first decision on CD expansion since 1978, the first since Ireland's application for membership, the first since the end of the cold war - does not deal in a clear and comprehensive way with all the applications for membership. Thirteen years after submitting our application, we believe ourselves entitled to a great deal more than this text offers.

Ireland will continue to press its membership application. We look forward to cooperating with the President of the Conference in the establishment of the progress reports which will be presented at the end of each session. We wish to state for the record that we interpret today's decision to mean that such reports will refer to all of the applications for membership and not only to the list of 23 countries mentioned in today's decision. And let me say, Mr. President, that I am particularly encouraged by the optimism you have expressed a few moments ago in response to the intervention made by Ambassador Weston of the United Kingdom.

In conclusion, I refer again to the dilemma I outlined at the outset. We strongly support the expansion of the Conference; we deeply appreciate your energy and integrity in seeking to achieve progress; we know that the Conference will be enriched by the membership of the 23 countries mentioned in

(Ms. Anderson, Ireland)

today's decision. But we do not conceal our strong sense of disappointment at the inadequacy of the present text. We profoundly hope that the Conference will return to this unfinished business in a more complete and more courageous way at the earliest possible time.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ireland for her statement and the kind words addressed to me. I would like to tell Ambassador Anderson that, in conformity with my desire for transparency, and as I said privately and to all of you bilaterally and particularly when addressing the 12 candidates, I am committed to work during the inter-sessional period to ask the right questions and try to get responses that would allow me to come up with a good result that would command consensus. I shall present a report by next January so that the next President can work on it. But of course, as I said, the only thing that I am required to do is to do my best, and I will definitely do that.

I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Bourgois.

Mrs. BOURGOIS (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, my delegation in turn wishes to thank you for the great energy and ceaseless efforts you have committed since taking up the Chair. You have just removed the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference from the deadlock in which it had been bogged down for the past two years. This in our view was an urgent and important matter. Therefore we are happy that thanks to your inventive diplomacy and your skill as a negotiator we have arrived at an initial result today. So we welcome the new members and hope that they will rapidly take their place in our work.

France considers this expansion of the membership of the Conference as a first phase. We have never concealed the fact that we would have preferred all 35 of the candidate countries to become members of the Conference; my colleague from India emphasized their legitimate aspirations at the beginning of this meeting. Therefore we think it important that the Conference should endeavour as a matter of priority to resolve the case of the 12 candidates that have not been included in today's list. Some of them, as you know, are our partners in the European Union, and we would like to see their contributions in the field of disarmament fully recognized and put to good use.

I would like to reiterate my gratitude to you and express the hope that the successful outcome of your initiative will be rapidly followed by a second phase that we so ardently desire.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would like to thank the representative of France for her statement and to say that I was extremely touched by the words she addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Portugal, Ambassador Santa Clara.

Mr. SANTA CLARA (Portugal) (translated from French): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, allow me to express our satisfaction at seeing you at the head of this Conference. Knowing your determination and your patience, I am sure that you will be successful in this task. Portugal recognizes your efforts to bring about a solution to the problem of the expansion of the Conference that will respond to the concerns of the different countries in this field. The possible consensus was difficult to achieve. Therefore you will not be surprised to hear that some of us are not satisfied.

Portugal believes it was possible to envisage a formula that would welcome more broadly, as full-fledged members of this Conference, all the States which have applied to join. It seems clear to us that their participation as full members could not but contribute to enriching the work of this forum. We regret that the decision which has been approved today does not go far enough. We would like the door to remain wide open, so that the candidate States not mentioned in the decision can become members of the Conference in the near future. This matter cannot remain closed, and that is why I encourage you, Sir, as well as the entire Conference, to begin work immediately in order to prepare the ground for the admission of the other candidate countries as soon as possible. But I must confess that as of now I am encouraged by your determination and by what you have said to us today on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Portugal for his statement and for his words of encouragement. I now call on the representative of Greece, Mr. Theodorou.

Mr. THEODOROU (Greece) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all many thanks for sparing no effort to try finally to devise a solution on a subject which has been dragging on for so long. Next, my sincere congratulations for the tenacity and perseverance which you have shown. Unfortunately, that was not enough for this Conference, which persists in a disquieting resistance to change.

The solution put before us was presented to us, more or less in the same words, two years ago. In the meantime the General Assembly has looked at it and adopted a resolution, the spirit of which does not seem to be shared by certain members of the Conference, even though they helped to have the resolution adopted. Worse still, some within the Conference even opposed any reference to the fact that the candidates have legitimate aspirations to membership.

When the proposed solution was first introduced, my delegation made a few comments. They were valid then, and they are just as valid today. I will mention just one: the way in which the Conference, with its present membership, works, produces the results which we are all witnesses to: all the items on the agenda are deadlocked, except - fortunately! - for one. Now if that is the effectiveness of the Conference, how would it be hindered by expansion, however extensive? The fact is that the Conference operates on the basis of consensus, and, whether we like it or not, consensus is in this particular case lacking. An expansion would not change very much.

(Mr. Theodorou, Greece)

As for the choice of numbers, they seem to be symbolic. Twenty-three in particular, the meaning escapes me, but not others, who are so keen on the figure that they refuse to depart from it. And yet, I would like to express my delegation's profound satisfaction and gratitude to the "Group of 23" and very specially to the Ambassador of Chile, Mr. Berguño, who last week took the various factors into consideration so well in his most eloquent statement.

I would have hoped that the Conference would draw to a greater extent on the principles of the United Nations, in particular that of the universal vocation which is its pivot. We have not yet reached that point in the Conference, which seems to be looking back towards a distant past which will never return.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Greece for his statement. I would quite simply like to tell him that in my view, having thoroughly considered the subject several times, things are a little more complicated than he suggested, and I would invite him to come to see the President to explain to him the problems as they stand in the Conference.

I now call upon the representative of Colombia, Mrs. Arias.

Mrs. ARIAS (Colombia) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, as we are participating in the deliberations of the Conference for the first time, I first of all wish to congratulate you on the outstanding work you have accomplished as President. Without any doubt you have made a major effort to achieve progress on matters of great significance to my delegation, such as the expansion of the membership of the Conference. I would also like to join those who have extended a welcome to the new members of the Conference.

As a member of the "Group of 23", my delegation fully supports the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Chile on this subject. Colombia regrets that a year after the adoption of resolution 49/77 B in the General Assembly, the Conference has made so little progress as regards the expansion of its membership, and that the outcome of the effort you have made over the last month does not fully satisfy the legitimate aspirations of our delegations. My delegation is surprised at the contrast between the many statements we have heard from members of the CD in recent meetings of the Plenary in favour of the expansion of the Conference and the result contained in the decision being adopted today, which does not fulfil the mandate of the Assembly, clearly inviting the CD to increase its membership to at least 60 countries.

We recognize the effort you made to harmonize views, and we thank you. We also urge all the members of the Conference to take a decision as soon as possible concerning the realization of full membership for all the countries mentioned in the decision, without prejudice to efforts to continue reviewing periodically the admission of the other countries that have expressed an interest in joining. The membership of the Conference and its pace of work should reflect the new international realities. It must be open and transparent, like most United Nations bodies, and all its members must have the same rights and obligations.

Mr. VATTANI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I would like to add my voice to those of all my colleagues who have expressed their feelings of admiration for the action you have taken, the mastery you have shown in your negotiations, the inventive nature of the method you adopted in trying to find a solution to this fundamental issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. We are most grateful to you. This is perhaps one of the major successes of this 1995 session, and you succeeded in achieving it.

I also think that we should all thank you for enabling us to have an in-depth discussion of this subject today. Each delegation of the member countries of the Conference, the countries that have become members of the Conference today, to whom I extend a welcome, but also the others, the representatives of the 12 which are still outside our Conference, have had an opportunity to express their views in a very frank way, and that is a very important result. Of course, I agree with what has been said by my partners in the European Union. I think that the ideas put forward by Ambassadors Weston, Guillaume and Hoffmann are important. It is very important to consider that, in the context of a forum such as ours, the veto allows everybody to feel reassured as regards the criterion of geographical representation, balance among the countries which are members of our club, and I think the idea put forward to take into account the candidatures which have been submitted to date could usefully be borne in mind in trying to bring about a final solution to the remaining problems concerning the 12 countries whose requests for participation in our forum have not yet been settled. I think that the Ambassador of Ireland employed very convincing reasoning. The particular case of a country which submitted its candidature back in 1982 is extremely convincing. The role played by Ireland in all disarmament issues is a fundamental one, and that can also be said for the 12 countries which have been left in limbo and for which we will have to find a solution. But of course, Mr President, you had to be practical, to find a common denominator, and you found it, and we are pleased that you did. You have assured us that you were going to continue - and you still have a few weeks - consideration of all the issues in the light of today's discussion, and we will be pleased if, before the end of your tenure at the head of the Conference, you can produce proposals that can give satisfaction to the countries which do not feel reassured today. We convey to you our wish that this will be possible and we hope that we will have some final indications before the beginning of the next session.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the encouraging and kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): First of all, I would like to welcome Ambassador Náray of Hungary and assured him of the Algerian delegation's full cooperation.

The CD has just adopted the decision contained in document CD/WP.467/Rev.1, concerning its expansion. My delegation fully subscribes to this decision and sincerely congratulates you, Sir, on the efforts you have

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

devoted to making this possible. This decision constitutes a step forward, a major step towards solving a problem which has been before this Conference for some time now. Since the O'Sullivan report was published my country has lent full support to the entry into the CD of the 23 countries concerned. We did so because we think this Conference must be enlarged - it has become a necessity. This Conference negotiates international legal instruments of universal scope and we believe that the more countries are involved in the negotiations, the better the chances of making the agreements concluded universal. It is true that consensus will be harder to achieve, but once attained it will be all the more solid - I would venture to say all the more legitimate. Also underlying our position are the changes which have occurred in the international situation. They have often been referred to in this forum - we will not bring them up again. We believe that the desire of each member State of the international community to become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament is legitimate. Therefore I reiterate my delegation's support for the 23 countries on the O'Sullivan list and my delegation very much hopes that they will be able to sit in this forum as soon as the next session opens, as full members. So I repeat my congratulations to you and encourage you to continue your efforts, hoping that they will not be in vain.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and his very kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): I have listened with care and respect to the serious and important views that delegations have expressed. It is not, however, my purpose to contribute in this intervention to this debate. Rather, I asked for the floor for two purposes. The first was to join with other delegations in commending your ingenuity and your tenacity, Mr. President, and congratulating you on your achievement in this matter. Achievement, as we all know, is difficult and all too rare, and I encourage you to continue your efforts. My second purpose in asking for the floor was, if I may, to express appreciation on behalf of my predecessor, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, for this Conference's adoption of his report. I know he approached his task with a grave sense of responsibility. Like you, Mr. President, he achieved what he could - what progress he could - in this multilateral environment. I will be taking great pleasure in phoning him and telling him that his report of August 1993 has been accepted. Better late than never, I suppose.

While I have the floor I would like to say that my delegation recognizes the limited nature of what we have achieved, but welcomes this as at least a modest step towards ensuring the increasing relevance of the CD and its work. My delegation hopes that, as a Conference, we are able to move promptly to make fully effective the membership agreed today of those countries named in the decision. We need also to focus on the implications of implementing a dynamic process of CD expansion, both with regard to the real claims of other applicants and with regard to the need for this Conference to address effectively its negotiating mandate in a dynamic and changing world.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Starr, for your statement and for your kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico.

Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): First of all, my delegation's welcome to Ambassador Péter Náray, Permanent Representative of Hungary. The delegation of Mexico congratulates you, Mr. President, for your praiseworthy efforts and your proven skill that have enabled us to reach a consensus on the expansion of the Conference. My delegation is also gratified at this partial solution, in two phases, the first outline of which was proposed by my predecessor on 25 January 1994, as the record shows, with the purpose, like that of the consensus achieved today, of breaking the deadlock which we had reached in 1993 and which had continued until now. Of course, my delegation is prepared to approve the immediate application of the decision to expand the membership of the Conference, so that the admitted States can assume on this date, all together and in full, their responsibilities as fully fledged members of the Conference on Disarmament, in keeping with the principle of the juridical equality of States.

It is true that, as has been said, the list of countries to be admitted was drawn up in accordance with criteria of which we are not aware, and we regret the absence of some countries which have applied to join the Conference, with which my country has cooperated closely on disarmament matters in other forums, and countries with which Mexico maintains fraternal and friendly relations. We note that this decision provides for the review of candidatures at regular intervals, and my delegation will continue to fight for a balanced and expanded membership that will enhance both the representativeness and the effectiveness of the Conference. Today's decision is certainly not perfect, but it was the only one capable of securing consensus, as is shown by the fact that we took two years of meetings to achieve it and we did so only thanks to your admirable tenacity. My delegation thanks you, Sir.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and his kind words, which I particularly appreciated. I now call on the representative of Cuba, Mrs. Fiffe Cabreja.

Mrs. FIFFE CABREJA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we are encouraged by the efforts that you have been making since the very start of your term in the search for appropriate solutions to the stumbling-blocks that have arisen as the work of the CD has unfolded. This calls for recognition of your tenacity and perseverance. Today we welcome the finding of a solution to the important and urgent aspect of the expansion of membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, today's satisfaction cannot make us forget the frustrations of the past two years, when the possibility of expanding this forum seemed to become more and more remote. There was and is, as we all know, the O'Sullivan proposal, which enjoys almost universal acceptance and could have been accepted had it not been for conditions that were improper, unacceptable and non-negotiable for my delegation, that were to be met before a certain country could participate fully in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mrs. Fiffe Cabreja, Cuba)

The outcome that has been achieved today thanks to your laudable efforts does not fully correspond to the interests of all delegations. However, it has been adopted and my delegation has gone along with that consensus. So, after a long struggle, we have found a regular solution that could have been and could be better if today, right now, we accept the O'Sullivan list. The CD can and must be expanded. States have the right to submit their candidatures and to be considered. We all have agreed on this. Yet we believe that the number of countries to be admitted to this forum should be given careful consideration in any negotiations which we may carry out, so that account is taken of geographical balance and interests, and which may enable this Conference to continue to retain its character as the sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement and her kind words. I now call on the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me first of all to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Péter Náray, the Permanent Representative of Hungary. I would also like to extend to you my most sincere congratulations for the commendable efforts you have made and for your persevering diplomatic endeavours in the negotiations with the various groups and with the delegations concerned, which has enabled us today to adopt in the Conference on Disarmament the decision contained in document CD/WP.467/Rev.1. Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan submitted his report on the expansion of the membership of the Conference when he was President of the Conference on Disarmament in August 1993. Unfortunately, due to circumstances of which we are all aware we were not able in August 1993 to take any decision on the expansion of the membership of the Conference and, at that time, the Conference requested me to continue the endeavours so that a consensus on the subject could be reached.

The Egyptian delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the ongoing endeavours in which many Presidents of the Conference have participated, including your predecessor, the Ambassador of Brazil, Ambassador Lampreia, who is currently the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil. We are gratified that, under your presidency, those endeavours finally bore fruit and enabled us to adopt that decision. In our view, however, that decision is deficient in so far as the delegation of Egypt had hoped that the 23 new members would be able to exercise their full membership rights with effect from the day on which we adopted that decision. Unfortunately, we were unable to adopt a full and integrated decision. Circumstances are not always conducive to the fulfilment of our aspirations. The decision states that a decision concerning the new members will be taken as soon as possible. We urge you to continue these endeavours so that we can take that decision as soon as possible.

With regard to the other countries which have applied for membership of the Conference, we would like to welcome them here and we hope that your endeavours will enable us to meet their legitimate aspiration to become members of the Conference on Disarmament and, consequently, to participate in the negotiations on various issues, particularly the comprehensive test ban and the question of nuclear disarmament, which has top priority. Before

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

re-examining the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, we should reach agreement, as we did in the Group of 21, on the optimum number for membership of the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard the delegation of Egypt shares the view expressed today by Ambassador Ghose of India.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I wish to thank Ambassador Zahran of the Arab Republic of Egypt for his valuable statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Fasehun.

Mr. FASEHUN (Nigeria): Mr. President, we have been on this important issue for quite a while. The CD does have its own tradition, but sometimes tradition can be constraining and we wish to congratulate you for overcoming this constraining tradition. In another sense, we have to congratulate ourselves for overcoming the almost seemingly impossible gridlock. For close to two years - and indeed over two years - this body was not able to decide to expand its membership despite the fact that the United Nations did increase in members and despite the urgings of many Member States who wished to gain admission into what is now a no longer exclusive club of 37 countries. Those countries which have been admitted are congratulated for their patience, for their understanding and for going along with what was an unnecessary gridlock. Whilst we congratulate ourselves and those who are coming to join us, we wish to also urge that these new member States be allowed to take their seats as early and as soon as possible so that there will not be another gridlock. Once again, Mr. President, I want to congratulate you. You have done a very good job, and I want to congratulate all of us around this table, and we do hope that by this time next year we will be moving to another room to accommodate the new members.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Ghose.

Ms. GHOSE (India): I will be very brief, since I have already spoken on the subject before, to address myself to the draft decision which is before us. I just wanted to make three short comments. We have already said that we are in favour of the 23, on whom we have already agreed, to join immediately. We would be very happy to see them as members of the CD as soon as possible. We also are aware of the very careful wording that has gone into this, and I would like, at this point, to express my delegation's appreciation, Mr. President, to your considerable efforts as negotiator and personal determination to try to move forward on a subject which has bedevilled us for so long. In this, we do have the understanding that all the 23 could perhaps join us now. If it were possible, we would be very happy to support them immediately (provided the secretariat can provide the chairs), but in principle we would be happy to have them immediately. As far as the remaining candidates are concerned, my country has extremely good relations with all of them. We would be happy to see them and we believe that countries which wish to join and participate in the deliberations and the negotiations in the CD should be facilitated. However, having said this, when at the review session which has been promised in the last paragraph we look at this overall issue -

(Ms. Ghose, India)

and I would like to reiterate this once again - on the issue of the optimum number of members that would enable the CD on the one hand to meet the aspirations of the candidate countries as well as maintain not a balance but the efficiency of this body as a negotiating forum, we have no fixed ideas on a number; we are quite happy to look at this, but I think, in all seriousness, we need to discuss this and we can do this simultaneously when we get your report at the time of the review. These were the points. I do feel that we would not want any country which wishes to be a member of the CD to feel that there are some of us who do not wish them to be members of the CD. We do wish them to join us in what we are trying to do together. As the Ambassador of Germany said, these are global issues we are discussing; this is the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament and we do want as many people as are interested to get onto this forum.

The PRESIDENT: I thank you, Ambassador Ghose, for your statement and clarifications. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Indonesia.

Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia): Mr. President, first of all, allow me at the outset to congratulate you for your tireless efforts, perseverance and for all the work you have carried out in order to achieve what we have now on the expansion issue. My delegation also believes that the decision we have taken now is really very significant and very important indeed. I would certainly like to congratulate those 23 States which have been agreed upon by the plenary today and trust they will assume their membership as soon as possible. I would also like to support the proposal that has been made by my distinguished colleague from India: if feasible, we agree as soon as possible, even today, on the adoption of membership based on Ambassador O'Sullivan's list and then my delegation would also like to look favourably into the additional list of 12 which has already been put in front of us as well. Every country which is interested and would really like to contribute to the work of our common cause in the CD certainly deserves our support. For that reason, my delegation once again would like to congratulate you on your tremendous efforts, on your work and would also like to congratulate the 23 additional members that we will be having very soon.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Tarmidzi, for your statement and for your kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil.

Mr. LAMAZIERE (Brazil): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor first of all to congratulate you on the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of the decision on expansion of its membership and to welcome the members of the so-called Group of 23 in our midst. As stated by the Ambassador of Brazil at the last plenary meeting, Brazil has always been in favour of the adoption of the so-called O'Sullivan proposal, without prejudice to the consideration of other candidatures in the future. In the past, Ambassador Lampreia, now presently our Foreign Minister as was mentioned by Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, tried to put into effect the O'Sullivan list trying to bridge the positions of some members of the CD. Unhappily his efforts were not successful. My delegation thanks you for the tremendous efforts you have put into this achievement and expresses the wish to see the 23 countries included in that list as full members of the CD as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank you for your statement and for your kind words. I do not see any other delegation who wishes to take the floor, so let me just go back to what I said when I started this discussion. For reasons of transparency, let me make two points.

The first is a procedural one: usually when a proposal is made from the floor we have to give a chance to each delegation to look at it and to consult their capitals, so it would not have been possible for me, in the manner that I was conducting this Conference from the time I took over, to be able to present it for consideration today. Happily, we have another meeting tomorrow and of course we could in any case take up tomorrow the proposal made by the United States. But, having said that, there is another point of substance I must mention. My job is easy because since almost everybody has taken the floor on this issue you can see that there is no consensus on the proposal made by the United States delegation. I have heard many delegations say that they would be happy if we could admit the 23 as such today. I think this is the very reason why we had this long delay for two weeks about the word "together" in the text when we say "Accordingly ... will all assume together membership ...". I think this is something that I have to negotiate for quite a long time. Of course the Chair is neutral and reflects only whatever the Conference wants to do, and therefore I will simply say that if the members want to consult among themselves, then the Chair is open to any proposal that was made today - and many were made. If we can find consensus on that, I will definitely bring it to the floor tomorrow. But if there is no consensus, I will not bring it to the floor because there is a good tradition of bringing things that are ripe, not those that are controversial.

I also think that the debate that we had today, which was a very constructive one - and I would like to congratulate all of you on having presented your views in a very transparent manner about your positions - shows in fact that there are different views and that is why the Chair has undertaken the task of trying to study the situation and present a report by the end of the year on this question and on the other 12 candidates. Before presenting any report, however, I will consult all of you so that the report will reflect the positions of the membership of the CD on this very important issue of expansion. These are my comments and my summing up for today.

(continued in French)

Since we have come to the end of the agenda for this plenary meeting, I intend to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will take place tomorrow, Friday 22 September 1995, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.720
22 September 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 22 September 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Benjelloun-Touimi (Morocco)

GE.95-63904 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 720th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before embarking on our agenda, allow me to say a few words on the occasion of the departure of our colleague from the Cuban delegation, Mrs. Magda Bauta Solés. As you know, Magda is leaving Geneva to take up important responsibilities in her country after seven years serving the Conference on Disarmament. We have all witnessed the energy and clear-mindedness with which she has upheld the positions of her Government in this forum. We have all appreciated the effectiveness and elegance with which she presided over the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1994, and the active role she played assisting her Ambassador when he chaired this Conference. Her professional competence and her human qualities have earned her the respect of one and all. On behalf of all of you I would therefore like to say goodbye to her and wish her and all her family happiness and success.

Following yesterday's plenary meeting I proceeded as agreed to hold consultations on the proposal submitted by Ambassador Ledogar of the United States on the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. These consultations confirmed the trend which emerged in the debate following the adoption of the decision on the expansion of the Conference and which indicates the absence of consensus on this proposal.

I now call on the representative of Switzerland, Ambassador Gyger.

Mr. GYGER (Switzerland) (translated from French): It is in my capacity as representative of the host State that I have the honour to take the floor at the Conference on Disarmament for the first time today. Before turning to the matter at hand, I would like to reiterate how important the Swiss Government believes the work of your Conference to be and that it will continue in future to do its utmost to offer the Conference as well as its members and observers the best working conditions in Geneva. I am very much looking forward to being able to cooperate personally with you.

Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on the new dynamics with which you have been able to imbue the question of the expansion of the member States participating in the Conference on Disarmament. Through the decision that your Conference adopted yesterday, your efforts have been crowned with success. This deserves mention, particularly as you have succeeded despite the complexity of the problems. Yesterday's decision is a first step towards giving the Conference on Disarmament the rank of a universal forum. Through this decision you have created the basis on which the Conference on Disarmament will now be able to draw to acquire its full importance, and this is also true in the eyes of the Swiss people. We keenly hope that this decision of principle will quickly be followed by practical actions. This will enable the candidates for membership to enjoy all the rights and obligations of member States as soon as possible. You may be assured that this will encourage my country to follow with increased interest and commitment the activities carried out within the framework of disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Switzerland for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I understand your remark that there is no consensus for the initiative that I tabled yesterday, and while disappointed, I am not surprised. But I would ask that the secretariat be sure to assign the United States proposal a formal number and that it be kept before the Conference on Disarmament. I have the suspicion that even as there is no consensus on it, there is growing support for it, and it is a matter to which we would want to refer as we keep under review the whole question of membership expansion.

The PRESIDENT: I thank you, Ambassador Ledogar, for your remarks, and the secretariat is assuring me that your proposal will be issued and circulated as a CD document. I can assure you that delegations will have a very close look at your proposal and that it will be debated in due time.

(continued in French)

As I announced at our plenary meeting yesterday, I would like to put before the Conference for approval document CD/1346/Add.1, containing the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban during the period 11 to 19 September 1995. This report was introduced by Ambassador Dembinski yesterday. It goes without saying that the secretariat will incorporate the changes contained in this addendum into the annual report of the Conference to the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and will update the list of the documents submitted. May I take it that the Conference adopts this document? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would now like to turn to the consideration of the draft annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. This report, as contained in document CD/WP.466/Rev.1, has been circulated to delegations in all languages. This document is the result of our second reading of the draft report at the informal meeting on 14 September.

In accordance with established practice, we shall proceed to the adoption of the draft report section by section. Of course, the blank spaces will be filled in by the secretariat and the list of documents submitted will be updated. Moreover, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban (CD/1346 and Add.1), which forms an integral part of the annual report, will naturally be incorporated in the annual report by the secretariat.

We shall begin with section I, entitled "Introduction". Are there any comments? There are none. Section I is adopted. Section II - "Organization of work of the Conference", parts A, B, C, D, F, G and H. Are there any comments? There are none. These parts are adopted.

(The President)

I now turn to section II, part E, entitled "Expansion of the membership of the Conference". In the light of the decision we adopted in plenary yesterday, I suggest the insertion of a new paragraph 14 reading as follows:

"14. As a result of intensive consultations undertaken by the last President during the 1995 session, the Conference, at its 719th plenary meeting on 21 September 1995, took the following decision (CD/1356):

"'The Conference on Disarmament, bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 49/77 B of 15 December 1994, decides to adopt the report (CD/1214) of the then Special Coordinator for membership, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, presented at the 660th plenary meeting of the Conference on 12 August 1993, and the recommended composition of the Conference on Disarmament attached to it. It is understood that, in accordance with the statement made by the then Special Rapporteur for membership at the 663rd plenary meeting of the Conference on 26 August 1993, this decision is in conformity with rule 2 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, which provides that "the membership of the Conference will be reviewed at regular intervals", and without prejudice to the consideration of the other candidatures to date.

"'Accordingly, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe will all assume together membership of the Conference at the earliest possible date to be decided by the Conference.

"'The Conference will review the situation following the presentation of the progress reports by the President on ongoing consultations at the end of each part of its annual session.'"

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): May I take it that the insertion of this new paragraph 14 is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): It goes without saying that the subsequent paragraphs will be renumbered. I now invite you to consider section III, entitled "Substantive work of the Conference during its 1995 session". May I take it that this section is adopted?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We have now completed the consideration of the draft annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. May I take it that the report as a whole is adopted?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any delegations wishing to speak at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of Slovakia, Ambassador Krasnohorská.

Ms. KRASNOHORSKA (Slovakia): Mr. President, first of all I should like to express our gratitude for your personal courage and tireless energy, which you have displayed in large measure in the effort to deal with the present gridlock of the CD expansion. Your initiative to overcome the stalemate was a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, we consider the decision of the Conference adopted at the plenary yesterday to be unsatisfactory. We appreciate that many speakers, among them a number of the CD member States, expressed the same opinion and urged the CD to adopt immediately the following step. Unfortunately, in spite of the number of voiced appeals, once again the CD was not in a state to adopt a decision granting the candidates full-fledged membership. We regret that the United States proposal has not commanded unanimous support materialized in a vote. We believe that the proposal could put into practice the decision prepared by you, Mr. President, simultaneously meeting the specific request of Slovakia. We hold that this proposal could settle the whole overdue issue without further delay.

The fact that the CD failed to adopt the long-awaited decision obliges me to state the following.

The Slovak Republic notes the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of the decision concerning the issue of the expansion of the Conference. Slovakia regrets that the decision was not followed by the second step, namely immediate admission of the candidate countries.

Slovakia therefore wishes to reiterate that it considers the adopted decision to be without prejudice to its request to fill the vacant seat left by the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The claim of the Slovak Republic is a specific one. It does not constitute an issue of the CD expansion but a request for retaking a liberated seat.

Slovakia urges the Conference to adopt the decision, which would bring the whole issue to an end no later than by the beginning of the year 1996.

I would be grateful if the text of this statement is issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the member States and non-member participants of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Slovakia for her statement. I would like to assure her that, within the framework of the consultations that the President will conduct during the inter-sessional period, the question of Slovakia will be studied in the same way as all the others, most carefully, and I am sure that all the members of the Conference will have taken note of your statement and your position. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Mrs. Bauta Solés.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): I would like to take this opportunity this morning to say a few words as I take leave of the Conference. First of all, allow me to thank you, Mr. President, for the kind words you addressed to me. I would like to say to you and the colleagues that I will always remember with great satisfaction the way in which I have been able to work with each and every one of you, and with many of your predecessors.

During the time I have been in Geneva I have had the very special honour of inserting my country's position in the context of the Group of 21 and finding in the Group political, professional and personal affinities. The first task I carried out when I came to this Conference was to coordinate on behalf of that Group a subject which unfortunately has in a certain sense gone into oblivion, and not because of its lack of importance. I refer to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which was honourably presided over by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico at the time, Alfonso García Robles. I also had occasion to coordinate the positions of the Group of 21 on the subject of outer space and transparency in armaments. I also had the opportunity to participate in the negotiations on the convention banning chemical weapons and, as you were kind enough to recall, it was under the Cuban presidency that the Committee for the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing was given a negotiating mandate. Today the work of this Committee is the focus of attention in this Conference. In this same context I have had the pleasure of cooperating with the Chairman of the Working Group on Legal and Institutional Issues and with the Friend of the Chair, who is also my personal friend, for the question of the organization of the future treaty. The chairmanship of the Committee on outer space also enabled me to benefit from cooperation with many distinguished friends and the competence of the secretariat.

I have been in this seat for seven years. I have seen the blocs disappear and a world take shape which is in transition towards a still uncertain future. The blocs played their role in history. The desire for a world without blocs was the inspiration for the founding of the movement of non-aligned countries and its joint action in which Cuba participated from the birth of the movement. The existence of blocs was far from helping to shape an ideal world. Yet today, in 1995, we have to say quite candidly that the disappearance of the balance that formerly prevailed has not given rise to the sought-for security either. We are in a process in which our planet is following a course which, in our view, is a course fraught with risks. The present international situation, when analysed from the viewpoint of any problem area, be it economic, social or environmental, has a recurring feature

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

which is mankind's need to preserve international peace and security. This Conference does not need an explanation of the reasons for this. Among efforts in favour of peace and security, disarmament plays a crucial role and for disarmament the Conference, of which we are a part, is the sole multilateral negotiating forum, hence its importance.

The interests represented here are different, but all the countries in this world, which is becoming smaller by the day, are interdependent. The rich and powerful countries have a greater impact on world events than the countries of the third world and the consequences of this fact customarily have harmful consequences for the latter. Negotiations between groups with different interests should take account of the fundamental concerns of all peoples. World peace is indivisible and can only be lasting when it is built on the basis of equality, both at the level of individuals and at the level of nations. The change on the international stage will only be beneficial to peace and development, which is its sine qua non, when equal respect is given to all and when justice reaches us all. Neither peace nor security can prosper if decisions are imposed by force, in any sphere of life. Acquiescence is not always a synonym for constructive compromise. Conciliation is therefore inevitable for the benefit of all and I am sure that this Conference will succeed in preserving the spirit that has carried it forward to the successes which have punctuated its history.

Exposure to the intelligence and talent of all of you present here, both those representing your respective countries and those who are members of the secretariat, are the greatest treasure that I am taking back to my country. What I have learnt from you will, you may be sure, be put to good use. To represent Cuba in Geneva has been a privilege for me and I have tried to do this in the most worthy and professional manner that my personal capacities allowed. Once again I thank all those who have honoured me with their trust and their friendship, both the colleagues from diplomatic delegations - I stress - and those from the secretariat. With many of you I will retain for ever ties which are not only of a professional nature.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement and I wish her every success. I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I wanted to make a statement on the immediately previous item of the adoption of the report of the CD to the General Assembly. I would like to call attention to the fact that on page 13, paragraph 27 of that report we accurately informed the General Assembly of the sad fact that, on 23 March, the Conference on Disarmament indeed did establish a Committee on the agenda subject "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and that, unfortunately, the Conference did not appoint a chairman of this Committee. Elsewhere in the report we are going to refer to a document that was presented yesterday by the Group of 21 entitled "Statement of the Group of 21 on the agenda and organization of work for the 1995 session of the Conference on

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Disarmament". In a stroke of revisionism this G.21 document claims that unfortunately the CD was unable to establish any ad hoc committee other than that on nuclear test ban. As our basic report indicates, that is simply not true. It may be true that the same Group prevented any further action once the Committee was established, although everybody in this meeting hall was in favour of a chairman being appointed. However, there was never a G.21 consensus to let work go forward, but in its call in this document urging that the Conference on Disarmament establish on a priority basis in 1996 an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, I intend to keep in front of the Conference next year that indeed there was a Committee on fissile cut-off established in 1995 and that, as far as we are concerned, it will take priority before any other nuclear disarmament item will be considered. I thought it necessary, in view of the error that we were presented with yesterday, to call that to the attention of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor at this stage? As there are none, allow me to make a few brief comments by way of conclusion.

We have thus come to the end of our session for 1995. I would like to take this opportunity to share with you some thoughts drawn from my experience acquired in the course of the past four weeks heading our Conference. I took over the presidency of this Conference shortly after having taken up my duties as head of the Moroccan delegation in our forum, and I could not resign myself to the idea that our Conference would not be in a position to begin its substantive work on all the items that it freely and deliberately included in its agenda at the beginning of the session.

Thus I witnessed the deadlocks which hindered all progress in solving our problems, and I followed most carefully the laudable efforts of my predecessors, in particular those of Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, to break the deadlock that had prevailed since the beginning of our session. Like everyone else, I was tempted to explain our inability to find common ground on all the outstanding items, at least in part, in terms of the climate of uncertainty and nervousness that characterized the whole period preceding the holding of the conference of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Like everyone, I was gratified that the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear test ban escaped the attempts to make linkages between the agenda items of our Conference. Like all of you, I dared hope that the positive conclusion of the NPT Conference in New York last May would finally allow wisdom to prevail and create the conditions for a balanced and measured approach to the outstanding problems. This hope unfortunately did not materialize, for reasons which it is idle to dwell on. Some also felt that they could impute our difficulties to the rigid procedures of the Conference and what they saw as the opaque process of consultations among the various groups in the Conference, and therefore proposed that the President of the Conference should make more frequent use of individual

(The President)

consultations with all delegations, as well as informal open-ended consultations which would have the merit of enabling us to assess the positions of all delegations, and to bring clarity and transparency into our debates. I did not hesitate, because I was absolutely convinced in view of my experience at the United Nations Security Council in New York, to involve you all individually on two occasions in the course of the past few weeks to establish everybody's positions and to create the basis for joint action that I attempted to promote through informal consultations open to the participation of all delegations. This exercise enabled us to define the outlines of a compromise on the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, which we were able to consolidate in the course of the presidential consultations, thereby justifying the complementarity of all the forms of consultations. The step we have taken in the solution of the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, while modest, means that we have not been deaf to the repeated appeals of the international community, and will, I hope, pave the way for other breakthroughs on outstanding problems regarding the agenda of the Conference.

However, on substantive problems, it is clear that it is not so much our methods of work or our procedures which are an obstacle to progress, but rather the persistence of fundamental differences on what should be the priority among the issues that the Conference should address, and hence, ultimately, the role of our Conference as the sole negotiating body on disarmament measures, the place that the issue of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament should occupy in its agenda and its programme of work. In a word, the task involves nothing more or less than striking the necessary balance between the concerns and interests of the various parties in a world freed of the constraints of the cold war. And only if everyone takes this into account will we be able to make progress. Our resolve to ensure that the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty are not affected by our differences on other subjects is to the credit of the entire Conference. It is encouraging to note that progress made in these negotiations under the calm and firm authority of Ambassador Dembinski of Poland and the entire bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee, despite the ups and downs encountered along the way. Equally encouraging is the solemn commitment reiterated by one and all to conclude the treaty before the end of next year.

My term will continue until 31 December, and I intend to continue my consultations actively both here in Geneva and in New York in parallel with the work of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in order to make progress on outstanding problems and to lay the groundwork for an agreement that will enable us to begin our 1996 session with better prospects. It goes without saying that, as I announced at our plenary meeting yesterday, I will also continue my consultations on the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference and I will submit a report on this subject at the beginning of next session. I thank you in advance for your readiness to cooperate in this respect.

Before concluding, I should like to express my gratitude to all of you for your encouragement and your support. My thanks go in particular to the group coordinators and the representative of China for their cooperation with

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me during my term of office. My task has been greatly facilitated by the entire team of the secretariat of the Conference and the interpreters under the leadership of our Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and I would like to pay tribute to him for his devotion and for his effectiveness. Throughout the exercise of my responsibilities I have been able to appreciate the competence, the profound knowledge of subjects and procedures and the organizing talents displayed by our Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. I have also benefited from his wise counsel. I would like to express my full gratitude to him here.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held in this room on Tuesday, 23 January 1996 at 10 a.m., in accordance with the timetable drawn up for the 1996 session. The last plenary meeting of this session is thus concluded.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.